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Humanism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2019

KIERAN SETIYA
KIERAN SETIYA*
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Abstract

I defend a form of humanism on which we have reason to care about human beings that we do not have to care about other animals, and human beings have rights against us that other animals lack. Humanism respects the equal worth of those born with severe congenital cognitive disabilities. I address the charge of speciesism and explain how being human is an ethically relevant fact.

Keywords

speciesismanimalsdisabilitymoral statusrespect
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 4 , Issue 4 , Winter 2018 , pp. 452 - 470
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2019 

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