Recent decades have witnessed the remarkable rise of a kind of market authority almost as centralized as the state itself – two credit rating agencies, Moody's and Standard & Poor's. These agencies derive their influence from two sources. The first is the information content of their ratings. The second is both more profound and vastly more problematic: Ratings are incorporated into financial regulations in the United States and around the world. In this article we clarify the role of credit rating agencies in global capital markets, describe the host of problems that arise when their ratings are given the force of law, and outline the alternatives to the public policy dilemmas created when ratings receive a public imprimatur. We conclude that agencies designated for regulatory purposes should be required to provide more nuanced ratings exposing their perceptual and ideological underpinnings (especially for sovereigns), and facilitating consideration of alternatives to ratings-dependent regulation.

This article discusses the concept of contractual uncertainty and assesses its impact upon the ability of public sector bodies to obtain value for money from their suppliers. Particularly in the realm of public private partnerships, governments around the world are increasingly developing specifications that are likely to be subject to contractual uncertainty. Contractual uncertainty is not necessarily a problem in itself, but can be if the public body cannot avoid an unfavourable power relation in its dealings with the supplier, because it is in a poor position to undertake the inevitable post-contractual negotiations. The argument is illustrated with two cases from the UK public sector that highlight the fact that British public bodies are often seeking to manage contractual uncertainty from a position of weakness.

At its Lisbon Summit in March 2000, the European Council decided to apply the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) to innovation policies. The aim is to establish a European Research Area, in which the OMC shall increase the coherence of regional, national and European policies. Until now, however, the OMC has only been applied to a very limited extent. We argue that this development is due to the fact that there are specific conditions for policy coordination in the emerging European multi-level innovation system that have hardly been mirrored by late EU initiatives for a more coherent European Research Area and its new open method of coordination.

The relationship between nationalism and public policy remains largely unexplored. Focusing on the link between sub-state nationalism and social policy, this article formulates three main arguments. The first is that social policy is likely to factor into processes of identity- and nation-building spearheaded by sub-state nationalism, and that nationalist movements typically trigger pressures for the decentralization of social policy. The second is that recognizing the importance of this connection should not lead to hasty conclusions about the impact of societal and institutional pressures on public policy. Nationalism is not only a societal force; it is also a political construction that reflects broad institutional legacies. The third is that the historical sequence of nationalism and policy development may create institutional forces preventing the congruence between policies and ethno-linguistic boundaries, in spite of pressures emanating from nationalist movements. The analysis of Social Security politics in contemporary Belgium provides ground to these claims.