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Williams, Smith, and the Peculiarity of Piacularity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2015

SIMON BLACKBURN*
Affiliation:
UNIVERSITY OF [email protected]

Abstract:

This article reflects on some of the complexities in Williams' discussion of moral luck. It compares this discussion with previous work, especially by Adam Smith, and argues that Williams' fear that the phenomenon of moral luck threatens the coherence of our moral concepts is unfounded.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2015 

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