These two notes are the first of a series which will suggest to mariners the causes of collision at sea when radar is in use, by showing against each apparent cause an accumulation of court evidence and judgment, by isolating certain kinds of action which seem to have led to collision but have not been so regarded in every judgment and by examining certain judgments against a technically informed background.

In the articles which follow, a particular judgment is examined in the light of a more precise study of true motion as a direct source of intelligence at slow speeds, of plotting when courses and speeds are changing and of the suggestion that the Crossing Rules may be applied in fog after ‘ascertainment’.

Every collision situation implies the existence of a sector within which any course steered will lead to a dangerously close approach and a sector within which the danger of collision will be avoided. The definition of these sectors may be said to constitute the structural aspect of the collision problem. The appropriate manœuvre in a given situation constitutes the operational aspect. The structural aspect is fundamental to the problem itself, the operational aspect offers possible solutions. The Steering and Sailing Rules involve the structural aspect because this is the only basis for legal rules.

In proposing a Sector Rule for use with radar in conditions of bad visibility, it is intended to establish a structural basis for legislation. In its most general terms, the Sector Rule is based on the principle that if the radar echo of another ship is always at an angle to one's own course determined by the speeds of the two vessels, their distance apart and the safe passing distance, then one's course lies within the safe sector for collision avoidance.

Many nations are debating the implementation of vessel traffic services (VTS) and it is envisaged that some regulation of the movement of marine traffic may soon be imposed. It is highly desirable that prior to any change a rigorous appraisal of the existing traffic be carried out to establish the level of risk in the area; this level can then be used to evaluate any proposed change. The following note describes a research project concerned with establishing a general method of determining the base risk level, developed from earlier research by M. Degré and M. Lefèvre who used a computer simulation of marine traffic in the Dover Strait to assess the impact of various suggested traffic separation schemes. A cost-effective tool has been developed at Liverpool which will enable traffic patterns to be studied in areas remote from the land. This is a computer simulation model which is being used to establish dynamic areas of risk in the Irish Sea, which could easily be transposed to study traffic patterns in any other area.

This paper presents a description of a general method for the evaluation of marine collision risk. The approach differs considerably from existing methods in this area, in that it combines analytical modelling in a special way to analyse historical data. The method makes it possible to find the collision probability of a specific ship in any particular location, taking into account such location factors as area geometry, ship movements and speeds. It also constitutes a basis for worldwide data collection.

In view of the growth of marine traffic and the increase in the transportation of hazardous materials over the past two decades, considerable efforts are being made towards the development of maritime risk evaluation methods, the main objective being the quantification of ship collision probability. The methods developed to date can roughly be subdivided into the following two groups: (a) kinematic models (see for instance refs. 1–6); (b) historical data analysis (see for instance refs. 7–17). It is a well-established fact that most collisions are due to human failures, and it is widely accepted that human behaviour cannot be described well by mathematical formulae. Kinematic models are therefore not recognized as suitable for estimating this probability. Historical data analysis estimates the collision probability as the ratio of the number of observed collisions to the number of ship movements. Probabilities estimated in this way are only correct in a probabilistic sense when the assumption is satisfied that every ship movement has the same probability of collision. This assumption is rarely fulfilled since most ships often pass each other without collision danger. In addition, this approach is often hampered by lack of data for a specific traffic area, while the application of worldwide data cannot be considered realistic. As far as we know, there does not exist a method which can transfer, in a statistically justifiable manner, marine traffic data from one area to another. Moreover, neither of the above-mentioned approaches is appropriate to analyse alternative routes in the same area, or under changing circumstances.

The Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite-based passive radio-navigation system under development by the US Department of Defense (DOD) and due for operational deployment in the late 1980s. Each satellite carries an atomic frequency standard and transmits L-band spread-spectrum signals whose carrier frequencies and code epochs are synchronized with the satellite clocks. A suitably equipped user may measure the arrival time and frequency of the signals from at least four satellites to obtain accurate three-dimensional position and velocity information and, as a by-product, an accurate ‘system’ time.

Although the use of bisectors to select the most probable position determined from astronomical observations is well known, the system seems to have received insufficient recognition in current navigational literature. In what follows an attempt is made to assess the problem practically.

Since 1975 the Royal Netherlands Naval College has operated a bridge manoeuvring simulator for the training of naval officers and petty officers of the deck department. There is a strong relationship between training objectives and performance abilities of a simulator and the way the two match defines the cost effectiveness and the value of simulator training. The training objective being the result aimed at (for a professional watchkeeper) consists partially of a combination of training subjects (things to be learned at the simulator). During 1980 and 1981 R.Nl.N.C. conducted a survey on simulator training subjects by means of an inquiry amongst Royal Netherland's Navy and Merchant Navy officers, marine lecturers (all of Dutch origin) and members of the International Marine Simulator Forum (IMSF). The results form the subject of this note.

Throughout the history of marine navigation it has been recognized by seamen that soundings of the sea bed are a most natural and valuable aid to safe passages. Yet it is probably true to say that the methods of obtaining such soundings and for recording and using the information so obtained remained relatively primitive for longer than any of the other arts or systems used by seamen.

Records can be found which indicate that the earliest navigators used poles or lines and plummets to measure the depths of water on the coasts and in the rivers. An example of the use of soundings by Phoenician seamen is recorded by Strabo, who relates that the captain of a Phoenician ship on a voyage to the Casseterides for tin thought himself too closely followed by a Roman ship and deliberately sought a shoal which he knew of on which to run his vessel to avoid capture and the loss of his precious secrets. Then Hanno, the famous Carthaginian admiral of about 500 B.C., at his furthest point south on the West Coast of Africa, outlined the contours of the River Niger, and the Greek admiral Nearchus at the same time made his voyage from the Indus to the Euphrates by soundings in the rivers and on the coast.

In 1967 a compilation of visual wave data was published as a book with the title Ocean Wave Statistics, which is still widely used. In 1983 work began on the development of a new global atlas of wave statistics which will be available both as a book and as a computer database. This task is being undertaken by NMI Ltd in collaboration with the UK Meteorological Office with funding from the Department of Industry and is expected to take about three years. A preliminary account of the project has already been published. This article briefly recapitulates the case for the new atlas and updates the indication previously given of the proposed form of the contents, which has been revised in the light of comments received. Reference will be included to the plans for an associated database not mentioned in the previous account.

It is now more than thirty years since Commander W. E. May, R.N. (formerly of the Admiralty Compass Observatory), drafted this hitherto unpublished paper, recording his opinions based on a study of documents made available to him in 1947 by Messrs Kelvin, Bottomley and Baird. The documents referred to in the paper are:

The Thomson v. Moore case as presented to the House of Lords in the Thomson v. Moore case (Patent Design and Trade Mark Cases, Vol. VII, No. 36.)

The case of Thomson v. Hughes (Patent Design and Trade Mark Cases, Vol. VII, Nos. 9 and 22.)

Report of Proof of case of Kelvin v. Whyte Thomson &. Co.

Bound volume of patent specifications referred to in the last named.

It is a curious habit of editors and publishers to invite well-known persons to write articles on subjects outside their normal orbit. Thus in 1874 Sir William Thomson was invited to write for Good Words an article on the mariner's compass. He took up the task and soon realized that he did not know enough of the subject to complete the article. He then began to study the compass and the final part of the article was published in 1879. Such is one of Lord Kelvin's explanations of how he came to interest himself. In 1885, in an affidavit for the Moore case, he said that he took up the study of the compass in 1871, whilst elsewhere he said that it was the necessity of writing for the Royal Society an obituary notice on Archibald Smith, who died in 1872, which first turned his attention to compasses.

In recent years it is probably true to say that the main pressures for inprovements in navigational safety have come from public and hence political sources. The pressure has usually taken the form of proposals for increased regulation of marine traffic. Often there is a defensive reaction from the professional mariner on the grounds that there is no real evidence that the proposals will produce a significant improvement in safety. Shipowners are also worried because of potential increased costs and curtailment of operating freedom.

It is therefore important that more information is made available so that both the safety aspects and economic aspects of additional regulation may be assessed. This paper is an account of a study into the development of danger criteria for marine traffic flows. This study was the key part of a larger one which was funded by the Department of Industry through its Ship and Marine Technology Requirements Board, now superseded by the Marine Technology Committee.

Collision rates on their own are usually not suitable for measuring safety risk, as collisions in a specific area are normally a very rare event. It is also not advisable to use data collected over several years as the traffic is likely to change, e.g. size of ship. Another approach might be the reporting of near misses, but there are considerable problems if navigators are asked to do this especially as there might be subjective judgments on whether to report an incident or not.

Various surveys have been carried out in narrow waters throughout the world and provide data on the traffic volume, traffic density, velocity distributions of ships, &c. Although these surveys certainly contribute to the safety of local navigation they do not give any information on traffic movements between terminal points in a marine traffic system. There are a few papers on voyage distribution based on traffic surveys, statistical reports or questionnaires to mariners and also a few based on radar observation, including one in Osaka Bay in Japan which was carried out by the traffic research group of the Kobe University of Mercantile Marine and Nautical Technical College.

Vertical speeds of aircraft are always very slight compared with their horizontal speeds (except in the case of aerobatics) and it is first necessary to study the problem of air collisions in horizontal flight, a problem which, from the point of view of the geometry, is analogous to that of collisions at sea.

The term ‘dead reckoning’, so the Admiralty Navigation Manual (1938) says, is a corruption of the old ‘ded-uced reckoning’ or ‘position by account’, and is used to cover all positions that are obtained from ‘the course the ship steers and her speed through the water, and from no other factors.’ (The last italics are ours.) Had Master William Borough, Chief Pilot of the Muscovy Company, and presently to be appointed to Queen Elizabeth's Navy Board, come across this definition, he would have picked a two-fold quarrel with their present Lordships at Whitehall. For his use and explanation of the term is the earliest of which we have knowledge, although it does not appear even then to have been new.

In this paper, methods and formulas for testing ARPA (Automatic Radar Plotting Aid) equipment according to IMO requirements are developed. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) requirements for tracking accuracy are also discussed.

This address by the Secretary-General of Imco was given at a meeting of the Institute in London on 10 March 1976, with a Vice-President, Mrs. Mary Pera, in the Chair.

IT gives me great pleasure to be here today and I should like to thank you most warmly for your kind invitation to speak on the work of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, or IMCO as it is commonly called. Naturally I do not need much encouragement to talk about Imco but I consider this to be a rather special occasion, because of the long and close association between the Royal Institute of Navigation and Imco. I shall advert again and more fully to this association later.

As you know, Imco is a specialized agency of the United Nations charged with important responsibilities in the maritime field. It was established by the Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, adopted by the United Nations Maritime Conference held in Geneva in 1948. Imco began life in January 1959 and its Headquarters have been in London from that time.

Map matching is an important algorithm for any location-based service, especially in navigation and tracking systems and services. Identifying the relevant road segments accurately and efficiently, given positioning data, is the first and most important step in any map matching algorithm. This paper proposes a new approach to searching for road candidates by clustering and then searching road segments through a constructed hierarchical clustering tree, rather than using indexing techniques to query segments within a fixed search window. A binary tree is created based on the hierarchical clustering tree and adaptive searches are conducted to identify candidate road segments given GPS positions. The approach was validated using road maps with different scales and various scenarios in which moving vehicles were located. Both theoretical analysis and experimental results confirm that the proposed approach can efficiently find candidate road segments for map matching.

There is no generally accepted definition of the difference between a map and a chart. A widespread feeling probably exists favouring the old saying that maps are to look at and charts to work on. It is true that the term ‘aeronautical chart’ gained a general currency over alternative terms as contact flying gave way to aerial navigation. But, in this paper, the terms ‘map’ and ‘chart’ will be used as seems appropriate to each occasion, without attempt to conform to any particular definition.

We can get an idea of what was available to the earliest aviators by looking at an Ordnance Survey reprint of one of their nineteenth century maps (Fig. 1). They are printed in one colour only, black on white. By far the predominant feature is the hill shading. Quite gentle hills are hachured with a heaviness which tends to obscure both natural features like rivers, lakes and woodlands and man-made constructions such as towns and villages, roads, canals and railways. Hills are, of course, very important features to those on the ground, since they limit the extent to which other features can be seen. To the soldier, the significance of high ground is self-evident, and it was principally for the ordnance requirements of soldiers that these maps had been developed. But when men began to view the ground from the air, the perspective changed. Hills appeared flattened out and, provided that you knew the height of the tallest in the area and were sure none would impede your take-off or landing, were of minor significance. Lakes and woods, though, were spread out before you in their distinctive shapes, while railway lines and canals presented bold straight lines and curves, and rivers their unique courses, to your view. The need was for new kinds of maps which would give due prominence to such features.

Despite increasing use of radar, marine collisions have continued to occur in significant number. The principal reason advanced for this development has been the ‘human element’ and many new electronic innovations have been suggested or built to minimize this factor. This note is written not for the purpose of providing an absolute answer to the problem, but rather to suggest there may be another angle from which it may be approached.