Theories of political accountability assume citizens use information about the performance of government to hold public officials accountable, but whether citizens actually use information is difficult to directly examine. We take advantage of the importance of citizen-driven, performance-based accountability for education policy in Tennessee to conduct a survey experiment that identifies the effect of new information, mistaken beliefs and differing considerations on the evaluation of public officials and policy reforms using 1,500 Tennesseans. Despite an emphasis on reporting outcomes for school accountability policies in the state, mistaken beliefs are prevalent and produce overly optimistic assessments of the institutions responsible for statewide education policy. Moreover, individuals update their assessments of these institutions in an unbiased way when provided with objective performance data about overall student performance. Providing additional information about race-related performance differences does not alter this relationship, however. Finally, support for specific policies that are intended to improve student performance is unchanged by either type of performance information; opinions about policy reforms are instead most related to race and existing partisan commitments.

This paper examines the relationship between the industry mix and policy decisions regarding the skill composition of immigration. I start with the premise that low- and high-technology industries are unequally affected by changes in the intensity of factors of production, and develop conflicting preferences over immigration policies. To avoid the negative reactions that would ensue from the depletion of regional industries, governments have incentives to adjust the skill composition of immigration in order to maintain the existing regional industry mix. I test the implications of this argument using data on Canadian provinces between 2001 and 2010, and a research design based on the two-stage least squares methodology. Overall, the empirical results are consistent with the theory: provinces relying intensively upon low-technology industries are likely to receive higher proportions of low-skilled immigrants. A consequence is that immigration policies may sustain existing technological gaps between regions and temper down the growth of high-technology sectors.

On average, higher per capita income comes with lower corruption levels. Yet, countries like Mexico, Libya and Saudi Arabia are relatively wealthy but experience comparatively high corruption levels. Simultaneously, countries like Madagascar or Mozambique (in the 1990s) combine poor economic development with a low level of corruption. I propose that the two most common variables in corruption research – wealth and democracy – are mutually conditional: economic development brings about a larger (and stronger) middle class that demands public goods from the government. However, citizens’ ability to influence governmental decision-making varies by political regime type. In democracies, citizens are, on average, more successful in demanding goods from the government than in autocracies. Using a large-N approach (up to 139 countries, 1984–2006), the analysis finds robust empirical support for the proposed conditional effect.

Although state resistance to federal mandates is a prevalent characteristic of contemporary American federalism, little is known about the factors that separate resisting states from states that do not oppose federal policy. This article examines state resistance through a framework that classifies public policies by salience and complexity and identifies societal interests and government officials who are hypothesised to influence policy making on issues of varying types. These hypotheses are investigated in the context of state resistance to four federal laws – the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, No Child Left Behind Act, Help America Vote Act and REAL ID Act. The results of the statistical analysis demonstrate the centrality of the characteristics of citizens, elected officials and specialised interest groups in conditioning state resistance to federal mandates. These results suggest that state resistance can be characterised as a strategic response to federal mandates that varies systematically across types of public policies.

Why do some countries deviate from European Union law? More specifically, why do countries violate the Stability and Growth Pact, which is a cornerstone piece of legislation for the shared economy? Is it that violators simply have no other choice due to economic need? Are the violators intentional deviators that are simply able to violate the Stability and Growth Pact because of their power in the European Union? This article answers these questions and identifies those factors that are most likely to impact a country’s deviation from the two main clauses of the Stability and Growth Pact. The major finding is that it is economic need, not a country’s relative power, governing ideology or diffusion, that has a large impact on which clause will be violated.

Focusing events are sudden, striking large-scale occurrences that attract political attention. However, not all potential focusing events appear on the agenda. Combining data from multiple sources, this study conducts an analysis of the determinants of prioritisation of external focusing events in the European Council over a period longer than two decades. The results demonstrate that decisions regarding the placement of crises on the agenda are underscored by exogenous (humanitarian) and endogenous (geopolitical interest) considerations. Those events with a higher likelihood of agenda access include manmade incidents (versus natural disasters), events with larger death tolls and crises in the neighbourhood. Stronger competition between potential focusing events across time and space reduces the chances of access. The level of attention each event receives depends on purely strategic interests. Focusing events in neighbouring countries gain a higher portion of attention, as do occurrences in states having a larger trade exchange with the European Union.