Laboratory studies frequently find that framing changes individual issue positions. But few real-world studies have demonstrated framing induced shifts in aggregate political opinions, let alone political identities. One explanation for these divergent findings is that the competitive nature of most real-world political debates presents multiple frames that cancel each other out. We assess this proposition and the extent of real-world framing by focusing on the issue of immigration, which has been framed in largely negative terms by the media. Specifically, we assess the connection between New York Times coverage of immigration and aggregate white partisanship over the last three decades. We find that negative framing on immigration is associated with shifts toward the Republican Party—the Party linked with anti-immigrant positions. This suggests that under the right circumstances, framing can alter core political predispositions and shape the partisan balance of power.

Immigrant sentiment, measured by the number of state laws enacted to curb the flow of undocumented immigration or expand rights to immigrants, have been on a steady incline since September 11, 2001. Despite the increased attention to unauthorized immigration, little research has examined how immigrant policies are affecting group identity (i.e., linked fate). Linked fate is a form of collective group identity that develops when a group of people experience discrimination and marginalization. Using a unique database that merges the 2012 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (n = 934 Latinos) with the sum of state-level immigration policies enacted from 2005 to 2012, this study is the first to examine the direct relationship between immigrant climate and linked fate. Results from our multinomial logistic regressions indicate that the linked fate among Latinos increases as the number of punitive immigration laws in a state increases, controlling for a vector of control variables. Consistent with our theory regarding differential impact, our findings also suggest that immigration laws have a more pronounced influence on the linked fate of foreign-born Latinos.

This paper incorporates the role of race into our understanding of the hidden welfare state by exploring the implications of racialization of hidden welfare state programs for mass attitudes. We explain how traditional welfare programs have been racialized historically and the implications of that racialization on attitudes towards welfare programs. We then discuss how the same fate could befall hidden programs for the poor if “unearthed” as hidden welfare state scholars have suggested. Finally, we carry out an experiment racializing a hidden welfare state program in the same way that traditional welfare state programs have been racialized historically. Our analysis finds that only when the hidden welfare state program is described using traditional racial stereotypes, support for the program drops significantly among racially resentful. Our findings suggest that the inclusion of race into the hidden welfare state narrative alters our understanding of attitudes towards some of these programs.

Political economy comparisons of Kenya and Tanzania have often found the political salience of ethnicity to be far higher in the former than the latter, with a negative impact on intercommunal trust. This difference has tended to be explained on the basis of the different kinds of leadership that the two countries experienced after independence. However, these findings have typically been demonstrated using aggregate or survey data. This paper assesses the salience of ethnicity at the individual level for the first time, deploying monetized two-round trust games in urban Kenya and Tanzania. The experimental games isolate the comparative impact of common knowledge of ethnicity and integrity among a quasi-random selection of 486 citizens. Verifying previous findings, we observe higher levels of trust and trustworthiness in Tanzania as compared with Kenya. Further, in comparison with Kenya, any shared knowledge of ethnic identities in Tanzania leads players to transfer fewer resources, while common knowledge that both players are “honest” led to higher transfers there than in Kenya. These results provide robust evidence of higher levels of trust in Tanzania, and of the negative effect in that country of common knowledge of ethnicity on levels of cooperation. The findings demonstrate the way in which political context can shape the impact of ethnic diversity, and encourage further experimental research that looks at the intersubjective dynamics of social cooperation.

In this research note, we explore compare and contrast three methods for measuring race. We utilize as our baseline, or “true”, measure expert coded racial categories, and to this compare two alternatives. The first is a hybrid Bayesian analysis of racial/ethnic surname lists and population distributions, which allow us to develop a race probability score for each candidate. The second is a novel and innovative crowdsourcing method that allows many contributors to classify the racial identity of candidates. We analyze and discuss the potential benefits, pitfalls, and tradeoffs of each method. We conclude with the implications of these new measures for future election research as well as race and politics scholarship more broadly.

Our understanding of the politics of race, indigeneity, and ethnicity is informed not only by the work of scholars, but also by the work of leaders and practitioners. The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics (JREP) is proud to continue our Q&A series with Erik Stegman, executive director of Center for Native American Youth (CNAY) at the Aspen Institute. Our hope is that forums like these will help advance our collective scholarship by better informing our research agendas, validating some of our claims, and building more bridges between the worlds of research, politics, and policy.