The origins of African political consciousness in Southern Africa can be traced back to the first half of the nineteenth century, to the impact of the Christian missions and to the development of a non-racial constitution in the Cape. As the century progressed, mission-educated Africans came to exercise a limited but real influence within Cape politics, and the Native policy of that Colony was seen to contrast favourably with those policies developing in the Boer Republics and Natal. By the turn of the century a new African élite had emerged, committed to non-racial ideals gleaned from Christianity and supported by the theory, and to some extent the practice, of Cape politics.

Situated side by side on the west coast of Africa, of similar size, and having similar national incomes per capita and capacity for development at independence, Ghana and the Ivory Coast present marked contrasts in the development of both agriculture and industry.1 Ghanaian politicians led the African independence movement, with Ghana receiving independence in 1957. The Ivory Coast was granted independence in 1960 with little indigenous effort. In the early years of independence Ghana welcomed aid and technical assistance from both private and government sources in the west, but after 1961 turned more and more to the Communist world and a philosophy of socialisation of agriculture and industry.2 During the five-year period from 1961 until Nkrumah was overthrown in early 1966, the development emphasis was on state farms and factories: 125 of the former were established by the State Farms Corporation, 84 by the Workers' Brigade and Young Farmers' League, and 870 by the co-operatives.

There has been a marked change in recent years in the climate of ideas about industrialisation in developing economies and it is fortunately no longer necessary to argue in favour of industrialisation in opposition to another approach to economic development. Yet it is still necessary to continue to state the basic case, particularly since Africa is industrially the least developed of all the continents. The doctrine that industry is the key to economic development is of comparatively recent origin. Its antecedents are the writings of Professor G. Myrdal and Dr R. Prebisch and the practical achievements of the U.S.S.R. and Japan.

Few of the new nations of Africa lack, as part of their colonial heritage, their potential Biafras—hence the reluctance of most African states to recognise the secessionist Eastern Region of Nigeria. This article is concerned with one of them, the Barotse Province of Zambia, and attempts to illuminate the historical background of the situation, the motives of the Lozi ruling class in demanding secession, and the methods by which successive colonial and independent governments have met this challenge.

In his recent article in this Journal, X, I, May 1972, Dr Michael F. Lofchie catalogued what he considers to be the major factors contributing to the Uganda coup. In his analysis, Lofchie emphasises President Obote's ‘Move to the Left’ ideology for its threat to the privileged position of the military: ‘The coup of January 1971 was the army's political response to an increasingly socialist régime whose qualitariar, domestic policies posed more and more of a threat to the military's economic privileges.’

As towns, industries, agricultural developments, and the green revolution come to Africa, social theorists are beginning to write about the emergence of a peasant class. In addition, they are relating the concept of a peasantry to the growing patterns of capitalism and socialism which are to be found throughout the continent, albeit for the most part asserting that contemporary social systems are built on tribal rather than feudal foundations. What is remarkable from this perspective is that as Africanists turn their attention to these issues, and discuss rigorous conceptual problems regarding the terms ‘peasant’ and ‘feudal’, they continue to be almost unaware of Ethiopia.

The theory of the African revolution, which is still in many respects only in its initial stage, found a most powerful inspiration in the West Indian psychiatrist, Frantz Fanon. His writings were at first confined to the French-speaking public, and even after their initial translation into English (published by Présence africaine) they remained almost unknown. But the growing race tensions in Africa and the United States are drawing more and more attention to this original thinker.

Of the four current schemes for international economic integration in West Africa, the operation of the Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest has been recently reviewed, the Economic Community of West African States continues to be widely discussed, while the agreement of the Presidents of Senegal and Gambia in Dakar on 17 December 1981 to establish a Senegambian Confederation, and to develop an economic and monetary union between the two countries, is as yet in its formative stages. This article examines the structure, progress, and potential of the Mano River Union (M.R.U.) about which little has been published.

The rôle of agriculture in the theory of economic development is equivocal. Not that anyone would dispute the need for expanding the supply of food in the course of economic development, especially during the early stages characterised by high income elasticities of demand. Quite the contrary, existing theories fully recognise this need, while noting, however, its frequent conflict with any programme of rapid capital accumulation in a situation of low savings rates.1 It therefore follows, so the argument runs, that the demand for food should be met as much as possible from domestic sources, while confining the export of scarce savings to the needs of industry: i.e. for importing manufacturing skills and techniques, with their higher productivities, linkages, and externalities.

The end of the Cold War freed donors' aid policies from the co-ordinate system of East/West competition around the world. As a result, it was no longer necessary for the United States and its allies to continue providing aid on ideological grounds and/or geo-strategic needs. In the post-Cold War era, it became necessary for donor countries to evolve new rationales to convince their sceptical publics of the continued necessity for aid. One such new rationale was the imperative of promoting democracy and good governance as a way of guaranteeing international peace and security. This article examines the Japanese response to this development by identifying the factors that led to the inauguration of the ODA Charter. Thereafter, the content and intent of the Charter is examined and its application in Sub-Saharan Africa is analysed to highlight the changing objectives of Japanese aid policy in the continent.

The article addresses possibilities and barriers to economic activity and development in the Oshana region of Northern Namibia. The focus is on the role of local embeddedness of economic activities in attaining economic development. A network perspective, based on theories of value chains that are embedded both in social relations and spatially, is selected as the analytical framework. The value chains of local black entrepreneurs in the study area are short. Moreover, the analysis reveals that social obligations may impede economic development, but that such practices are diminishing. The economic dominance and competition from South Africa is the main impediment to economic development in Northern Namibia. Local political embeddedness is shallow and political measures have not significantly reduced the implications of this dominance.

There is no question about the seriousness of the AIDS epidemic in Africa. It has been clear for some years that problems associated with the epidemic are enormous. The depth of the problem has been documented repeatedly. Now that we have moved into what is described below as the ‘acceptance-response phase’, it is timely to look beyond present problems to the legacy that will remain once the epidemic has been confronted by medical science and endured by its millions of victims and their families, most especially in Africa. This article argues that as a result of many pre-existing conditions, having little to do with AIDS, aggressive responses to the epidemic, especially by the international community, are likely to undermine African autonomy and impede future development, particularly politically and psychologically. While AIDS is one of many deterrents to development, it has, in many affected countries contributed significantly to undermining their future prospects.

From several perspectives the AIDS epidemic can be seen to have levelled an enormous toll on Africa, especially in the eastern and southern regions. This article confines itself to the non-medical consequences of the epidemic where it has been most profound. Although the epidemic has possibly passed its peak, evidence of the toll of the disease, with its related health problems is now clear. In its wake are serious multidimensional problems: anthropological, sociological, economic and political. AIDS has greatly diminished prospects for increased autonomy in many countries, and dashed hopes for major improvements in their quality of life. These multisectoral dimensions of the AIDS impact are likely to affect African development negatively for many years to come. As an extreme example of the enormous difficulties, a recent report suggests an HIV rate of 50 per cent in seven armies in central Africa. Such reports highlight consequences that affect development prospects in general. These and related problems undermine the sense of nationalism and national identity so eagerly fought for in all parts of Africa during the independence era. This article focuses on these dimensions of the epidemic and suggests possible consequences in terms of national development in those countries most affected.

A study of the Republic of Mali's readmission into L'Union monétaire ouest-africaine provides an illustration of some of the problems inherent in African economic integration as political concerns intrude on development issues. In a broader sense, this case-study displays the difficulties involved in achieving the goal expressed in the very name of the Organisation of African Unity. It also shows the dual pull felt by many post-independence states: a desire for greater autonomy, as well as the necessity of maintaining some important links with the erstwhile colonising power.

The concept of ‘agency’ and its role in capturing the dynamics between Africa and external actors feature increasingly in the African IR scholarship. Over the past decade, Turkey has become an increasingly prominent actor in Africa, strengthening political, cultural and economic ties with African states and providing humanitarian aid and development assistance. In this paper, we examine Turkey's relationship with Africa from the point of view of African agency and ask ‘How much and what kind of agency can we identify by examining the way in which Turkey approaches African states?’ The conventional understanding of the concept of African agency defines it in materialist terms and emphasises its transactional nature; it does not adequately explain incidents of enhanced outcomes for Africans in their relationship with Turkey. We argue that an under-examined aspect and a vital source of African agency lies within the discourses of Turkish policy which provide an enabling source of policy space for negotiation for Africans. We demonstrate that the notion of Muslim kinship in Turkish discourses not only distinguishes Turkey from most of the other external powers engaging with the continent but also enables African interlocutors to negotiate enhanced outcomes.

Rising competition and conflict over land in rural sub-Saharan Africa continues to attract the attention of researchers. Recent work has especially focused on land governance, post-conflict restructuring of tenure relations, and large-scale land acquisitions. A less researched topic as of late, though one deserving of greater consideration, pertains to how social differentiation on the local-level shapes relations to land, and how these processes are rooted in specific historical developments. Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Teso sub-region of eastern Uganda, this paper analyses three specific land conflicts and situates them within a broad historical trajectory. I show how each dispute illuminates changes in class relations in Teso since the early 1990s. I argue that this current period of socioeconomic transformation, which includes the formation of a more clearly defined sub-regional middle class and elite, constitutes the most prominent period of social differentiation in Teso since the early 20th century.

In less-developed countries generally, and Africa in particular, centralised forms of political and economic organisation were until recently the norm. But over the past 15 years, this form of government has come under attack, and excessive centralisation is now viewed as a primary contributor to prevailing high levels of inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Various forms of decentralisation – the shifting of responsibilities and resources from central to sub-national units and actors – have been proposed as the necessary corrective mechanisms. Algeria, Kenya, the Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia have been among the African countries which have implemented programmes aimed at strengthening the personnel, finances, and freedom of manoeuvre of non-central agencies and governments.

For most organisations, a tenth anniversary session is a time for dwelling on the significance of past achievements while resolutely insisting that the best is yet to come in terms of new initiatives. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (E.C.A.) proved to be no exception when it met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, during late January and early February 1969. Yet, behind the formal façade of celebration, one sensed an anxious attempt to overstate the results of past efforts in order to enlist support for a dynamic future which seems highly improbable. Because E.C.A. as an institution faces a serious crisis of confidence, its secretariat and its supporters seemed to seize on the tenth anniversary celebrations almost as if this were the last chance to change radically the Commission's role and image in the eyes of both Africa and the world. Indeed, the 1969 Commission session marked the culmination of an attempt by Robert K. A. Gardiner – the Commission's able Executive Secretary – and his associates to reverse the downward trend of E.C.A.'s influence and prestige since those halcyon early days of 1958–9 when Africans had such great hopes for their Commission.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the fall of many authoritarian régimes, some observers suggest that we are in the midst of what can be called a worldwide democratic revolution. Although questions remain as to the durability of these changes, particularly in Africa, it is clear that we are at a cross-roads. Nations are considering what kinds of political institutions they want to replace those they are trying to dismantle. What, at this historical moment, is the special appeal of democracy in the non-Western world? Is it the promise of individual freedom? or popular elections designed to give all citizens a say in who governs? or the prospect of guaranteed individual and group rights?

The wealth of ethno-linguistic units in Nigeria has been the object of anthropological, linguistic, historical, and political study since the country was first so named at the beginning of this century. But since independence in 1960, the federal motto of ‘Unity in Diversity’ has raised a central principle of language use which has been gradually articulated in successive constitutions and white papers on national policy in the educational and cultural spheres.

The term ‘Ibadan School’ is used here in two senses, locational and generic, and refers to studies on, and students of, federal finance that have employed a distinctive approach. Some of the most dominant figures in this group are (or used to be) on the staff of the University of Ibadan, and when it was decided after independence in 1960 that Nigerians themselves should handle the recurrent problems of federal finance, the task fall on the laps of a number of western-trained, liberal, and orthodox economists.