People often assess the reasonableness of another person’s judgments. When doing so, the evaluator should set aside knowledge that would not have been available to the evaluatee to assess whether the evaluatee made a reasonable decision, given the available information. But under what circumstances does the evaluator set aside information? On the one hand, if the evaluator fails to set aside prior information, not available to the evaluatee, they exhibit belief bias. But on the other hand, when Bayesian inference is called for, the evaluator should generally incorporate prior knowledge about relevant probabilities in decision making. The present research integrated these two perspectives in two experiments. Participants were asked to take the perspective of a fictitious evaluatee and to evaluate the reasonableness of the evaluatee’s decision. The participant was privy to information that the fictitious evaluatee did not have. Specifically, the participant knew whether the evaluatee’s decision judgment was factually correct. Participants’ judgments were biased (Experiments 1 and 2) by the factuality of the conclusion as they assessed the evaluatee’s reasonableness. We also found that the format of information presentation (Experiment 2) influenced the degree to which participants’ reasonableness ratings were responsive to the evaluatee’s Bayesian rationality. Specifically, responsivity was greater when the information was presented in an icon-based, graphical, natural-frequency format than when presented in either a numerical natural-frequency format or a probability format. We interpreted the effects of format to suggest that graphical presentation can help organize information into nested sets, which in turn enhances Bayesian rationality.

Twelve experiments examined ways of improving informal reasoning, as assesed by presenting students with accessible, current, and interesting social and political issues, eliciting reasoning about them, and scoring the reasoning for quality of argument. The experiments addressed: (1) the impact of established instructional programs that emphasized critical thinking (Experiments 1–4); (2) the impact of an investigator-designed high school level minicourse (Experiments 5–7); (3) the responsiveness of subjects to prompts that asked them to develop arguments more fully, and the relation of their responses to general intelligence (Experiments 8–10); (4) checks on the validity of the testing methodology (Experiments 11–12). Two of the established instructional programs had a beneficial effect. The minicourse had a particularly large effect on students’ attention to the other side of the case, the most neglected aspect of informal reasoning. The prompting studies showed that subjects could develop their arguments far more than they normally did. Finally, subjects with higher intelligence were actually somewhat more biased in their reasoning. In summary: people can reason much better than they typically do on the sorts of issues posed; people are not performing near the limits of their abilities; strategies and standards of good reasoning can improve reasoning; and education can develop students’ reasoning much further than education typically does.

Revealed preference is the dominant approach for inferring preferences, but it is limited in that it relies solely on discrete choice data. When a person chooses one alternative over another, we cannot infer the strength of their preference or predict how likely they will be to make the same choice again. However, the choice process also produces response times (RTs), which are continuous and easily observable. It has been shown that RTs often decrease with strength-of-preference. This is a basic property of sequential sampling models such as the drift diffusion model. What remains unclear is whether this relationship is sufficiently strong, relative to the other factors that affect RTs, to allow us to reliably infer strength-of-preference across individuals. Using several experiments, we show that even when every subject chooses the same alternative, we can still rank them based on their RTs and predict their behavior on other choice problems. We can also use RTs to predict whether a subject will repeat or reverse their decision when presented with the same choice problem a second time. Finally, as a proof-of-concept, we demonstrate that it is also possible to recover individual preference parameters from RTs alone. These results demonstrate that it is indeed possible to use RTs to infer preferences.

Surprisingly little research has investigated the particular motives that underlie choice behavior in social dilemma situations. The main aim of the present research was to ask whether behavior in take-some games (such as the multiple-person Commons Dilemma Game and the two-person Bandit Game) and give-some games (such as the multiple-person Public Goods Dilemma Game and the two-person Dictator Game) is differently affected by proself and prosocial motives. Two experimental studies were conducted. Our first experiment used a trait-based assessment of the motives, whereas in our second experiment the motives were measured as state variables. The results of both experiments revealed that proself and prosocial motives did not explain much difference between taking and giving when comparing the Commons Dilemma Game and the Public Goods Dilemma Game. Yet, our second experiment revealed that these motives did differentiate choices in the Bandit Game and the Dictator Game. More specifically, prosocial motives are more strongly related to giving behavior in the Dictator Game than to taking behavior in the Bandit Game. As such, it can be concluded that in dyadic games (but not in multiple-person games) prosocial motives (but not proself motives) predict choice behavior in a game-specific way.

Decisions are often delegated to experts chosen based on their past performance record which may be subject to noise. For instance, a person with little skill could still make a lucky decision that proves correct ex-post, while a skilled expert could make the best possible use of available information to reach a decision that, with hindsight, turns out incorrect. We aimed to show that one could assess decision skills more accurately when analyzing not only the observed decisions, but also the decision-making process. Incorporating eye-tracking into an established behavioral finance experimental framework, we found that making an eye transition between pieces of information that previous research associated with bias makes one less likely to make good financial decisions in future trials. Thus, even the simplest, easy to obtain eye metrics could allow us to more accurately judge if a person’s performance is a reflection of skill, or down to luck and unlikely to be reproduced in the future.

Previous research has demonstrated a link between illusory pattern perception and various irrational beliefs. On this basis, we hypothesized that participants who displayed greater degrees of illusory pattern perception would also be more likely to rate pseudo-profound bullshit statements as profound. We find support for this prediction across three experiments (N = 627) and four distinct measures of pattern perception. We further demonstrate that this observed relation is restricted to illusory pattern perception, with participants displaying greater endorsement of non-illusory patterns being no more likely to rate pseudo-profound bullshit statements as profound. Additionally, this relation is not a product of a general proclivity to rate all statements as profound and is not accounted for by individual differences in analytic thinking. Overall, we demonstrate that individuals with a tendency to go beyond the available data such that they uncritically endorse patterns where no patterns exist are also more likely to create and endorse false-meaning in meaningless pseudo-profound statements. These findings are discussed in the context of a proposed framework that views individuals’ receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit as, in part, an unfortunate consequence of an otherwise adaptive process: that of pattern perception.

Traditionally, information has been assumed to never harm consumers, a notion recently challenged. Salience nudges have been argued to evoke negative emotions, therefore acting as “emotional taxes”. I design a hypothetical restaurant meal experiment to analyze the emotional and short-term consumer welfare impact of a calorie salience nudge (calorie menu labeling) – a policy implemented nationwide in the U.S. in 2018. I find that a calorie salience nudge may act as an emotional tax, but only for some – there is considerable heterogeneity in the emotional response to the nudge. In particular, the nudge emotionally taxes people with low eating self-control, while it emotionally subsidizes those with higher levels of eating self-control. It therefore emotionally taxes the “right” people. However, people with lower levels of self-control may experience fewer benefits from the nudge – the nudge causes them to adjust their high calorie meal consumption by less than do those with higher self-control. It is therefore unsurprising that consumers with lower self-control attach a lower (a negative) value to the calorie salience nudge. Overall, the calorie salience nudge positively affects consumer welfare, although heterogeneity over consumers is substantial – the consumer value ranges from positive to negative. I find no distributional effects over income from the calorie salience nudge.

Previous studies have demonstrated that fluency affects judgment and decision-making. The purpose of the present research was to investigate the effect of perceptual fluency in a causal learning task that usually induces an illusion of causality in non-contingent conditions. We predicted that a reduction of fluency could improve accuracy in the detection of non-contingency and, therefore, could be used to debias illusory perceptions of causality. Participants were randomly assigned to either an easy-to-read or a hard-to-read condition. Our results showed a strong bias (i.e., overestimation) of causality in those participants who performed the non-contingent task in the easy-to-read font, which replicated the standard causality bias effect. This effect was reduced when the same task was presented in a hard-to-read font. Overall, our results provide evidence for a reduction of the causality bias when presenting the problem in a hard-to-read font. This suggests that perceptual fluency affects causal judgments.

The moral dumbfounding phenomenon for harmless taboo violations is often cited as a critical piece of empirical evidence motivating anti-rationalist models of moral judgment and decision-making. Moral dumbfounding purportedly occurs when an individual remains obstinately and steadfastly committed to a moral judgment or decision even after admitting inability to provide reasons and arguments to support it (Haidt, 2001). Early empirical support for the moral dumbfounding phenomenon led some philosophers and psychologists to suggest that affective reactions and intuitions, in contrast with reasons or reasoning, are the predominant drivers of moral judgments and decisions. We investigate an alternative reason-based explanation for moral dumbfounding: that putatively harmless taboo violations are judged to be morally wrong because of the high perceived likelihood that the agents could have caused harm, even though they did not cause harm in actuality. Our results indicate that judgments about the likelihood of causing harm consistently and strongly predicted moral wrongness judgments. Critically, a manipulation drawing attention to harms that could have occurred (but did not actually occur) systematically increased the severity of moral wrongness judgments. Thus, many participants were sensitive to at least one reason — the likelihood of harm — in making their moral judgments about these kinds of taboo violations. We discuss the implications of these findings for rationalist and anti-rationalist models of moral judgment and decision-making.

People are more likely to rely on descriptive norms (i.e., what their peers are doing) when deciding whether to take a risk themselves than when deciding whether to recommend others to take a risk. We proposed and found that people also attend to normative information when making risk recommendations to others, but in this case they attend to a different type of normative information — injunctive norms (i.e., whether their peers approve of this behavior). Descriptive norm plays a bigger role in influencing people’s own decisions, whereas injunctive norm plays a bigger role in influencing people’s recommendations to others. This research demonstrates the importance of differentiating descriptive versus injunctive norms in risky decision-making and provides further evidence that perceived norms significantly influence risky decision-making.

We propose a new method to facilitate comparison of aggregated forecasts based on different aggregation, elicitation and calibration methods. Aggregates are evaluated by their relative position on the cumulative distribution of the corresponding individual scores. This allows one to compare methods using different measures of quality that use different scales. We illustrate the use of the method by re-analyzing various estimates from Budescu and Du (Management Science, 2007).

Are highly intelligent people less risk averse? Over the last two decades scholars have argued the existence of a negative relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion. Although numerous studies support this, the link between cognitive ability and risk aversion has not been found consistently. To shed new light on this topic, a systematic review and meta-analysis was conducted. A total of 97 studies were identified and included for meta-analysis in the domain of gains (N=90, 723), 41 in the mixed domain (N=50, 936), and 12 in the domain of losses (N=4, 544). Results indicate that there exists a weak, but significant negative relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion in the domain of gains. However, no relationship was observed in the mixed domain or in the domain of losses. Several meta-regressions were performed to investigate the influence of moderator variables. None of the moderator variables were found to consistently influence the relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion across the domain of gains, mixed and losses. Moreover, no significant difference was observed between males and females across all three domains. In conclusion, this systematic review and meta-analysis provides new evidence that the relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion is domain specific and not as strong as suggested by some previous studies.

The dual-process model of the mind predicts that religious belief will be stronger for intuitive decisions, whereas reflective thinking will lead to religious disbelief (i.e., the intuitive religious belief hypothesis). While early research found intuition to promote and reflection to weaken belief in God, more recent attempts found no evidence for the intuitive religious belief hypothesis. Many of the previous studies are underpowered to detect small effects, and it is not clear whether the cognitive process manipulations used in these failed attempts worked as intended. We investigated the influence of intuitive and reflective thought on belief in God in two large-scale preregistered experiments (N = 1,602), using well-established cognitive manipulations (i.e., time-pressure with incentives for compliance) and alternative elicitation methods (between and within-subject designs). Against our initial hypothesis based on the literature, the experiments provide first suggestive then confirmatory evidence for the reflective religious belief hypothesis. Exploratory examination of the data suggests that reflection increases doubts about beliefs held regarding God’s existence. Reflective doubt exists primarily among non-believers, resulting in an overall increase in belief in God when deciding reflectively.

Following the airplane attacks of September 11th, 2001 it is claimed that many Americans, dreading a repeat of these events, drove instead of flying, and that, consequently, there were extra car accidents, increasing the number of fatalities directly caused by the attacks by 1, 500. After the Madrid train bombings of March 11th, 2004, Spaniards, like Americans, avoided the attacked mode of travel, but no increase in car travel or fatal accidents resulted. Here we analyze behavioral concomitants of the July 7th 2005 bomb attacks on public transport in London. We find reduced underground train travel and an increase in rates of bicycling and, over the 6 months following the attacks, 214 additional bicyclist road casualties — a 15.4% increase. Nevertheless we found no detectable increase in car accidents. We conclude that, while fear caused by terrorism may initiate potentially dangerous behaviors, understanding the secondary effects of terrorism requires consideration of the environmental variables that enable fear to manifest in dangerous behaviors.

In the sacrificial moral dilemma task, participants have to morally judge an action that saves several lives at the cost of killing one person. According to the dual process corrective model of moral judgment suggested by Greene and collaborators (2001; 2004; 2008), cognitive control is necessary to override the intuitive, deontological force of the norm against killing and endorse the utilitarian perspective. However, a conflict model has been proposed more recently to account for part of the evidence in favor of dual process models in moral and social decision making. In this model, conflict, moral responses and reaction times arise from the interplay between individually variable motivational factors and objective parameters intrinsic to the choices offered. To further explore this model in the moral dilemma task, we confronted three different samples with a set of dilemmas representing an objective gradient of utilitarian pull, and collected data on moral judgment and on conflict in a 4-point scale. Collapsing all cases along the gradient, participants in each sample felt less conflicted on average when they gave extreme responses (1 or 4 in the UR scale). They felt less conflicted on average when responding to either the low- or the high-pull cases. The correlation between utilitarian responses and conflict was positive in the low-pull and negative in the high-pull cases. This pattern of data suggests that moral responses to sacrificial dilemmas are driven by decision conflict, which in turn depends on the interplay between an objective gradient of utilitarian pull and the moral motivations which regulate individual responsiveness to this gradient.

In clinical trials, incentivizing human research subjects with large amounts of money is often considered unethical, as it may coerce people to participate. This argument implies that people perceive rewards (i.e., incentives) independently of risks (i.e., probability of side-effects) or that they assume that larger rewards are associated with lower risks. However, past research on risk perception indicates that people associate higher rewards with higher risks. To test whether people treat incentives in clinical trials as a proxy for risk, we conducted an online experiment (N = 483) in which people estimated the riskiness of hypothetical clinical trials. We manipulated the monetary incentives that participants of the clinical trials were offered. The results show that people expect more side effects if the monetary incentives for participation are higher. Results further show that the majority of participants were more likely to ethically approve a trial if it offered a high monetary incentive. In contrast to existing ethical guidelines these results suggest that paying large rewards may be less problematic because people implicitly associate them with higher risk and because they trade-off risks and financial benefits.

Policy makers should understand people’s attitudes towards opt-out nudges to smoothly promote and implement the policies. Our research compares people’s perceptions of opt-in and three improved versions of opt-out (transparency, emphasis on the low-cost opt-out option, education) in pro-social and pro-self policy domains, e.g., organ donation (N=610), carbon emission offset (N=613), and retirement saving (N=602). We found that people acknowledged more practical and societal benefits of opt-out than opt-in in organ donation and retirement saving but less so in carbon emission offset. Improved opt-out policies failed to address ethical concerns and most emotional discomfort concerns in organ donation whereas opt-out transparency and emphasis on low-cost opt-out were more successful than education at addressing concerns in retirement saving and carbon emission offset. Nonetheless, transparency and education may raise consciousness of policies’ aims. The results suggest that 1) acceptability of opt-out approaches may be more difficult to enhance in some domains than others; 2) policy makers should ensure the public understands that opt-out is a convenient choice and may consider combining all forms of improvement to increase people’s acceptance of opt-out nudges.

Right-wing ideology and cognitive ability, including objective numeracy, have been found to relate negatively. Although objective and subjective numeracy correlate positively, it is unclear whether subjective numeracy relates to political ideology in the same way. Replicating and extending previous research, across two samples of American adults (ns= 455, 406), those who performed worse on objective numeracy tasks scored higher on right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO), and they self-identified as more conservative on general, social, and economic continua. Controlling for objective numeracy, subjective numeracy related positively to measures of right-wing ideologies. In other words, those who strongly (vs. weakly) endorsed right-wing ideologies believed they are good with numbers yet performed worse on numeracy tasks. We discuss implications for the opposing direction of associations between ideology with objective versus subjective numeracy and similarities with literature on overconfidence.

People experience fair and unfair treatment daily, and at times may react by breaking ethical rules and lying. Here, we assess the extent to which individuals engage in dishonest behavior aimed at helping or harming others after they experience (un)fair treatment. Across three financially incentivized experiments, recipients in a dictator game received a fair or unfair amount and then could, by means of dishonesty, inflate or deflate their counterparts’ pay. Results show that dishonest helping is a common and robust behavior. Individuals lie to help others after fair, unfair, and no prior treatment. Dishonest harming, however, is less prevalent. Only after unfair treatment, some, but not all, individuals engage in dishonest harming. Dishonest harming was associated with high levels of anger and disappointment, and low levels of gratitude. Interestingly, the source of (un)fairness, whether it is intentional or not, did not attenuate peoples’ behavior, suggesting that dishonest reactions to (un)fairness were driven by the mere (un)fair treatment, and not by a motivation to reciprocate an (un)fair counterpart.

Across four studies participants (N = 818) rated the profoundness of abstract art images accompanied with varying categories of titles, including: pseudo-profound bullshit titles (e.g., The Deaf Echo), mundane titles (e.g., Canvas 8), and no titles. Randomly generated pseudo-profound bullshit titles increased the perceived profoundness of computer-generated abstract art, compared to when no titles were present (Study 1). Mundane titles did not enhance the perception of profoundness, indicating that pseudo-profound bullshit titles specifically (as opposed to titles in general) enhance the perceived profoundness of abstract art (Study 2). Furthermore, these effects generalize to artist-created abstract art (Study 3). Finally, we report a large correlation between profoundness ratings for pseudo-profound bullshit and “International Art English” statements (Study 4), a mode and style of communication commonly employed by artists to discuss their work. This correlation suggests that these two independently developed communicative modes share underlying cognitive mechanisms in their interpretations. We discuss the potential for these results to be integrated into a larger, new theoretical framework of bullshit as a low-cost strategy for gaining advantages in prestige awarding domains.