The article examines Sparta’s influence on the treatment of luxury and wealth in early-modern republican thought, analyzing three key thinkers: Francesco Guicciardini, Montesquieu and Abbé de Mably. In this view, unnecessary wealth and, particularly, consumption over a certain limited level, is a pernicious extravagance that harms virtue and leads to corruption of the commonwealth that allows it. Both the direct influence of the Spartan example and the correlative Platonic ideal, inspired by the Lacedaemonians, are analyzed; the influence of Plutarch is emphasized. Special attention is given to the distinction between the Platonic account, with the twin dangers of both wealth and poverty, and a simpler, binary opposition of virtuous poverty vs. corrupting wealth. Guicciardini’s and Mably’s views are closely examined; for Montesquieu, the article traces the decisive role Plato plays in Montesquieu’s account of luxury, and analyzes his almost unknown work, Dialogue de Xantippe, showing the importance of Sparta for Montesquieu’s idea of republic.

Until around 1950, the German émigré Ernst Friedrich Schumacher (1911–1977) was a relatively conventional economist, believing in progress based on economic growth and developments in science and technology. Then, as he turned forty, he went through a period of prolonged self-examination and spiritual quest, which, amongst other things, led him to become critical of Western modernity. Developing a great interest in Buddhist spirituality and culture, in 1955 he travelled to Burma, where he spent three months as a United Nations consultant. His encounter there with the encroachment of Western development upon a traditional society proved pivotal for him, confirming his skepticism about modernity and stimulating him to write a renegade essay, “Economics in a Buddhist Country.” This experience in Burma shaped his work thereafter, as contributor to debates on development both East and West, as promoter of intermediate technology, and as author of the prophetic, popular book of 1973 Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered.

This paper is an exploration of the genesis of Paul Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947) from the perspective of his commitment to Edwin B. Wilson’s mathematics. The paper sheds new light on Samuelson’s Foundations at two levels. First, Wilson’s foundational ideas, embodied in maxims that abound in Samuelson’s book, such as “Mathematics is a Language” or “operationally meaningful theorems,” unified the chapters of Foundations and gave a sense of unity to Samuelson’s economics. Second, Wilson influenced certain theoretical concerns of Samuelson’s economics. Particularly, Samuelson adopted Wilson’s definition of a stable equilibrium position of a system in terms of discrete inequalities. Following Wilson, Samuelson developed correspondences between the continuous and the discrete in order to translate the mathematics of the continuous of neoclassical economics into formulas of discrete magnitudes. In Foundations, the local and the discrete provided the best way of operationalizing marginal and differential calculus. The discrete resonated intuitively with data; the continuous did not.

Through his philosophical treatises, John Locke is perceived as the founder of political liberalism. However, from a different perspective, he can also be seen as a mercantilist. To show that there is no complete incompatibility between Locke’s philosophical treatises and his economic essay, I stress the central role of money. Money leads to a conflict, which is usually described as a conflict between “haves” and “have nots” (Macpherson 1962; Vaughn 1980; Caffentzis 1989). I complete this analysis showing that the introduction of money in the state of nature also leads to an uncommon conflict within the owners’ class between “landed men” and “moneyed men.” I also argue that this transition from a state of peace to a state of unrest leads to the establishment of a government whose role is to avoid the escalation of the conflict into a state of war.

Environmentalism in the United States historically has been divided into its utilitarian and preservationist impulses, represented by Gifford Pinchot and John Muir, respectively. Pinchot advocated conservation of natural resources to be used for human purposes; Muir advocated protection from humans, for nature’s own sake. In the first half of the twentieth century, natural resource economics was firmly in Pinchot’s side of that schism. That position began to change as the postwar environmental movement gained momentum. In particular, John Krutilla, an economist at Resources for the Future, pushed economics to the point that it could embrace Muir’s vision as well as Pinchot’s. Krutilla argued that if humans preferred a preserved state to a developed one, then such preferences were every bit as “economic.” Either way, there were opportunity costs and an economic choice to be made.

I first met Bill Barber in 1975, when I came to interview for a position in economics at Wesleyan University, where Bill had taught for almost twenty years. I’d shown some interest in interdisciplinary work, so my hosts made sure my tour included the College of Social Studies, an unusually intensive undergraduate program that combined three years of close study in economics, government, history, and philosophy with a relentless regime of weekly essays and tutorial meetings. Bill had his office there, across the campus from the other economists, and taught half his courses in the college, which he’d helped to found. It was, my skeptical hosts cordially informed me, modeled on the way philosophy, politics, and economics were taught together at Oxford, and had little to do with "real" economics, the kind they did, with its high theory and, even then, its commitment to econometrics. As I soon learned, the college was the brainchild of a group of tweedy Oxonians with a mission: to teach these subjects together in a way that recognized the essential unity of the social sciences and history and, in the teaching of each, drew insights and context from all the others. This wasn’t how I’d been taught economics, or anything else. I knew nothing about Oxford, and next to nothing about history and philosophy. But in the two hours I spent that day at the College of Social Studies with Bill and his collaborators in the mission, all of them subjects of the same cordial skepticism in their own departments, I became one of them myself.

This article examines the way Vilfredo Pareto addresses the dynamics of social equilibrium and the evolution of economic institutions based on the principle of the rupture of the Machiavellian Moment. In the first part, we analyze why and how Pareto’s categories (residues, derivations, interests, \social heterogeneity, logical actions, and non-logical1 actions) borrow from those of Machiavelli (virtù, fortuna, corruptio, and ordine) to define various forms of the Machiavellian Moment. In the second part, we show that this borrowing allows Pareto to explain: (i) the evolution of political equilibriums, from the distinction the author makes between “Maximum of utility FOR a community in sociology” and “Maximum of ophelimity FOR a community in political economy”; and (ii) the alternative between free trade and protectionism.

The paper analyzes the rise of the Latin American-based inertial inflation theory. Starting in the 1950s, various traditions in economics purported to explain the concept of “inflation inertia.” Contributions ranging from Celso Furtado and Mário Henrique Simonsen to James Tobin anticipated key aspects of what later became the inertial inflation hypothesis, building it into either mathematical or conceptual frameworks compatible with the then contemporaneous macroeconomic theory. In doing so, they bridged the analytical gap with the North American developments while maintaining the key features of the CEPAL (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) approach, such as distributional conflicts and local institutional details. These contributions eventually influenced the second moment of the monetarist–structuralist controversy that unraveled in the 1980s. The paper also highlights how later works by structuralist economists gradually stripped the inertial inflation approach of its previous substance and form, thereby unearthing tensions among Latin American structuralists that led to the eventual decline of this research program.

The paper shows how William Barber’s background as a development economist influenced his research agenda in the history of economic thought, in terms of the questions he asked and the way he approached them. The links between the history of economic theory and of policy-making are highlighted, as well as Barber’s investigation of the engagement of British economists with India’s economic matters throughout the time span of the British East India Company.

In his widely read and cited History of Economic Analysis (Schumpeter 1954), Joseph Alois Schumpeter dismissed Adam Smith’s Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Smith 1976a) in a blunt and often ad hominem manner. In fact, he even questioned Smith’s intellectual mettle. We argue that Schumpeter’s assessment might have resulted from his failure to appreciate the rhetorical structure of Smith’s masterpiece (and the highly political character of its Book V), a failure possibly due to Schumpeter’s not having access to student notes of Smith’s lectures on rhetoric that surfaced only after Schumpeter’s death. We argue that Schumpeter’s failure to appreciate the rhetorical structure of Smith’s masterpiece is a prominent example of the consequences of not taking into account Smith’s rhetorical strategies and principles when trying to understand the man and his oeuvre.

A standard reading in the history of economic thought sets the classical stream of economists drawing upon the influence of Adam Smith (Jean-Baptiste Say, David Ricardo, etc.) in opposition to a “black box” of social thinkers (Louis Blanc, Fourierism, Saint-Simonianism, Jean de Sismondi, Robert Owen). This article, however, argues that, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the Saint-Simonians and the liberal economist Jean-Baptiste Say can be seen to adopt convergent views during the famous controversy about commercial gluts.

First, we show that the Saint-Simonians and Say both see undersupply and lack of industry as causes of gluts. Next, we assert that their intellectual affinities are also visible in their belief that increasing production remains an appropriate solution for gluts. Finally, this convergence is explained by their common belief in industrialism: Saint-Simonianism is embedded in a French industrialist tradition for which Say can be taken as representative. We argue that their common belief in industry explains their convergence.

The purpose of this essay is to analyze Léon Walras’s theory of public interest goods. For him, “services and products of public interest are theoretically those that interest men as members of the community or of the State emanating from the authority to establish social conditions, that is, from the satisfaction of needs that are the same and equal to all” ([1875, 1897a] 1992, EEPA, p. 187). In Walras’s mind, this definition meant that public interest goods could not be factored into the utility function, in sharp contrast with the standard approach in public goods theory. Walras did not imply that public interest goods were not useful, but he maintained instead that their utility was felt only by the community as a whole and not by the individual. Walras developed an anti-individualistic view of the State in which the collective interest was not reducible to the sum of private interests.

The history of economics, properly read, is very much a history of economics in the public sphere. Sir William Petty developed his most important insights in the process of providing advice on taxation to the monarch. Adam Smith wrote with a view to influencing the habits of thought of both the educated layman and policy makers. Jane Marcet and Harriet Martineau brought early classical political economy to the masses. David Ricardo formulated foundational elements of the nineteenth-century classical system writing policy pamphlets and then entered Parliament with a view to putting policy making on a solid economic footing. Karl Marx’s intended audience was anything but the practitioners of the emerging science of political economy. Alfred Marshall buried his technical analysis in appendices to maximize the exposure of his work. John Maynard Keynes’s influence can be ascribed, without too much injustice, as much to his effectiveness outside the walls of Cambridge as within them and to the use by others of his ideas in that same public realm. Yet, despite this lengthy history of economists’ engagements with various publics, including those pulling the levers of policy, those writing on the history of economics have focused far more intently on the history of theory and the implications for the construction of a body of thought known as “economic analysis” than on the interplay among economists, economic ideas, and the public realm. It is as if the economic conversation went on solely within the space of academic departments of economics, even though those spaces are very recent creations.

This paper sheds light on Albion Small’s views on the inequalities resulting from capital concentration. As a leading intellectual of the Progressive Era, Small sought ways to reduce social injustice, which in his view was key to avoiding class conflict and preserving democracy. He emphasized the need to devise social policies with a view to ensuring the equality of opportunities for all to realize what Small termed their “interests”—through the combination of their labor with “tool-capital.” Small entrusted the State with the central role of fighting capital inequalities through social policies, the treatment of inequalities dealing with morals. He embraced the then-fashionable idea of reasonable capitalism, as expounded by fellow progressive scholars, the likes of Richard T. Ely, John Dewey, or John R. Commons, who all sensed that such an economic system would survive only if it improves the social well-being as well as the self-development of all individuals.

In contrast to the common maxims for good taxation, Antonio De Viti de Marco revolutionized public finance studies by placing collective economic activity within a theoretical framework and trying to explain concrete fiscal phenomena such as tax incidence or public debt. The polar cases of cooperative and monopolistic states and the state factor of production are usually considered characteristics of such a framework. Here, we remark that De Viti’s theory of the cooperative state appears grounded only on the principles of minimum means and of political competition, and on the assumption that individual income is a proxy of individual consumption of general public services. Thus, it appears that the characteristics might be inessential to the real core of his theoretical framework. Moreover, we claim that his theoretical framework was not actually applied in his explanation of concrete fiscal phenomena. Finally, we remark that he seldom employed marginal tools in his Principî.

Although Jacques Rueff (1896–1978) is known as a liberal thinker, what he means by the term “economic liberalism” should be specified. Indeed, for Rueff, the notion of economic liberalism leads to the notion of the liberal social order: i.e., a situation where the freedom of the individual is maintained and State intervention is justified in order to ensure a harmony of interests. This paper aims to bring out the particularism of the Rueffian liberal social order and to explore the connections between Rueff’s vision of this concept and his specific approach to liberalism, where private property (the pillar of freedom in liberal thinking) may be called into question under certain circumstances.

The discussions of the Bullionist Controversy were closely related to the effects of inconvertibility on prices and exchange rates. However, during their discussions, economists had a need to address other important questions such as the convenience of free banking. In this paper, we will study the perspective of the different schools involved in the debate on this issue: we will show that their positions were wholly coherent with their underlying assumptions on the nature of monetary assets. The economists who viewed gold and banknotes as perfect substitutes, such as the radical bullionists, tended to favor a ban on free banking. On the contrary, the economists who viewed banknotes and gold as imperfect substitutes, such as the moderate bullionists and antibullionists, were inclined to favor free banking.

Economic lore has it that, with his 1926 article, “A Statistical Relation between Unemployment and Price Changes,” Irving Fisher “discovered the Phillips curve.” Did he? This paper argues he did not, for two reasons. One: the statistical relationship between inflation and unemployment that Fisher described in his 1926 article was contemporaneously described by Alvin Hansen, Henri Fuss, John Rotherford Bellerby, and Arthur Pigou in their own studies. Two: the statistical relationship that Fisher, Hansen, Fuss, Bellerby, and Pigou described is substantially different from the statistical relationship that Alban William Phillips described in his famous 1958 paper, as well as the many variations of the Phillips curve in the literature, including today’s conventional expectations-augmented Phillips curve. To correct the economic lore, the work of Fisher, Hansen, Fuss, Bellerby, and Pigou on the statistical relationship between inflation and unemployment and Phillips’s 1958 paper should be viewed as separate contributions.

The eminent scholar William J. Barber made three great contributions to the history of American economic thought: on the institutionalization of political economy in US universities in the nineteenth century, on the interplay between economic ideas and events in US policy-making from 1921 to 1945, and on the contributions, writings, and career of Irving Fisher.