Tengger Javanese are an ethnic Javanese people who live in the rugged uplands surrounding Mount Bromo in eastern Java. Tengger are unique among modern Javanese in that they alone trace their religious traditions back to a non-Islamic, Hindu-Javanese priesthood thought to date from the time of the last of Java's great Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms (the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries). Specialists of Java's ancient Hindu traditions, however, have generally concluded that liturgical manuscripts from the Tengger region can tell us little about Old Javanese religion. The eminent Dutch historian Th. G. Th. Pigeaud writes that the people who preserved the religious texts among the Tengger never belonged to the class of cultured ecclesiastics so prominent in Hindu-Javanese times. Many of the Tengger manuscripts in museum collections are written in a rustic and non-standard, budha script, and do not contain any learned Sanskrit slokas or other easily identifiable references to classical Hindu-Javanese traditions. These facts led Pigeaud to speculate that the Tengger population had always formed a separate community, only superficially influenced by Hindu tradition, and primarily involved in the worship of Mount Bromo, the volcano located at the centre of the region.

In the on-going debate over the consequences of national policies of political and economic integration in pluralistic nations such as the Philippines, two facts have become increasingly obvious. We need to know more about the effects of the patterns of political incorporation and more about the type of economic strategies pursued by individuals to judge the effects of integration on peripheral populations. Our former views of the monolithic nature of external influences have been modified; new research has made it apparent that local populations have certain resources at their disposal which can influence the direction of political and economic change. One such resource is the manipulation of the discrepancy between state law and customary law, a strategy which often includes the use and/or invention of custom. This paper uses diachronic data from one upland community in the northern Philippines to illustrate how individuals have manoeuvred within and utilized the conflicts between the provisions of customary law and national legal codes in order to pursue certain economic strategies. The creative process of inventing custom is demonstrated, since the patterns of communal ownership which have been set against Philippine state property law in this region, and which have been used to support claims for regional autonomy, are shown to be a relatively new jural construct. The paper suggests that there are no clear winners in these strategies, elite prerogatives have been eroded in favour of poorer families and the community as a whole has suffered from increased factionalism. This in turn suggests that should regional autonomy be granted in this region, conflict will not necessarily be reduced by a return to customary practice.

Only recently has it become possible to attempt to reconstruct a history of Javanese music in the nineteenth century. The relevant primary and secondary sources, including Javanese poems and treatises, colonial writings and scattered references in various historical tracts are only now beginning to emerge from cold storage to be published, translated, and made more widely available. This article is a preliminary attempt to draw together from them an overview of Javanese music in the nineteenth century, adopting a musicological, cultural and historical approach which is based partly on my own fieldwork over the past twenty years. An understanding of nineteenth century musical developments is clearly important not only in its own right but also as a means of facilitating our comprehension of the contemporary artistic scene.

A government's education policy reflects its attitudes towards the people it rules. The response of the people towards this education policy in turn is determined by their needs.

The Brooke Rajahs ruled Sarawak for slightly more than a century, a personal rule characterized by strong adherence to the principle that the cultures of the local inhabitants should be respected and accepted as essentially natural. There was little interference with the customs and traditions of the people and only gradual change took place under this paternalistic totalitarian administration.

The French move into what they came to call Indo-China began, as the Hong Kong Register was to put it, with motives hostile to British power. Pre-revolutionary France had indeed seen such a move as a means of contesting Britain's supremacy in Asia: placing themselves between the growing empire in India and the growing trade with China, the French could embarrass their European rivals. But establishing themselves in Vietnam was easier said than done. The limited help they were able to afford Gia-long reaped them no great reward, and his successor, Minh-mang, even turned against the Catholic missionaries whom he saw as sources of subversion of his Confucian-style reunification. Continued anti-Catholic activity on the part of his successor was to give Napoleon III an excuse to intervene in the 1850s. But by then, as the Register noted, the old rivalry with the British had died out. The British had sought to open up trade with Vietnam, but, both before and after their victory over neighbouring China, the Vietnamese had refused to accept a commercial treaty. The British thus did not oppose the more forceful attempt the French made to open up Vietnam. Their only concern was lest the French should trench upon the territory of Laos and Cambodia, and thus undermine the independence of Siam, which the British saw as an outwork of their empire in Burma and Malaya. There was indeed a crisis over Laos, and thus over Siam, in 1893, but the French and the British came to terms in 1896. Their agreement in Southeast Asia was consolidated by their agreement in Europe, which the apprehension of Germany promoted.

Prostitution in Singapore was linked to economic factors in rural China and Japan. Congenital poverty, weak family economies, and rising economic expectations were all part of a set of prevailing conditions that created a vast source of supply of Chinese and Japanese women and young girls for international traffic. Life in both countries was exceptionally difficult in the second half of the nineteenth century. Although China had considerable wealth, most lived a hand to mouth existence in the over-populated rural areas. Poverty in the villages and outlying districts of southeastern China, where many agrarian families lived on the edge of starvation, not only drove women and girls out of the countryside into the ports but acted as a lever on parents already bowed under financial strain. Privation was a handicap which struck hardest at the daughters of peasants and rural labourers. Unable to feed the many mouths they were responsible for, and suffering from chronic economic insecurity, parents sold their daughters to would be benefactors, totally unaware of the future fate in store for so many of them who were taken to Singapore. Poverty and desperate hungry Chinese families were root causes of brothel prostitution in Singapore at the end of the nineteenth century.

At the end of World War II, American Office of Strategic Service (OSS) officers in Bangkok were dismayed to discover that, contrary to their expectations, the Thai showed little animosity toward the Japanese. The OSS unit reported in August 1945 that ‘there has been very little in the way of hostile reaction’. Japanese accounts confirm this, with a Foreign Ministry study, for example, concluding: ‘The general attitude of Thai officials and citizens toward Japan just after the war's end was relatively sympathetic….’

By the late nineteenth century British control over Burma had been firmly established and by 1893 a comprehensive legal system for its population put in place. The guiding principle of the judicial and legislative system was that each racial or religious group had the right to its own law in matters of religion and custom. Thus, Burmese “Buddhist law” for the Burmese, “Mohammadan law” for Muslims and Hindu law for the Hindus. In addition, the customary laws of other ethnic groups were also recognized.

It has become a commonplace of Malayan historiography that the period following the end of the Pacific War witnessed the establishment of a pattern of political life which has persisted in its main features into the present decade. Existing accounts have focused around the restructuring of the British presence in Malaya under a military administration and the introduction of, and opposition to, the Malayan Union scheme in 1946 and the Federal structure which succeeded it in April 1948. These years saw the emergence of an ethnically based nationalist movement and the defeat of a radical challenge to its predominance. The communal and insurrectionary violence which was a feature of the period has been represented as a constraint to subsequent political action — as a limit to what the structure of Malaya's pluralism could tolerate — and the constitutional struggles as a lost opportunity to effect its transformation. Whilst it is hard to exaggerate the importance of these events in shaping the landscape of Malaysian politics, there is a sense in which the sophistication of these political and constitutional preoccupations suggests uneven development within the historical writing as a whole. The social context which stimulated change, and the breadth of the local response which dignified it, has been marginalized in many accounts. There has been a tendency to conceive the state system and the colonial presence in Malaya within the bounds of a paradigm governed by the constitutional settlement, and the various phases of insurrection and political change as primarily the products of the subversive or nationalist imagination.

The Thammakai movement in Thailand has won increasing attention over the past decade for its popularity, for the devotion of its supporters and the size of their contributions, and for its links with influential individuals in the Thai government, army, and business communities. This suburban monastery's ability to draw a congregation of 50,000 participants each year for its most publicized annual religious observance is perhaps unprecedented in Thai ecclesiastical history. Thammakai leaders see themselves heading a key Buddhist reform movement to improve the lives of their followers, to strengthen the religion, and to bring prosperity to the nation. But Thammakai's detractors criticize the meditation method around which the movement has been built, deplore the movement's expenditure rates and fund-raising techniques, charge that it uses hypnotic mind-control methods over its followers, and criticize its increasingly acquisitive tendencies. Thai observers of all persuasions have noted Thammakai's skilful use of positive national and religious symbols in its public relations, its abilities in organizing students and young urban professionals to work for organizational goals, and its skill at staging visually and emotionally appealing public displays.

1988 was unlike any other year in Burma's short history as an independent nation. It began quietly, but erupted into a revolution for democracy and change which failed when the army violently restored its dictatorship; it ended quietly, but with the people living in fear under a military determined not to be challenged openly again. During this same period, while the world focused on Rangoon, the minorities continued to pursue a civil war which some have been fighting for the past forty years, hopeful that the changing situation in Burma's heartland would effect their struggles because both they, and the Burmans who rose in revolt, have the same enemy and seek the same ends — a peaceful and democratic Burma. Both looked to and sought help from the free nations of the world who spoke out vigorously when the rebellion began but whose voices either have been lowered or even stilled since the military made clear that it would decide the time and degree of change; only the U.S. continued to hold the high moral ground in support of the rebellion but its actions hardly matched its rhetoric.

Throughout Thai history there have been religious ascetics credited with the ability of precognition (mii yaan) as a result of accumulated virtues and meditation abilities. One such religious figure, perhaps the most widely acknowledged “saint” in modern times, was Phra Ajaan Man Phuurithatto (1870–1949). Of particular interest to this paper is the recorded prediction made by this ascetic monk shortly before his death, documented by a former disciple Phra Aajaan Wiriyang, that there would be a proliferation of self-proclaimed meditation masters and pupils and fragmentation into urban-based “cults” or religious movements (yaek pen kok pen lao).