The changing legislative landscape of the U.S. wine market provides a scenario to examine the effect of regulation on the size distribution of firms. Using the variation across states and time in the sum of in-state and out-of-state adult populations between 2002–2017, and a difference in difference-style empirical model, I examine how restrictions on Direct to Consumer (DTC) sales impact the number of establishments and the employment at wineries. I find that the expansion of the potential wine market by 10 M adults caused about a 3.5% increase in the number of wineries. While reduced DTC restrictions explain growth in the number of wineries, I find no effect of lessened restrictions on the number of winery employees, though there is evidence of a lagged effect. Additionally, I find that the growth of smaller wineries substantially outpaces that of larger wineries when regulations are lessened. These results suggest that regulatory barriers in particular industries may allow states to maintain an artificial size distribution.

Much research shows that the ratings that judges assign to the same wine are uncertain. And while the ratings may be independent, research also shows that they are not identically distributed. Thus, an acute difficulty in ratings-related research and in calculating consensus among judges is that each rating is one observation drawn from a latent distribution that is wine- and judge-specific. What can be deduced about the shape of a latent distribution from one observation? A simple maximum entropy estimator is proposed to describe the distribution of a rating observed. The estimator can express the implications of zero, one, a few blind replicates, and many observations. Several tests of the estimator show that results are consistent with the results of experiments with blind replicates and that results are more accurate than results based on observed ratings alone.

Studies suggest the inter-rater reliability of judges at wine competitions is higher than what would be expected by random chance, but lower than what is observed when experts in other fields make judgments specific to their expertise. To further contextualize the (un-) reliability of wine judging while also extending the study of fine water, we examine the inter-rater reliability of judges at an annual international competition for bottled waters. We find that the inter-rater reliability of water judging is generally better than chance and, at best, about the same as the inter-rater reliability of wine judging at some wine competitions. These results suggest that perceptible differences between fine waters exist but are less pronounced than those between fine wines and, also, that aesthetic standards with respect to fine waters exist but are currently less established than those for fine wines.

Most of the previous research examined the demand for alcohol consumed at the off-trade (consumed at home). However, some consumers might prefer to consume alcohol on-trade (away from home) or switch between on-trade and off-trade consumption as a reaction to price or income change. We estimate the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System consisting of three broad alcohol categories, consumed on-trade and off-trade, to derive own-price, cross-price, and income elasticities. Selectivity due to the high censoring is treated, and special attention is paid to quality-adjusted price. Beer consumption is the most responsive to income as well as own price changes, while spirits are the least responsive. The own-price elasticity of wine is –0.66 and –1.00 at on-trade and off-trade, respectively. Beer is more price responsive, spirits are less price responsive, and consumption reacts weaker in the off-trade market. Own-price elasticities of demand range between –1.20 and –0.41 at the off-trade and between –1.51 and –0.63 at the on-trade alcohol market. Increasing the price of wine in one market decreases wine consumption in another one. Between the two markets, wine and spirits are complementary, and wine and beer are substitutes in both markets.

This study uses gravity models to explain bilateral patterns of global wine trade since 1962. This is, to our knowledge, the first study on global wine trade covering the second wave of globalization as a whole. The results suggest that the impact of distance, common language, and common colonizer post-1945 on wine trade was lower in the 1991–2019 period than in the 1962–1990 period. We also use gravity models to explain the impact on bilateral wine trade patterns of similarities across countries in the mix of winegrape varieties in their vineyards. Although our models do not allow us to identify causality, the results suggest that countries trade more wine with each other the closer their mix of winegrape varieties.

Analyses and aggregations of the ratings that wine critics and judges assign to wines are made difficult by stochastic error and biases that remain even when wines are assessed blind to price, label, capsule, and closure. Stochastic error is due to the partially random nature of ratings. Cognitive and omitted-variable biases are due to anchoring, expectation, serial position, commercial, and other factors. Differences in decanting, filtering, aeration, and temperature can also affect ratings.