Even now, in the last third of the twentieth century, the nineteenth-century dual economy still exists, in effect if no longer in name, over much of the developing world. Although nationally independent — in Latin America for the past 100 years, and now in Africa and Asia — many of the developing nations are still economically dominated by their past colonial masters.

In the light of lively and widespread interest in developing-country technology it is not surprising that the search for what is ‘appropriate’ should be bedevilled by semantic confusion. This is, nevertheless, a nuisance which imposes on those who participate in the search and related discussion a tiresome obligation to try to make more than usually clear the meaning of the terms they use. In this regard, it comes naturally to economists to take as ‘appropriate’ that technology (set of inputs and processes) which would minimise the cost of production of a given volume of a given good in any particular location. This minimum cost can, of course, be calculated either at market or social prices, and the application of the latter — if they accurately reflected the real opportunity costs to the economy of the various factor inputs — would for many identify the optimum technology.

The absence of an efficient framework of economic institutions is frequently regarded as a major hindrance to the effective carrying out of economic policies, particularly in development planning2. However, rather little attention has been paid to the possibilities and problems of multi-purpose economic institutions, designed for the joint promotion of several government policies at the same time. This gap is particularly noticeable and particularly crucial in regard to Africa. To date, there have been several African examples of multi-purpose institutions, although these have not necessarily been intended as such originally. Set up to fulfil one or two main purposes, they have come to serve a multitude of aims as the need arose, and in doing so have demonstrated a considerable degree of institutional flexibility. Their example might well be deliberately followed in future.

This comment is a reaction to an article dealing with farmer–herder relationships in Burkina Faso. It was argued that the relationship between Mossi and Fulbe is not deteriorating as has often been described in the so-called mainstream literature, and that the apparent open animosity between the two ethnic groups can partly be explained as a frontstage discourse with the aim of concealing personal wealth. The comment questions the use of historical data and the extent of secrecy in relation to personal wealth, and criticises the way in which the authors use terms like orthodoxy and mainstream to portray a broad set of ideas and theories.

The article analyses the relationship between the Anglican Church of Rwanda and evangelical Episcopalians in the United States. In 2000, the archbishop of Rwanda, Emmanuel Kolini, in a move that gained great support for Rwanda's post-genocide recovery, ordained several bishops to preside over congregations of orthodox, evangelical Americans who had severed their relationship with the Episcopalian Church of the United States over issues such as the blessing of same-sex marriages and the ordination of openly gay clergy. The result was the creation of the Anglican Mission in the Americas, a missionary province in the United States that acknowledges Kolini as its archbishop. Such actions have made Rwanda the current cause célèbre not only of AMIA but the wider evangelical community. While the relationship offers great support for Rwanda's recovery, the Anglican Church has presented to American evangelicals a misleading narrative of Rwanda's past and present political situation.

South Africa is at a crossroads. The state has not adequately addressed dire human development needs, often failing to provide the services it constitutionally guarantees. As a result, citizens are expressing their frustrations in a variety of ways, at times including violence. These serious challenges are most readily apparent in poverty, inequality and unemployment statistics, but also in electricity provision, billing and affordability as well as a recent spate of racially motivated attacks which highlight the tension both among South Africans and between South Africans and darker skinned foreigners. The country has, however, been on the brink before and avoided the worst-case scenario of full-scale civil war and state collapse. Far too often South Africa's past successes have been attributed to the role of one man, Nelson Mandela. While Mandela was indeed an extraordinary human being who rightly deserved the international awards and accolades as well as the deep admiration of so many, South Africa's triumphs as a society and a state are the product of both cooperative and conflicting contributions by a wide range of actors. A central question at the present juncture is how well equipped domestic actors and institutions are to address the crisis. The following pages seek to provide some insights and through the perspectives of three authors to consider causes and possible responses.

Jihadist groups have found a ‘safe haven’ in northern Mali. They have managed this by operating strategically to establish themselves and to develop relationships with local communities, but characteristics of the environment have also facilitated their development and survival. In northern Mali, the political landscape is fragmented, and replete with competition between the central authority and various groups of local elites, who are themselves divided. I conceptualise this fluid environment as a context that incentivises ‘political nomadism’. Using the Tuareg communities as an entry point, I explore the complex dynamics between local and national political actors and jihadist groups in northern Mali. I argue that the jihadist ‘safe haven’ in northern Mali is highly relational and has been facilitated by the form of political nomadism practiced in the region since the 1990s. The article is based on eight months of fieldwork conducted between 2016 and 2017 in Mali and Niger.

Pierre Nkurunziza died in 2020, just a few months short of completing his tenure as the first post-civil war President of Burundi. Critics have cast him as yet another rebel-turned-politician who came to office on a promise of a democratic transformation but became progressively authoritarian, particularly during his third, disputed term in office. As a political figure, however, Nkurunziza remains poorly understood. What kind of a worldview motivated his politics? Drawing on critical discourse analysis, we identify three recurring themes in Nkurunziza's key political speeches: anti-colonialism; unity and self-sufficiency; and discourse around ‘politics of a new beginning’. These themes were stable across time, indicating Nkurunziza's consistent worldview, but became more pronounced and radical as he faced growing challenges to his legitimacy from within and without. Far from being confined to rhetoric, the themes also manifested in concrete policy decisions, underscoring the urgent need to take ideology seriously in understanding the political trajectories of African leaders.