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Paradise in Peril: The Netherlands, Great Britain and the Defence of the Netherlands East Indies, 1940–41

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2011

Herman Theodore Bussemaker
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Abstract

The military side of British-Dutch diplomatic relations in the Far East at the end of the 1930s has received little attention. The issue is examined here on the basis of original source materials, with particular attention to the way the Netherlands abandoned its policy of diplomatic “aloofness”.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , March 2000 , pp. 115 - 136
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 2000

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References

1 For a detailed discussion of Dutch foreign policy, see Vandenbosch, Amry, Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815: A Study in Small Power Politics (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also van Hamel, J.A., “Can the Netherlands be neutral?”, Foreign Affairs 16 (1937–38): 346Google Scholar.

2 German agents based in the NEI operated in British India during the First World War. See Tarling, Nicholas, Britain, South East Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 As the NEI financial administration was strictly separated from that of the mother country, a separate body was needed as a counterpart for the Governor-General and his department heads.

4 Compton referred to President Washington's famous farewell address of 1796, in which he admonished the American Congress never to allow the nation to be entangled in European power politics.

5 A literal reproduction of the text of this broadcast is to be found in Press Report no. 11 of the Dutch Legation in Washington, covering the period 8–15 February 1940. (Secret Archives, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Washington Legation 1940–45, Inventory number 2838, Letter no 862/144. This archive will be subsequently referred to as Archives MinBuZa.)

6 These very important talks are almost unknown even today. The only British author who has given much attention to this subject has been Tarling, Nicholas in “A Vital British Interest: Britain, Japan and the Security of Netherlands-India in the Inter-War Period”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 9,2 (1978): 180–218CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Tarling, however, mentions only one meeting of Colijn with the British military attaché (p. 207), while reports in the Public Record Office (PRO) indicate that Colijn talked with all three British service attachés on different dates.

7 Montgomery to Sargent, F.O., 22 Apr. 1936. PRO FO 371/20507 [W 3583/498/29]. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent references to FO documents are from the PRO.

8 “Holland and the Netherlands East Indies: Defence problems”. Memorandum of the Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee, 27 Jul. 1936, PRO CAB/4/24 CID/1256-B. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent references to CAB documents are from the PRO.

9 Report, Cabinet meeting of 15 Jul. 1936, CAB 23/85.

10 Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, pp. 29–30.

11 Ibid., pp. 32–33; Tarling, “Britain, Japan and the Security of Netherlands India”, p. 211.

12 Trotter, Ann, Britain and East Asia, 1933–1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975)Google Scholar, ch. 11.

13 On the Neutrality Act and its ramifications see Pearl Harbor as History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), Borg, Dorothy and Okamoto, Shumpei, ed., p. 312Google Scholar.

14 See F.O. 371/21025 [F 6568/597/61].

15 Chiefs of Staff (COS), 1385-B, 7 Jan. 1938, CAB 4/27.

16 Note in pencil on the COS Memorandum dated 19 Jan. 1938.

17 Extract of minutes of 307th CID meeting, 20 Jan. 1938, p. 2, CAB 2/7. The British were therefore aware of the secret Dutch airfields in Borneo. Colijn's position again illustrates his pragmatic attitude towards Dutch neutrality.

18 FO 371/22172 C.I.D. 307th meeting, 20 Jan. 1938, Item 1. CAB 2/7.

19 British General Lewin of Malaya Command made a top secret visit to his counterpart General Cramer in Batavia in June 1934 and exchanged military information. Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, p. 24.

20 Press clippings in Archives MinBuZa, London Legation, inv. nr. 1194. See also FO 371/23547 [F 1337/1337/61].

21 FO 371/23547 [F 1907/1337/61].

22 Bland to Halifax, telex 30, 27 Apr. 1939, FO 371/23538.

23 Admiralty to F.O., 26 Jun. 1939, FO 371/23538 [ M/04476/39].

24 Archives MinBuZa, London Legation, accession number Aa.23, inv. nr. 998. This contains a file of all Dutch diplomatic complaints about alleged violations and British replies.

25 The Japanese possessed a number of submarines equipped with seaplanes.

26 Fitzmaurice to Ronald, 7 Mar. 1939, FO 371/23546 [F 3223/687/61].

27 Letter C.G.A. Merens to MinBuZa, 14 Jun. 1941, no. S(XIII-H1)-1759/143, in Political Reports from Simla nr. 1, Archives MinBuZa, box 19.

28 Letter Boerstra to Governor General (G.G.), dated 12 Jul. 1937 with attached report by Capt. Weijerman, in ARA Archive Legation London 1930–39, accession code 2.05.44, inv. nr. 844.

29 Letter Col. C.A.L. Howard, GHQ Indian Army, to C.G. Visser 26 Nov. 1936 no. 39168/M.T. Archives MinBuZa, Consulate-General Simla, inv. nr. 111, Code IX-d.

30 Letter M. Boerstra to G.G. 21 Jul. 1937, in ARA Archives Dept. of the Colonies, accession number 2.10.36.051, inv. nr. 498, file nr. 11/8/1937 C-20.

31 Letter Secretary G.G. to A. Merens, 1 Feb. 1939, Archives MinBuZa, Consulate-General Simla, Code IX-d, inv. nr. 112.

32 Report by Brig. G.N. Molesworth, FO 371/23439 [F 3961/2742/61].

33 Letter G.G. to Min. of Colonies, 28 Sep. 1937, ARA Dept. of Colonies I, inv. nr. 502 File 12/10/37 L-26.

34 Letter Consul-General Fein at Singapore to G.G., 27 Mar. 1940, ARA Dept. of Colonies, File G-19, box 580.

35 Letter Ferwerda to G.G., 15 Sep. 1937. ARA, Dept. of Colonies I, inv. nr. 499, File nr. 12/10/37 L-6.

36 Also mentioned in Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, p. 33.

37 Fitzmaurice to F.O., 10 Apr. 1939, FO 371/23549 [F 4495/2644/61].

38 Vice-Adm. Sir Percy Noble, “Intelligence Report Dutch East Indies, 17 Apr. 1939, HMS Kent at Sandakan”, AA Victoria, MP 1185/8, File 2021/8/202. The report also gives interesting information on peaceful Japanese penetration in the East Indies (including a map of the Japanese concessions) and on gunnery in the Dutch Navy, which attracted favourable comment.

39 Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, p. 34.

40 Tjarda to MinCol Welter, 15 Jul. 1940. Reproduced in Documenten betreffende de Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland, ed. Manning, A.F. and Kersten, A.E. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff)Google Scholar, Periode C, Volume I, document no. 176, p. 181. This important source will subsequently be referred to as DBPN. For an interesting discussion of possible British diplomatic options after the Arita Declaration, see Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, pp. 84–87.

41 Ibid., p. 95.

42 Consul-General Singapore H.M. Fein to G.G., 6 Jul. 1940. Archives MinBuZa, Political Reports from Singapore, box 19, inv. nr. 1.

43 Letter Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Kleffens to Dutch Minister in London, 22 Aug. 1940, no 1173 GA/223, with the G.G.'s views on the question of mining the Singapore approaches. Archives MinBuZa, London Legation, inv. nr. 1411. For the comments of British Consul-General Walsh, see Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, pp. 88, 94.

44 Memorandum Fürstner to Dutch Cabinet, 15 Jul. 1940. ARA Archives Ministry of Colonies, accession number 2.10.45, inv. nr. 656; Report on meeting on 26 Jul. 1940 between Commander-in-Chief K.M. Fürstner, S.G. van Bylandt of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Maj.-Gen. Verniers van der Loeff, Head.of Military Affairs, Dept. of Colonies. (DBPN, Vol. 1, no. 219, pp. 243–45.)

45 Letter Sir Horace Seymour to Michiels van Verduynen, 6 Jun. 1940, F 3346/3346/61. Archives MinBuZa, London Legation, access nr. Aa.23, inv. nr. 999.

46 Without consulting the Governor-General, Welter decided to agree, informing the Governor-General of his decision, communicated to the FO on 7 June.

47 Report Lt-Gen. J.F. van de Vijver to Minister of Colonies, 16 Oct. 1940, Afd. I, no 55P. ARA Archives Ministry of Colonies, acc. No. 2.10.45, inv. nr. 655.

48 Bosscher, Ph.M., De Koninklijke Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Franeker: T. Wever, 1986), vol. II, p.75Google Scholar. See also DBPN, I, doc. no. 444, pp. 517–18.

49 Telegram G.G. to Welter, 22 Oct. 1940, cypher NNN, appended to letter MinBuZa to Minister in London, 25 Oct. 1940, no. 1535 GA/409, Archives MinBuZa, London Legation, inv. nr. 1547.

50 This meeting was attended by Furstner, the Dutch Naval Attaché de Booy, Rear-Admiral R.M. Bellairs of the Admiralty and Lt. Col. E.I.C. Jacob of the Secretariat of the British War Cabinet. See Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine, vol. 2, p. 75.

51 For the text of the questionnaire see PRO ADM 199/1232. Bosscher, in De Koninklijke Marine, mentions an incorrect date for the handing over of the questionnaire to Furstner (vol. 2, p. 458, n. 143); it was not 21 Oct. 1940, but 30 October.

52 Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, p. 214.

53 Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine, vol. 2, p. 458, n. 143.

54 Ibid., p. 463, n. 210.

55 Helfrich, C.E.L., Mémoires (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1950), vol. 1, pp. 129–33.Google Scholar

56 For the handling of this issue within the FO, see Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, p. 218.

57 Letter Michiels van Verduynen to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20 Nov. 1940, no 1747 GA/492 with report of discussion with Sir Neville Bland. Archives MinBuZa DZ/GA, London Legation, inv. nr. 1546.

58 Minister of Foreign Affairs van Kleffens to British Minister, 3 Jan. 1941. DBPN, series C, vol. 2, doc. 140.

59 T. Elink Schuurman to Dutch consul Vigeveno in Wellington, 4 Feb. 1941, no T3/712, ARA Archives CG Sydney, accession nr 2.05.48.14, inv. nr. 78.

60 Verniers van der Loeff to van Kleffens, 17 Jan. 1941, Archives MinBuZa, London period, DZ F.2/9), box 72.

61 T. Elink Schuurman to van Kleffens, 11 Jul. 1940, no T4/3105/189, ARA Archives MinBuZa London period, accession number 2.05.44, box 13, file 8.

62 Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, pp. 147, 150.

63 Spender reported to the Australian War Cabinet that a complete change of opinion had taken place in the NEI with respect to the desirability of staff talks. He attributed this to the victories of the British forces in North Africa and the success of the Taranto attack. Advisory War Council Minute no. 145, 13 Feb. 1941. Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937–1949 (DAFP), ed. Neale, Robert G. et al. (Canberra: Australian Government Publications Service, 1975–98), vol. 4, doc. 289, p. 391.Google Scholar

64 Welter to G.G. 4 Feb. 1941 (tel.). See DBPN, period C, Vol. 2, doc. no. 205, p. 253.

65 The Dutch Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Vice-Adm. Furstner, was appointed Minister of the Navy, a new Cabinet-level post, in July 1941, which of course reinforced his position.

66 Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine, Vol. 2, p. 76 and p. 458, n. 148; Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, p. 222.

67 de Jong, Louis, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1969–1991), vol. 11a, first part, p. 558.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

68 Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, p. 222.

69 Report of the Singapore Defence Conference, Oct. 1940, CAB 80/24.

70 Telegram G.G. to Welter, 22 Nov. 1940, Archives MinBuZa, London Legation, DZ/AI 6, box 34.

71 Follow-up meetings on technical matters took place between Dutch and British officers in Batavia and Bandung on 30 Jan. 1941, in Bandung on 7 Feb. and again in Batavia on 15 Feb.

72 Sometimes the confusing indications ADB (American-Dutch-British, for the fourth conference) and ADA (Anglo-Dutch-Australian, for the fifth conference) are used in the literature. The Fifth Staff Conference, however, was in fact a continuation of the third, with U.S. observers again present. For the official Report of the Fourth Staff Conference, see DBPN, series C, vol. 2, doc. nr. 371, pp. 469–84.

73 These somewhat surprising recommendations are to be found in para. 18 of the Final report, Fifth Singapore Staff Conference, DBPN, series C, vol. 2, doc. nr. 372, pp. 485–94.

74 Marder, A.J., Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, vol. I (Strategic Illusions 1936–1941) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 209Google Scholar.

75 G.G. to Minister of Colonies, 21 May 1941 (tel.), Archives MinBuZa, London Legation, DZ/GA, inv. nr. 1415, box C8.

76 Loudon to van Kleffens, 31 Jul. 1941, no. 4006/859, in Archives MinBuZa, Washington Legation, inv. nr. 2833.

77 Bosscher, De Koninklijke Marine, vol. 2, pp. 114–15.

78 Helfrich, Mémoires, vol. 1, pp. 101–102.

79 To be found in Military History Section SMG, (Dutch) Army General Staff, The Hague, File 2/33.

80 Plenaps Copy nr. 33 of 12 Nov. 1941, in File Hd-18, CAD (Central Archives Dutch Ministry of Defence), The Hague.

81 Telegram G.G. 20 Nov. 1941, Archives MinBuZa, London Legation, inv. nr. 1415.

82 Note of Admiral Furstner to Admiralty, 21 Nov. 1941.

83 Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, pp. 212–38.

84 Report of meeting between Van Kleffens and Eden, 25 Jun. 1941. Archives MinBuZa, London Legation, DZ/GA, box C8, inv. nr. 1415.

85 Letter Michiels van Verduynen to Van Kleffens, 1 Aug. 1941, no 2576/607, Archives MinBuZa, London Legation, box C8, inv. nr. 1415. See also DBPN, Series C, Vol. 3, Doc. 149, p. 202.

86 For the reasons underlying the British position, see Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, pp. 303–305.

87 Report Michiels van Verduynen to van Kleffens, 6 Aug. 1941, Archives MinBuZa, London Legation, box C8, inv. nr. 1415.

88 War Cabinet conclusions, confidential attachment, 12 Nov. 1941, CAB 65/24, COS 112(41)1.

89 Note by Chief of Air Staff on a conversation with Sir Earle Page and S.M. Bruce on 18 Nov. 1941, PRO PREM 3/156/6. See also Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, p. 310.

90 DBPN, series C, vol. 3, doc. 411; Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, p. 310.

91 According to Tarling (The Onset of the Pacific War, p. 309), Churchill believed that the next Japanese move would not be to attack the NEI, but to cut off the Burma Road.

92 Haggie, Paul, Britannia at Bay: The Defence of the British Empire against Japan 1931–1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 187Google Scholar.

93 Letter M.F. Vigeveno to T. Elink Schuurman, Consul-General in Sydney, 14 Oct. 1941, no. 275/CG 239, in Archives MinBuZa, Political Reports Consulate General Sydney, box 13, file 8.

94 Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, p. 303.

95 Ibid., p. 311.

96 Washington to FO, 4 Dec. 1941, FO 371/27913 [F 13001/86/23].

97 War Cabinet meeting of 4 December 1941, W.M.(41) 124th Concl., minute 4, CAB 65/24.

98 This important letter dated 5 Dec. 1941, FO 13245/230/G, is to be found in Archives MinBuZa, London Legation, DZ/GA, Inv. nr. 1415; see also Tarling, The Onset of the Pacific War, p. 313.

99 DBPN, Series C, Vol. 3, doc. 430, p. 573. Also Telegram G.G. to MinCol., 17 Nov. 1941, nr. 237/240. Archives MinBuZa, Washington Legation.

100 van Mook, H.J., The Netherlands East Indies and Japan: Battle on Paper (New York: W.W. Norton, 1944)Google Scholar.