For a stationary set S ⊆ ω1, and a ladder system C over S, a new type of gaps called C-Hausdorff is introduced and investigated. We describe a forcing model of ZFC in which, for some stationary set S, for every ladder C over S, every gap contains a subgap that is C-Hausdorff. But for every ladder E over ω1 ∖ S there exists a gap with no subgap that is E-Hausdorff.

A new type of chain condition, called polarized chain condition, is introduced. We prove that the iteration with finite support of polarized c.c.c. posets is again a polarized c.c.c. poset.

Cet article fait suite à [D] dont il utilise les résultats.

Soit if ℒ langage constitué de deux constantes 0 et 1, et de deux fonctions + et ·; si A est un sous-ensemble d'une structure de ℒ, nous noterons if ℒ (A) le langage obtenu en ajoutant à ℒ if les éléments de A comme constantes.

Tous les corps considérés seront commutatifs. Nous appellerons corps de courbe sur un corps k une extension K de k finiment engendrée de degré de transcendance 1 sur k telle que k soit relativement algébriquement clos dans K.

Nous appellerons ensemble de coefficients d'une courbe sur un corps k un sous-ensemble A de K tel qu'il existe un système de générateurs de l'idéal de cette courbe dont les coefficient sont des éléments de A.

Nous nous proposons d'étudier les conjectures suivantes:

1. Conjecture. Si K est un corps de courbe sur un corps algébriquement clos k, il existe un sous-ensemble fini A de k tel que tout corps de courbe sur kélémentairement équivalent à K dans le langage ℒ (A), lui est k-isomorphe.

2. Conjecture. Deux corps de courbe sur un corps algébriquement clos K élémentairement équivalents dans le langage ℒ sont isomorphes.

Nous démontrerons ces conjectures lorsque le genre est différent de 1, et si le genre est 1, lorsque la caractéristique est nulle et le corps de courbe sans multiplication complexe.

Une version plus simple de cet article est parue dans [D′].

In [1] Craig introduced a proof procedure for first order classical logic called linear reasoning. In it, a proof of P ⊃ Q consists of a sequence of formulas, each of which implies the next, beginning with P and ending with Q. And one of the formulas in the sequence will be an interpolation formula for P ⊃ Q. Indeed, this was the first proof of the Craig interpolation theorem, some of whose important consequences were demonstrated in a companion paper [2]. In this paper we present systems of linear reasoning for several standard modal logics: K, T, K4, S4, D, D4, and GL. Similar systems can be constructed for several regular, nonnormal modal logics too, though we do not do so here. And just as in the classical case, interpolation theorems are easy consequences. Such theorems are well known for the logics considered here. There is a model theoretic argument in [6], an argument using Gentzen systems in [8], an argument using consistency properties in [4] and [5], and an argument using symmetric Gentzen systems in [5]. This paper presents what seems to be the first modal proof that follows Craig's original methods. We note that if the modal rules given here are dropped, a classical linear reasoning system results, which is related to, but not the same as those in [1] and [10].

Since the basic linear reasoning ideas are fully illustrated by the propositional case, we present that first, to keep the clutter down. Later we show how the techniques can generally be extended to encompass quantifiers. We do not follow [1] in making heavy use of prenex form, since it is not generally available in modal logics. Fortunately, it plays no essential role.

A system SF, closely related to NF, is outlined here. SF has several novel points of simplicity and interest, (a) It uses only one basic notion, from which all the other concepts of logic and mathematics may be built definitionally. Three-notion systems are common, but Quine's two-notion IA has for some time represented the extreme in conceptual economy, (b) The theorems of SF are generated under just three rules of analysis, which unify into a single postulational principle, (c) SF is built solely in terms of what is commonly, known as the “natural deduction” method, under which each theorem is attacked primarily as it stands, by means of a very small body of rules, rather than less directly, through a very large, potentially infinite backlog of theorems. Although natural deduction is by no means new as a method, its exclusive applications have previously been relatively limited, not even reaching principles of identity, much less set theory, relations, or mathematics proper, (d) SF is at least as strong as NF, yielding all of its theorems, which are expressed here in forms analogous to those of the metatheorems in ML. If NF is consistent, so is SF. The main points in the relative consistency proof are set forth below in section seven.

Let be a first-order structure; we denote by DEF() the set of all first-order definable relations and functions within . Let π be any one-to-one function from ℕ into the set of prime integers.

Let ∣ and • be respectively the divisibility relation and multiplication as function. We show that the sets DEF(ℕ, π, ∣) and DEF(ℕ, π, •) are equal. However there exists function π such that the set DEF(ℕ, +, ∣), or, equivalently, DEF(ℕ, π, •) is not equal to DEF(ℕ, +, •). Nevertheless, in all cases there is an {π, •}-definable and hence also {π, |}-definable structure over π which is isomorphic to 〈ℕ, +, •〉. Hence theories TH(ℕ, π, ∣) and TH(ℕ, π, •) are undecidable.

The binary relation of equipotence between two positive integers saying that they have equal number of prime divisors is not definable within the divisibility lattice over positive integers. We prove it first by comparing the lower bound of the computational complexity of the additive theory of positive integers and of the upper bound of the computational complexity of the theory of the mentioned lattice.

The last section provides a self-contained alternative proof of this latter result based on a decision method linked to an elimination of quantifiers via specific tables.

We isolate a forcing which increases the value of while preserving ω1 under the assumption that there is a precipitous ideal on ω1 and a measurable cardinal.

We compare the strength of polychromatic and monochromatic Ramsey theory in several set-theoretic domains. We show that the rainbow Ramsey theorem does not follow from ZF, nor does the rainbow Ramsey theorem imply Ramsey's theorem over ZF. Extending the classical result of Erdős and Rado we show that the axiom of choice precludes the natural infinite exponent partition relations for polychromatic Ramsey theory. We introduce rainbow Ramsey ultrafilters, a polychromatic analogue of the usual Ramsey ultrafilters. We investigate the relationship of rainbow Ramsey ultrafilters with various special classes of ultrafilters, showing for example that every rainbow Ramsey ultrafilter is nowhere dense but rainbow Ramsey ultrafilters need not be rapid. This entails comparison of the polychromatic and monochromatic Ramsey theorems as combinatorial principles on ω.

Axiomatizations of the sentential calculus which use Rmp (modus ponens), have been shown equivalent to axiomatizations similar in all respects except that Rmp is replaced by the less restricted rule Re (rule of excision)1:

Re. If S and (…(S⊃S') …), then (… S' …).

In this article, unpublished methods of Solovay and Kunen are applied to describe conditions under which an uncountable regular κ can satisfy weak (κ, λ)-compactness (see 1.1(3) below), yet lie below 2μ for some μ < κ. The argumentation is in informal ZFC, and general set-theoretic notation is standard. The lower-case Greek letters κ, λ, μ, ν are reserved for cardinals in the sense of some transitive or inner model of a reasonable set theory, φ, Ψ, θ, are (arithmetizations of) formulas in some extension of the first-order language of set theory, and other lower-case Greek letters except Є are metavariables for arbitrary ordinals. If M is transitive, M ⊨ φ abbreviates 〈M, Є 〉 ⊨ φ. [2], [3], [9] and [1] provide more information about large-cardinal theory for those who wish it.

1.1. Definitions. (1) κ is inaccessible iff κ is regular and ℵκ = κ; strongly inaccessible iff κ is regular and ℶκ = κ, i.e., λ < κ for all λ < κ; weakly inaccessible iff κ is inaccessible but not strongly inaccessible.

(2) L κλ is the infinitary language with conjunctions and disjunctions of length < κ and quantification over sequences of length < λ, and PL κ the prepositional language with κ letters and conjunctions and disjunctions of length < κ.

In this note we present a simplification of the axiom schemes which were given in our earlier paper Axiom schemes for m-valued propositional calculi. Except for new concepts that are needed for our present purposes, the terminology used will be the same as that introduced in the earlier paper. Hence, we can say that in addition to listing our simplified specifications for axiom schemes, we shall indicate how our new axiom schemes may be used to establish deductive completeness.

The simplification of our axiom schemes is achieved by using only the operators ⊃ and Jk( ) with the resulting elimination of ∨ and ·. This does not constitute an actual reduction in functional complexity since the latter operators can be denned in terms of the former. For example,

However, by dispensing with ∨ and · one can greatly reduce the number of axioms without an appreciable increase in the difficulties of proving deductive completeness.

Our simplified specifications for axiom schemes will retain conditions (1) and (3) of our earlier set but (2) and (4) will be changed to (2*) and (4*) which we will now state.

(2*) Assume that an implication function (P ⊃ Q) can be defined exclusively in terms of the basic functions Fi(P1, …:, Pαi).

The statement of what follows is simplified by introducing a chain symbol defined recursively as follows:

The variable i of a chain symbol which takes values from u to v will be called the chain variable. When it is clear that i is the chain variable we will use the notation in place of . Hence, denotes (P5 ⊃ (P4 ⊃ (P3 ⊃ Q))).

We give an affirmative answer to Brendle's and Hrušák's question of whether the club principle together with is consistent. We work with a class of axiom A forcings with countable conditions such that is determined by finitely many elements in the conditions p and q and that all strengthenings of a condition are subsets, and replace many names by actual sets. There are two types of technique: one for tree-like forcings and one for forcings with creatures that are translated into trees. Both lead to new models of the club principle.

Bounded lattices (that is lattices that are both lower bounded and upper bounded) form a large class of lattices that include all distributive lattices, many nondistributive finite lattices such as the pentagon lattice N5. and all lattices in any variety generated by a finite bounded lattice. Extending a theorem of Paris for distributive lattices, we prove that if L is an ℵ0-algebraic bounded lattice, then every countable nonstandard model of Peano Arithmetic has a cofinal elementary extension such that the interstructure lattice Lt(/) is isomorphic to L.

Many philosophers take set-theoretic discourse to be about objects of a special sort, namely sets; correlatively, they regard truth in such discourse as quite like truth in discourse about nonmathematical objects. There is a thin “disquotational” way of construing this construal; but that may candy-coat a philosophically substantive semantic theory: the Mathematical-Object theory of the basis for the distribution of truth and falsehood to sentences containing set-theoretic expressions. This theory asserts that truth and falsity for sentences containing set-theoretic expressions are grounded in semantic facts (about the relation between language and the world) of the sort modelled by the usual model-theoretic semantics for an uninterpreted formal first-order language. For example, it would maintain that ‘{ } ∈ {{ }}” is true in virtue of the set-theoretic fact that the empty set is a member of its singleton, and the semantic facts that ‘{ }’ designates the empty set,‘{{ }}’ designates its singleton, and ‘∈’ applies to an ordered pair of objects iff that pair's first component is a member of its second component.

Now this theory may come so naturally as to seem trivial. My purpose here is to loosen its grip by “modelling” an alternative account of the alethic underpinnings of set-theoretic discourse. According to the Alternative theory, the point of having set-theoretic expressions (‘set’ and ‘∈’ will do) in a language is not to permit its speakers to talk about some special objects under a special relation; rather it is to clothe a higher-order language in lower-order garments.