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Towards Global Marine Traffic Control — the Need, the Technical Feasibility and the Social and Political Impediments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2009

A. G. Corbet
Affiliation:
(Department of Maritime Studies and International Transport University of Wales College of Cardiff)

Abstract

1. Introduction. Active MTC (Marine Traffic Control), in its various forms, is at present mainly confined to port areas and canals and their approaches, whereas all other areas are mainly subject to passive MTC measures; that is, the Collision Regulations, including traffic separation schemes, areas to be avoided by certain classes of vessels, deep water routes, etc. The Collision Regulations, however, despite many attempts to improve them, are fundamentally flawed by specious logic sanctioned, unfortunately, by legislation which is supported in turn by the well-meaning connivance of the courts. This paper highlights some of the insoluble problems of the Collision Regulations and looks at the planning of ocean passages, weather routeing, search and rescue, and fishery protection; and shows that there is already a measure of active MTC in these areas of activity. The future possibility of a comprehensive global active MTC system to deal with avoidance of collisions and strandings, in addition to those other activities, is considered with respect to technical feasibility and to social and political impediments.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Navigation 1992

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References

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