Mathematical and computational decision models are powerful tools for studyingchoice behavior, and hundreds of distinct decision models have been proposedover the long interdisciplinary history of decision making research. Theexistence of so many models has led to theoretical fragmentation and redundancy,obscuring key insights into choice behavior, and preventing consensus about theessential properties of preferential choice. We provide a synthesis of formalmodels of risky, multiattribute, and intertemporal choice, three importantdomains in decision making. We identify recurring insights discovered byscholars of different generations and different disciplines across these threedomains, and use these insights to classify over 150 existing models asinvolving various combinations of eight key mathematical and computationalproperties. These properties capture the main avenues of theoretical developmentin decision making research and can be used to understand the similarities anddifferences between decision models, aiding both theoretical analyses andempirical tests.

We study whether experts and novices differ in the way they make predictionsabout National Football League games. In particular, we measure to what extenttheir predictions are consistent with five environmental regularities that couldsupport decision making based on heuristics. These regularities involve the hometeam winning more often, the team with the better win-loss record winning moreoften, the team favored by the majority of media experts winning more often, andtwo others related to surprise wins and losses in the teams’ previousgame. Using signal detection theory and hierarchical Bayesian analysis, we showthat expert predictions for the 2017 National Football League (NFL) seasongenerally follow these regularities in a near optimal way, but novicepredictions do not. These results support the idea that using heuristics adaptedto the decision environment can support accurate predictions and be an indicatorof expertise.

Bias Blind Spot (BBS) is the phenomenon that people tend to perceive themselvesas less susceptible to biases than others. In three pre-registered experiments(overall N = 969), we replicated two experiments of the first demonstration ofthe phenomenon by Pronin et al. (2002). We found support of the BBS hypotheses,with effects in line with findings in the original study: Participants ratedthemselves as less susceptible to biases than others (d =–1.00 [–1.33, –0.67]). Deviating from the original, wefound an unexpected effect that participants rated themselves as having fewershortcomings (d = –0.34 [–0.46, –0.23]),though there was support for the target’s main premise that BBS wasstronger for biases than for shortcomings (d = –0.43[–0.56, –0.29]). Extending the replications, we found that beliefsin own free will were positively associated with BBS (r ∼0.17–0.22) and that beliefs in both own and general free will werepositively associated with self-other asymmetry related to personal shortcomings(r ∼ 0.16–0.24). Materials, datasets, andcode are available on https://osf.io/3df5s/.

In decision making, people may rely on their own information as well as oninformation from external sources, such as family members, peers, or experts.The current study investigated how these types of information are used bycomparing four decision strategies: 1) an internal strategy that relies solelyon own information; 2) an external strategy that relies solely on theinformation from an external source; 3) a sequential strategy that relies oninformation from an external source only after own information is deemedinadequate; 4) an integrative strategy that relies on an integration of bothtypes of information. Of specific interest were individual and developmentaldifferences in strategy use. Strategy use was examined via Bayesian hierarchicalmixture model analysis. A visual decision task was administered to children andyoung adolescents (N=305, ages 9–14). Individual differences but noage-related changes were observed in either decision accuracy or strategy use.The internal strategy was dominant across ages, followed by the integrative andsequential strategy, respectively, while the external strategy was extremelyrare. This suggests a reluctance to rely entirely on information provided byexternal sources. We conclude that there are individual differences but notdevelopmental changes in strategy use pertaining to perceptual decision-makingin 9- through 14-year-olds. Generalizability of these findings is discussed withregard to different forms of social influence and varying perceptions of theexternal source. This study provides stepping stones in better understanding andmodeling decision making processes in the presence of both internal and externalinformation.

Many popular books and articles that purport to explain how people, companies, orideas succeed highlight a few successes chosen to fit a particular narrative. Weinvestigate what effect these highly selected “success narratives”have on readers’ beliefs and decisions. We conducted a large, randomized,pre-registered experiment, showing participants successful firms with foundersthat all either dropped out of or graduated college, and asked them to makeincentive-compatible bets on a new firm. Despite acknowledging biases in theexamples, participants’ decisions were very strongly influenced by them.People shown dropout founders were 55 percentage points more likely to bet on adropout-founded company than people who were shown graduate founders. Mostreported medium to high confidence in their bets, and many wrote causalexplanations justifying their decision. In light of recent concerns about falseinformation, our findings demonstrate how true but biased information canstrongly alter beliefs and decisions.

A core principle in decision science is that people choose according to theirsubjective values. These values are often measured using unincentivized scaleswith arbitrary units (e.g., from 0 to 10) or using incentivizedwillingness-to-pay (WTP) with dollars and cents. What is unclear is whetherusing WTP actually improves choice predictions. In two experiments, we comparethe effects of three different subjective valuation procedures: anunincentivized rating scale, the same scale with incentives, and incentivizedWTP. We use these subjective values to predict behavior in a subsequent binaryfood-choice task. The unincentivized rating task performed better than theincentivized WTP task and no worse than the incentivized rating task. Thesefindings challenge the view that subjective valuation tasks need to beincentivized. At least for low-stakes decisions, commonly used measures such asWTP may reduce predictive power.

Experiments are increasingly moving online. This poses a major challenge forresearchers who rely on in-lab techniques such as eye-tracking. Researchers incomputer science have developed web-based eye-tracking applications (WebGazer;Papoutsaki et al., 2016) but they have yet to see them used in behavioralresearch. This is likely due to the extensive calibration and validationprocedure, inconsistent temporal resolution (Semmelmann & Weigelt, 2018),and the challenge of integrating it into experimental software. Here, weincorporate WebGazer into a JavaScript library widely used by behavioralresearchers (jsPsych) and adjust the procedure and code to reducecalibration/validation and improve the temporal resolution (from 100–1000ms to 20–30 ms). We test this procedure with a decision-making study onAmazon MTurk, replicating previous in-lab findings on the relationship betweengaze and choice, with little degradation in spatial or temporal resolution. Thisprovides evidence that online web-based eye-tracking is feasible in behavioralresearch.

In social interactions, people frequently encounter gain (i.e., all outcomes aregains from the status-quo) or loss (all outcomes are losses from the status-quo)social dilemmas, where their personal interests conflict with social interests.We ask whether there are any behavioral differences in social interactions whenit comes to gains and losses. Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma games, inthree studies we observed that participants were less cooperative in the lossdomain than in the gain domain. This effect was robust, not moderated by payoffamount (Study 1), cooperation index (Study 1), domain comparison (Studies 1 and2), and personal loss aversion (Study 3). Social motive and belief explainedthis effect: compared to the gain domain, participants in the loss domainaroused more pro-self motive and less prosocial motive, and showed strongerbeliefs that their partner would defect, which led them to cooperate less. Thesefindings suggest that gain and loss domains affect individual motivation andbelief, subsequently affecting strategic choices in social dilemmas.

In two studies, we tested the power of revenge as a justification mechanism thatenables people to cheat with a clear conscience. Specifically, we explored theeffects of prior dishonesty and unfairness towards participants on theirsubsequent moral behavior, as well as the physiological arousal associated withit. To this end, we employed a two-phase procedure. In the first phase,participants played one round of a bargaining game (the Ultimatum game in Study1 and the Dictator game in Study 2) in which we manipulated whether the playershad been treated (un)fairly and (dis)honestly by their opponent. In the secondphase, they did a perceptual task that allowed them to cheat for monetary gainat the expense of their opponent from the first phase. In Study 1, participantsalso took a lie detector test to assess whether their dishonesty in the secondphase could be detected. The behavioral results in both studies indicated thatthe opponent’s dishonesty was a stronger driver than theopponent’s unfairness for cheating as a form of retaliation. However, thephysiological arousal results suggest that feeling mistreated in general (andnot just cheated) allowed the participants to get revenge by cheating theoffender while dismissing their associated guilt feelings.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, public health guidance (e.g., regarding the use ofnon-medical masks) changed over time. Although many revisions were a result ofgains in scientific understanding, we nonetheless hypothesized that makingchanges in guidance salient would negatively affect evaluations of experts andhealth-protective intentions. In Study 1 (N = 300), wedemonstrate that describing COVID-19 guidance in terms of inconsistency (versusconsistency) leads people to perceive scientists and public health authoritiesless favorably (e.g., as less expert). For participants in Canada(n = 190), though not the U.S. (n = 110),making guidance change salient also reduced intentions to download a contacttracing app. In Study 2 (N = 1399), we show that a briefforewarning intervention mitigates detrimental effects of changes in guidance.In the absence of forewarning, emphasizing inconsistency harmed judgments ofpublic health authorities and reduced health-protective intentions, butforewarning eliminated this effect.

Messaging applications are changing the communication landscape in emergingcountries. While offering speed and affordability, these solutions have alsoopened the way for the spread of misinformation. Aiming to better understand thedynamics of COVID-19 as infodemic, we asked Brazilian participants (n=1007) toreport the perceived accuracy of 20 messages (10 true and 10 false). Eachmessage was randomly presented within five fictitious WhatsApp group chats ofvarying political orientation. Correlational analyses revealed that right-wingparticipants had lower levels of truth discernment as did those with greatertrust in social media as a reliable source of coronavirus information.Conversely, open-minded thinking about evidence and trust in the WHO andtraditional media was positively associated with truth discernment. Familiaritywith the content consistently increased perceived truthness for both true andfalse messages. Results point to the nefarious effects of COVID-19politicization and underline the importance of promoting the ability torecognize and value new evidence as well as enhancing trust in internationalagencies and traditional media.