The brutal nine-year conflict in Sierra Leone has defied both military solutions adopted by various governments and peace accords imposed by the international community and regional powers. The latest casualty is the controversial Lomé Accord, which gave power and amnesty to the rebels in a power-sharing government. This article offers explanations for the failures by focusing on the interplay between the policy choices of decision-makers and the country's governance institutions and social structure. The policies of decision-makers can have negative consequences on societies if they are grounded on institutions that are at variance with a country's social structure. The article develops three main arguments to support this conclusion. First, the country's bipolar ethnic structure and majoritarian presidential system of government act as serious constraints on policies that seek to forge a national coalition to end the war. Second, conventional armies in ethnically polarised settings are a poor instrument for fighting rebel groups that deliberately use mass abductions and terror as war strategies. Third, peacemakers do not understand the institutional contexts in which violence-prone rebel groups can be made to reclaim their humanity and observe peace agreements. The logic of the interconnections between territory, resources and civilisation suggests that Sierra Leone's rebels are unlikely to accept disarmament and honour the democratic road to peace.

This article shows the importance of understanding the pluralism of moral ideas in contemporary Africa. Although the discourse on human rights is only one aspect of that pluralism, it threatens to overshadow other ways of conceiving human dignity. The impact of the ‘human rights talk’ can be observed in Christian churches, and the article contrasts elite and lay practices in Catholic and pentecostal churches in Malawi. Drawing upon rural and urban fieldwork, the article reveals variation as much within as between these two forms of Christianity. Rather than documenting a wholesale rejection of the ‘human rights talk’, the article draws attention to the situational use of different moral ideas. In this regard, public debates on politics may be enriched by the insights gained during fieldwork among Catholic and pentecostal congregations.

South African women's success in moving from active participation in the liberation struggle to active participation in government has been exceptional on a world scale. Their achievement is based in the long history of women's struggles against apartheid and for gender equality in the African National Congress. The result has been a political representation that is grounded in the experience of a united women's movement in the transition to majority rule and a firm policy consensus towards gender equality within the ANC. This has enabled women politicians to entrench gender equality goals within government discourse. Yet, the success has come with the price of a women's movement that has lost its strong leaders to government, and women politicians who lack the support of a strong women's movement. Thus, in the moment of greatest victory South African women lack the mass movement that propelled them to success, suggesting that the struggle is not done with yet.

The African National Congress (ANC) government in South Africa, having made compromises in the transition of 1994, has been accused of resorting to undemocratic ways in dealing with the frustrations of government. The instability of political leadership at the provincial level appears to confirm pessimism. The central organs of the ANC have tried to bring wayward provinces into line, most recently (May 2000) by dissolving the local party executives in two provinces. But there have been successes in provincial leadership and the party has resolved a number of disputes flexibly and arguably effectively. Conventions of political management are solidifying and may help to pattern ideological conflict in democratic ways in the future.

This article examines the new norms in bilateral, regional and international relations that evolved in the wake of the emergence of the Eritrean state which had successfully challenged the hegemonic claims of both the imperial and Afro-Marxist Ethiopian state. The analysis proceeds from a retelling of the events in 1998 which precipitated the break between the Ethiopian and Eritrean partners of the old alliance against the Mengistu regime, then examines the structural anomalies in the alliance and their consequences. The evidence examined here suggests that two inter-related phenomena help to shed light on the structural, historical and philosophical underpinnings of the 1998–2000 Ethio–Eritrean conflict: (1) the asymmetry of vision between diasporic and hegemonic states, leading to a clash of interests; (2) the failure of both post-war regimes to formalise their ‘understandings’ into formal treaties based on international law.

As the two countries pursued different systems of economic and political governance, the cluster of informal understandings unravelled amidst conflicting interpretations of issues relating to sovereignty: territorial jurisdiction and citizenship. What emerges is a picture – seen from below rather than from above – of the norms and rules that govern the conduct of interstate relations between Africa's most recent and oldest sovereign states.

In the process of structural adjustment and economic liberalisation, former strong socialist sub-Saharan African countries are experiencing additional challenges in their efforts to develop the private sector, compared to those that had relatively market oriented economies. Tanzania is known for its past strong socialist orientation. This article assesses the country's effort to reform the banking system, state owned enterprises, taxation system and the public services sector, and the emergence of the private sector. Comparisons are made where relevant with the experiences from transition economies in Eastern Europe.

Major reforms have taken place in all the sub-sectors, and there is significant increase in the participation by the private sector in the economy with increased production. Private banks have increased from zero in 1994 to thirteen in 1998. Over 40 per cent of former state owned enterprises have been divested, 50 per cent of which were sold. Some are performing well, contributing to government income and reversing the drain through subsidy. The taxation system has improved. It now recognises the role played by the private sector and has introduced new mechanisms to collect taxes e.g., VAT, and plugging tax evasion loopholes. Private sector investment has increased and major developments are notable in mining and tourism.

Although the overall impact of liberalisation on the areas examined has been positive, significant weaknesses remain, especially in the regulatory frameworks required to prevent abuses of their position by private enterprises. Both corruption and an uncertain legal environment inhibit the realisation of benefits from reform. The ‘trickle down’ of welfare to poorer sections of society has been inadequate, as has the extension of financial services to small businesses and rural areas. Further public investment is required, especially in health, education and infrastructure.