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Keeping Kosher: The Epistemology of Tax Expenditures*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Aaron Wildavsky
Aaron Wildavsky
Affiliation:
Political Science and Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley
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Extract

Not long ago, I found myself at an athletic breakfast. Having long supported a broader-based, lower-rate income tax, with fewer tax preferences, I was dismayed to discover a letter from an administrator requesting all present to protest against the new reform on the grounds that by weakening tax preferences it would reduce contributions to the University in general and sports in particular. To this special interest – all interests are special to those who care about them – one can add, among numerous others, museums, opera companies, and sports franchises. Indeed, until I started writing this review, I was unaware of how tax preferences help increase the salaries of athletes. These franchises make substantial income from box seats bought by corporations that can write them off as business expenses. Absent this subsidy, franchise income, hence allowable salaries, would be less. Do we want to subsidize athletes? Or owners? How is this to be avoided while protecting the busboys, waiters, and other people who depend on the ablity of businessmen to write off meals and drinks?

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , August 1985 , pp. 413 - 431
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1985

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References

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