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Discussion of the Buddhist Doctrines of Momentariness and Subjective Idealism in the Nyaya-sutras
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 March 2011
Extract
There is a difference of opinion among scholars as regards the exact significance of such Nyāya-sūtras as are supposed to refer to the doctrines of the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra schools of Buddhism. It has also been suggested that probably some of these sūtras have been interpolated later on, possibly by Vātsyāyana—the author of the Nyāya-bhāṣya. After making a careful study of the sūtras in question, however, I have come to the conclusion that some of them, in any case, do not refer to the Buddhist doctrines at all, and form a natural and quite an integral part of the particular sections in which they occur, and that the theory which regards them as later interpolations is not justifiable.
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References
page 31 note 1 Vidyābhūṣaṇa, , History of Indian Logic, pp. 120, 121Google Scholar. Sūtra, iii, 2, 10, being Sphaṭike 'py aparāparotpatteḥ kṣaṇikatvād vyaktīnām ahetuḥ.
page 32 note 1 Indian Thought, x, p. 313.
page 34 note 1 For considerations of space it is impossible to consider here every sūtra in this section, but the main arguments given above should be sufficient to show that the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness is not the theme of these sūtras. It is evident that it is the term kṣaṇikatvād in the sūtra which has suggested the presence of this doctrine here; but it is to be noted that kṣaṇika and its derivatives are quite normally used to denote simply “momentary” as apart from the technical sense of the term as found in the Buddhist metaphysics. A very happy example of the use of the word, and that, too, in order to express the momentary nature of cognition (buddhi), which forms the subject of discussion in the present context also, is to be found in the Śabara-bhāṣya, under Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, i, 1, 5Google Scholar, where it is said: arthaviṣayā hi pratyakṣa-buddhiḥ, buddhy-antara-viṣayā; kṣaṇikā hi sā, na buddhy-antara-kālam-avasthāsyate. Another text of the Śloka-vārttika under Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, i, 1, 4, and the Kāśikā on the same provide another example of the use of this term in the same kind of context. Speaking about buddhi, the Vārttika says: na hi sā kṣaṇam-apy-āste jāyate vā pramātmakam (i, iv, 54); and the Kāṣikā explains: kintu nendriyādivaj jātā satī buddhiḥ kṣaṇamātram apy āste, etc.
page 36 note 1 Cf. Nyāya-sūtra, iv, 1, 28.
page 36 note 2 Cf. Ns., iii, 2, 24: “Inasmuch as cognition is recognized as noneternal, its destruction proceeds from another cognition, just like sound.”
page 36 note 3 History of Indian Logic, p. 121.
page 36 note 4 History of Indian Logic, p. 246.
page 36 note 5 Nirvyāpāraṃ kṣaṇikaṃ viviktaṃ, kṣayavarjitam,
Anutpattiṃ ca dharmāṇāṃ kṣaṇikārthaṃ, vadāmy-aham,
Utpattyanantaraṃ bhaṅgaṃ na vai deśemi bāliśāḥ.
page 37 note 1 History of Indian Logic, p. 120.
page 37 note 2 Journal of the American Oriental Society, xxxi (1911)Google Scholar.
page 38 note 1 Nyāya-sūtras (Sacred Books of the Hindus), p. 133.
page 39 note 1 Compare the arguments contained in Sūtras, iv, 2, 7, to iv, 2, 15, especially the opponent's view in iv, 2, 14, where it is said that the perception of things would be possible, just like the perception of a mass of hair by a person of dim vision.