The 3 August 2005 military coup was Mauritania's best opportunity to turn the page on decades of the deposed quasi-military regime's destructive politics. This article critically analyses relevant aspects of the transition that ensued in the context of the prevailing models of military withdrawal from politics in Africa. It also examines the challenges that Mauritania's short-lived Third Republic faced. It argues that the transition process did not escape the well-known African military junta leader's proclivity to manipulate transitions to fulfil suddenly awakened self-seeking political ambitions, in violation of solemn promises. While there was no old-fashioned ballot stuffing to decide electoral outcomes, Mauritania's junta leader and his lieutenants spared no effort to keep the military very much involved in politics, and to perpetuate a strong sense of entitlement to political power. Originally designed as an ingenious ‘delayed self-succession’ of sorts, in the end, another coup aborted Mauritania's democratisation process and threw its institutions in a tailspin. This only exacerbated the challenges that have saddled Mauritania's political system and society for decades – unhealthy civil-military relations, a dismal ‘human rights deficit’, terrorism, and a neo-patrimonial, disastrously mismanaged economy.

How has the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union helped promote peace, security and stability on the African continent? This article assesses the PSC's activities in light of insights generated by the literature on international security institutions. After providing an overview of the immediate origins of the PSC, it discusses five elements of the Council's institutional design. It then evaluates the PSC's activities during its first five years (2004–9), by examining the Council's political relevance, its efficiency and productivity, and whether it is the institution best placed to deal with the continent's security problems. It concludes that the PSC's future will hinge on whether more of the African Union's members can be persuaded to devote more serious levels of resources (human and financial) to it.

The ‘non-electoral context’ of elections is often overlooked in democratisation studies, in order not to obscure an otherwise clear model or theory of transition. A key challenge for research on democratisation processes is to balance electoral ‘formalities’ with contextual factors, qualitative perceptions and non-electoral issues, in order to reach a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of democratic transitions. This article advocates a multilayered approach to – or a ‘thick description’ of – elections, as this will capture the diversity of real life experiences and expose alternative power discourses competing with the electoralist one in influencing the path of democratisation. In so doing, it casts light on the crucial impact of the Eritrean–Ethiopian war on Ethiopia's 2005 election, in addition to other qualitative and contextual factors, which lead to the conclusion that the advancement of democracy through multiparty elections in Ethiopia under the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has failed.

In order to give an account of the Congolese tragedy since independence, the inhabitants of Haut-Katanga often resort to four different narratives: the abandonment by Belgium; the biblical curse on Africans; the conspiracy of Western capitalism; or the alienation of life powers by Whites. Though these four stories offer different scenarios, they are all constructed with two types of actors – Whites and Congolese people. This article suggests that this racial/national frame finds its origins in colonial and national ideologies, which have left their mark on Haut-Katanga, and that it continues today to structure the narratives through which people remember their post-colonial history. Collective memory and racial/national identity are reciprocally constituted in these stories, but in different terms. They offer, accordingly, different ways of influencing the present.

Recent studies on vigilante groups show how they often begin as popular schemes for imposing order, before degenerating into violent militias which contribute in turn to social and political disorder. The Masai, a group of khat sellers and consumers in the Ugandan border town of Bwera, represent a more complex case. By using vigilance tactics in the provision of security, the Masai actually help to shape public authority within Bwera town instead of creating institutional chaos. They also provide a range of services, imposing a degree of order on illegal cross-border activities in the area. However, a closer look at the Masai shows that their vigilance activities are mainly performed out of self-interest, as a quid pro quo enabling them to continue their illegal activities of smuggling, general criminality outside town and illegal drug use. Therefore they straddle the ‘crime or social order’ dynamic, representing a criminal gang of illegal drug traffickers which also provides services for public community interests. As such, they contribute to both order and crime.