The heritage of traditional Malay literature: A historical survey of genres, writings, and literary views By VLADIMIR BRAGINSKY Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004. Pp. xiv, 890. Notes, Bibliography, Index.

John Leyden's Malay Annals With an introductory essay by VIRGINIA MATHESON HOOKER and M. B. HOOKER Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 2001. Pp. 81, 361. Notes, Bibliography, Index.

We are playing relatives: A survey of Malay writing By HENK MAIER Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004. Pp. viii, 542. Notes, Bibliography, Index.

Bidasari: Jewel of Malay Muslim culture Edited by JULIAN MILLIE Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004. Pp. 310. Notes, Bibliography, Index.

A merry senhor in the Malay world: Four texts of the Syair Sinyor Kosta Edited by A. TEEUW, R. DUMAS, MUHAMMAD HAJI SALLEH, R. TOL and M. J. VAN YPEREN Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004. Pp. x, 467. Notes, Bibliography, Index.

In Cambodia, orphan dance shows were once popular as a way to preserve endangered art forms and to cultivate children's dignity and well-being. But they came to be seen as exploitative instead, and today are nearly nonexistent. This article examines the confluence of changes that caused this reversal of opinion. The reversal is due to both covert factors such as changes in constructions of childhood, and overt factors such as changes in audience composition. The rise and fall of Cambodian orphan dance shows took place largely within foreign communities, with little local input.

The Asian Civilisations Museum, Singapore, is to be congratulated for organising a splendid exhibition of Thai Buddhist art entitled ‘Enlightened ways: The many streams of Buddhist art in Thailand’, which ran from 30 November 2012 to 17 April 2013, and for publishing the exhibition catalogue as well as a separate monograph, Buddhist storytelling in Thailand and Laos, which elucidates the long cloth scroll depicting the story of Prince Vessantara on display at the exhibition.

Anti-Japanese activities in North Borneo before the Pacific War were part of a larger anti-Japanese campaign waged by the Chinese in Southeast Asia. In North Borneo one of the most important outcomes was politicisation of the Chinese community. During this period the North Borneo Company, which had previously welcomed Japanese capital and labour, also began to take steps to curb Japanese activities in the state.

Globalization, the worldwide web of economic and cultural communications with its unifying and integrative tendencies, has done more than deeply affect the political economy (liberal markets) and the cultural patterns (mass consumption) of our time. It has also internationalized the debate on moral principles and ethical practices concerning human behaviour. Already the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the first statement on the issue by the United Nations, has claimed universal validity as a “common standard of achievement”.

Studies of Indonesia in the twentieth century have properly concentrated on the history of the nationalist movement, but its external relations have been unduly neglected. It is indeed a commonplace that the Japanese invasion had a decisive impact on the fortunes of the nationalist movement and of its antagonists. But the invasion was the climax of a sequence of developments that brought the security of the Netherlands' tenure of Netherlands India into question. Apart from their intrinsic interest, those developments provide an additional context within which to appraise the nationalist movement and the Dutch reaction to it.

The history of mankind is studded with narratives of human conflicts, inspired largely by man's desire of domination. Domination gave rise to resentment and agitation and finally gave way to freedom. Thus the struggle between man's desire to dominate and yet to be free determined the changing patterns of society and the course of human civilization. With the march of time and growth of experience the frontiers and concepts of loyalties widened and the tribal and clan conflicts developed into organised and highly mechanised national warfare. Consequently at the turn of this century most of the world lay humble at the feet of a few industrially and technologically advanced nations of the West. South East Asia belonged to the majority community of the humbled. Known as the “economic bulwark of western Imperialsm”, its economic wealth had, in fact, attracted over a period of centuries peoples of various cultures and races. The Europeans were only the last to come; before them had come the Indian, Chinese and Arab merchants. Of all these the Europeans were the most organised and persistent intruders. Their commercial rivalries through a process of political intrigues and military strifes inevitably led to the colonisation of South East Asia for several centuries. Except Thailand, all the nations of this region suffered a period of European domination; even Thailand's independence remained at its best precarious. Some remnants of this domination are still to be seen, for instance, in West Irian and Timor.

Linking the early historic cultures of Southeast Asia to their prehistoric antecedents has, despite some decades of research, proved difficult for a number of reasons. Until the 1960s, this did not seem to be an issue for scholars of the region. For George Coedès, the region was simply occupied by diverse and backward ethnic and linguistic communities, cultivators using stone tools, or at best, people using bronze with poorly developed social organisations until impacted by the expanding Han peoples during the third century CE: ‘There is very little direct information about the societies of South East Asia before they entered into contact with India and China.’

This study focuses on state–state relations for business, a phenomenon shaped by how local power elites (LPEs), in this case, in Malaysia, collaborate with transnational corporate elites (TCEs), in this case, from China, to implement infrastructure projects linked to the latter's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These LPE-TCE links, which have led to the creation of novel forms of state–business relations (SBRs), offer interesting theoretical insights for SBR-related studies. This article builds on the conventional wisdom of homogenised SBRs as usually driven by bureaucrats by indicating that, in practice, state–business ties are extremely heterogeneous, with the capture of key institutions by influential LPEs. A conceptual framework explains theoretically how state–state relations, forged by two countries, both led by dominant parties that control their respective enterprises, have contributed to unique SBRs created to undertake BRI projects, driven by LPE-TCE links. Case studies of three BRI projects in Malaysia provide insights into how disparate forms of SBR-based institutional architecture function, not only at the federal level, but also in different states, involving enterprises from China. Diverse types of power relationships have emerged in these joint ventures, encompassing different LPEs, contributing to the creation of dissimilar SBRs. These LPEs have turned effective SBRs, fashioned to implement BRI projects, into economic endeavours that feature rent-seeking behaviour.

This article compares Buddhist and Christian approaches to the drug problem among ethnic minorities in northern Thailand. Government programmes implemented through Buddhist monasteries aim to construct Buddhist subjects and realise agendas of national security in border areas. Yet, they also offer development support and access to resources. Meanwhile, gospel rehabilitation centres provide much-needed drug treatment services while drawing highlanders into transnational spheres of Christian fellowship. Consequently, I argue that the relationship between ethnic minorities and the state can be defined in terms of aspiration and negotiation, as well as resistance and evasion, as has been previously argued in the literature.

The seventh session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea has just ended after three months (28 March to 19 May, and 22 August to 15 September 1978). There seems to be general agreement that territorial waters should be extended from the traditional 3-mile limit out to 12 miles (19 kilometres) offshore, and that every coastal state is entitled to an economic zone reaching 200 miles. More than 40 countries have established, or are in the process of establishing, 200 miles (320 kilometres) offshore as a fishery zone, economic zone, or territorial sea. To many states, the 200-mile economic zone is already a fact of international law. But there is still some disagreement over how much control coastal states should exercise over the adjacent 200 miles of water.

Many historians have accepted the view that the two prominent Filipino leaders — Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmena — were not really in favour of immediate Philippine independence despite their constant open advocacy of such an aspiration. For instance, Roy W. Curry wrote that “… the eloquent Quezon was playing independence as a necessary political expedience while privately fearing that it might be granted”, whereas Bonifacio S. Salamanca suggested “… at least the two foremost leaders of the Filipino elite — Quezon and Osmena — did not really desire immediate independence, or even want to have a date fixed for the future recognition of Philippine independence”.

From the opening of Thailand (Siam) to the West in the middle of the nineteenth century until World War II the dominant European influence in thissmall independent country was that exerted by Great Britain. Although other Europeans played important roles in the technological and administrative development of Thailand, the British were able to retain a pre-eminent position in the affairs of the country. The bulk of Thailand's rice trade was with the British empire, and a British expert was traditionally employed by the Thai absolute monarchs as their leading financial adviser. The British likewise played a vital role in preventing the French from seizing larger territories in Thailand as these two leading colonial powers clashed in Southeast Asia in the 1890's. An agreement between Great Britain and France in 1896 enabled Thailand to retain its national independence, and until World War II Thailand served as a buffer state between the British colonialists in Burma and the French colons in Indochina.