This article develops the concept of ‘mediating bureaucrats’ by exploring their role during liberal reforms that led to rehabilitation of the sugar industry in Mozambique. By focusing on how relations between the state, government and business are mediated by a group of cadres who have occupied positions in different social domains, the article argues that these ‘mediating bureaucrats’ cannot easily be identified in one-dimensional terms as belonging to either the public or private sector, the state or the market. It is argued that as ‘socially embedded actors’, the group of ‘mediating bureaucrats’ are in a position to translate and mediate between diverse and sometimes conflicting interests and aspirations of the state, the government and business. We use the rehabilitation of the sugar industry in Mozambique to show how mediating bureaucrats adopted two practices – muddling through and translation – in order to straddle conflicting interests during different reform initiatives in post-independence Mozambique.

Constitutions in Africa are often considered fragile. Mali is an example of both constitutional crisis and constitutional durability. While Mali was upheld as a democratic model, the 2012 military coup might lead one to argue that Mali's recent history reflects constitutional weakness. However, the swift reinstatement of the constitution, popular commitment to its preservation, and attempts to pursue the post-coup transition in a constitutional manner all illustrate the domestic and international legitimacy of Mali's 1992 constitution. This article analyses the process of the proposed Malian constitutional referendum that, though constitutional in itself, contributed to the March 2012 overthrow of President Touré. It argues that the history of participatory constitutionalism in Mali contributed to the movement against the referendum. Constitutional reform is a necessity for an enduring constitution and this article sheds light on constitutional reform in states with weak legislatures, and illustrates the process of reform and the political divide that surrounded it in Mali. It provides a unique analysis of the crisis in Mali while at the same time making a contribution to our understanding of constitutionalism and constitutional reform in Africa.

Stefano Ponte's article in the first JMAS issue of 2001 brings good news: previous pessimistic accounts of the dynamics of economic life in the Uluguru Mountains, especially mine, have to be revised (Ponte 2001; van Donge 1993c). There may have been economic decline in the area, but economic liberalisation has turned that around and raised incomes. Ponte collected rich material, especially in his household survey. Whereas I found it difficult to get precise estimates of money, land, and so on from people there, he collected precise quantitative insights. This information covers not only their present situation: people recalled with considerable precision their situation back to the mid eighties when I did research there. His critique touches, however, not only changes over time, but also the assumptions about how actors behave: people are much more resourceful than I portrayed them.

The Government of Uganda headed by President Yoweri Museveni, which came to power in January 1986, has made impressive progress since then in bringing about peace and national reconcilication, and in restoring the rule of law. It has turned the economy round from what might be described as ‘free fall’ to steady growth, albeit still heavily dependent on foreign aid. It has returned expropriated properties to their Asian owners, and has begun to attract foreign investment. Above all it has restored hope and given Ugandans back their pride. These are no means achievements, and place the country firmly among the few in Africa in recent years which have managed to bring about a real improvement in the overall quality of life for their citizens, albeit from a very low base. This would in itself be sufficient reason for looking more closely at what has been happening there. But, after all the disappointments of the past, it is also legitimate to ask whether these dramatic improvements are likely to be sustainable.

This paper studies how the practices of climate change governance and development assistance have reshaped the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) process in Mozambique. We look at how the original goals of the Mozambican REDD+ strategy changed in the interplay of different governance-related practices, both those originating locally and nationally, and those coming from international organisations. The paper is based on the frameworks of multilevel governance and practice theory. We identify six combinations of practices that are relevant in the REDD+ programmes and projects. Three of them are incorporated in the general idea of sustainability, including practices of promoting environmental conservation, economic growth and social justice/development, while the remaining three practices are connected to climate-mitigation practices, for which the frame is defined in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Violence based on identity constructs reinforces the experience of ethnic boundaries as felt distance between in-groups and out-groups. But what makes such an experience of rigid ethnic boundaries fade or disappear, if anything? We examined this in Burundi, a country characterised by repeated episodes of violence between Hutu and Tutsi since independence. We analysed the waxing and waning of ethnic boundaries through the (life) stories of 202 individuals collected through an iterative research process in two rural villages that were seriously touched by (ethnic) violence. Rigid boundaries between ethnic in- and out-group appeared to fade through non-violent interactions; when categorisations other than ethnic emerged; and when awareness of interstitiality, being in-between salient groups, contested the relevance and meaning of the ethnic boundary as such. These insights invite us to bring in multiple temporalities and identities when aiming to understand legacies of violence in conflict-affected societies such as Burundi. This would allow us to avoid treating groups as substantial entities, which reinforces boundaries between in-groups and out-groups.

Zambia experienced its third electoral turnover in the 2021 election. While the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) lost votes across the territory, the electoral collapse in urban Zambia was particularly remarkable. This paper argues that economic performance voting can explain urban party switching in Zambia. The argument is supported by a unique panel survey of Zambian voters in the period 2019–2022. We show that urban voters were more likely to desert the PF, even when we control for ethnicity. We also show that they were more likely to evaluate the economy poorly and more likely to change their electoral preferences in view of such poor economic evaluation. Our results stress that African elections should not be understood as static expressions of stable political cleavages but may function as real opportunities for political accountability. However, the extent to which voters are willing to re-evaluate their vote choice varies across space.

Recent events in Southern Africa have focused attention on the hundreds of thousands of migrant workers in that region, and this short article recalls the role of those from Malawi – before that country became independent – in the strike which held up the construction of the Kariba dam in 1959. As is well known, there had been previous strikes in this area,1 but the Kariba walk-out coincided with an outbreak of opposition to colonial rule in Nyasaland, and prompted the declaration of a state of emergency, perhaps the first unmistakeable sign that the Central African Federation was doomed.