This article seeks to acquaint the reader with the intellectual landscape of comparative policy studies, and to raise the level of self-consciousness of scholars active in the field. To this end it discusses why comparative policy studies emerged when and where it did in the 1970s. Then it grapples with the reasons and possible effects of the fact that the very term ‘comparative policy’ is so difficult to translate into non-English languages, and links this to a discussion of problems of conceptual cohesion. The last part assesses the prospects of a field which is seeking to gain and retain intellectual coherence and respect, though not nestled comfortably within a single discipline, and is subject to contending pulls from national and international academic, political and bureaucratic forces.

A vigorous tradition in comparative politics argues that national policymakers develop characteristic and durable methods for dealing with public issues, that these can be linked to policy outcomes, and that they can be systematically compared. More recently, a number of scholars have suggested reversing the direction of causality, claiming that the nature of political issues themselves causes the politics associated with them. This policy sector approach implies that there should be cross-national similarities in the way issues are treated, whatever the styles particular nations adopt. The two approaches need to be integrated into a common framework built around a research strategy that investigates policymaking within specific sectors across multiple national cases. Such an approach can transcend the often sterile debate over whether the policies of nations are unique or are converging by seeking to explain how the nature of issues structures the variation among the policies of nations.

This paper attempts to place the role of defense spending within the overall context of the budgetary process. Using an extended version of the ‘Competing Aspirations Level Model’ based on the behavioral theory of decision-making, major budgetary aggregates, total spending, defense spending, exhaustive civilian expenditures, and capital outlays, are modelled as outcomes of independently generated aspirations, based on parochial organizational and environmental influences, and a reconciliation process reflecting the bargaining power of budgetary agents. An empirical assessment of the model's performance is conducted using the experience of thirteen national governments, including seven western industrialized states and six developing states. The results of this statistical analysis suggest that the model provides a useful basis for understanding and comparing budgetary processes and outcomes.

The relationship between the state and its own enterprises may be analyzed at three different levels: a rational-economic level, where what is good for the state-owned enterprise may oppose what is good for the state as a whole; an organizational level, where such conflicts are aggravated by a power struggle; and a political level, where the arbitrating authority is seen as an individual member of the government. If state-owned enterprises are to serve national goals and be efficiently managed, their relationship with the state must be improved. First, the state should set the state-owned enterprise's general objectives, approve its proposed strategy, and refrain from intervening any further in its management. Second, the state-owned enterprise should report to one authority only for an approval, and submit to effective strategic control. Third, political interventions should be few, and should consist of middle-range agreements signed between a member of government and the state-owned industry's top manager, avoiding partisan or too detailed considerations.

This paper attempts to explain what influenced efficient decisions in the adoption of important technology in the steel industry. An index of efficient decisions for the adoption of the basic oxygen furnace and for continuous casting is discussed theoretically and then empirically developed for the steel industries of 28 and 27 countries respectively. Statistical tests are performed to determine the influence of government ownership of the steel industries, central planning of the economies and involvement in international competition on efficient decisions regarding technology adoption. The tests reveal that both government ownership and central planning retarded efficient decisions regarding the adoption of technology.