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Military Coups and Military Régimes in Africa

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Samuel Decalo
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Extract

In the past several years there has been a proliferation of studies on coup d'états in Africa and the political role of African military structures. Armies have been analysed in terms of their social and ethnic composition, training, ideology, and socialising influences. Intense debate has focused around the overt and covert reasons for their intervention in the political arena. Simple and complex typologies of civil–military relations and of military coups have been constructed; statistical data – both hard and soft – has been marshalled and subjected to factor and regression analysis, in order to validate general or middle-range theories of military intervention. And once in power, the officer corps' performance has been examined in order to generate insights into its propensity to serve as a modernising or developmental agent.

Type
Africana
Information
The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 1973 , pp. 105 - 127
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1973

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References

Page 105 note 1 The important question of what is a military régime has hardly been touched upon by most analysts. Hence the civil–military coalition in Upper Volta, the civilianised Togolese régime, and the largely personal cliques of General Idi Amin in Uganda, and General Jean-Bedel Bokassa in the Central African Republic, have been dealt with as part and parcel of the same phenomena of ‘military régimes’, while the growing influence of the military in Gabon and Guinea has been left outside the scope of research.

Page 107 note 1 This problem can be partly surmounted, of course, in several ways. Nevertheless, there is serious doubt whether even the most sympathetic observer, equipped with the best credentials, could carry out systematic research on the military in, for example, Algeria, Morocco, Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, Uganda, or for that matter Zaïre. See The New York Times, 14 04 1972,Google Scholar for one tragic attempt to verify an inter-tribal massacre in the Mbarara barracks in Uganda.

Page 107 note 2 See the cautionary remark made by Banks, A. S. and Textor, R. B., A Cross Polity Survey (Cambridge, 1963), p. 96.Google Scholar Recent statistics on military forces in Africa and their budgets are to be found in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures, 1970 (Washington, 1971).Google Scholar

Page 107 note 3 For some conclusions based on assumptions of ‘modernisation’ of groups in Africa, see Melson, Robert and Wolpe, Howard, ‘Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: a theoretical perspective’, in The American Political Science Review (Berkeley), LXIV, 4, 12 1970, pp. 1112–30.Google Scholar

Page 108 note 1 Dowse, Robert E., ‘The Military and Political Development’, in Leys, Cohn (ed), Politics and Change in Developing Countries (Cambridge, 1969), p. 213.Google Scholar

Page 108 note 2 The fullest tabulation of structural deficiencies underlying instability in Africa is contained in Zolberg, Aristide, ‘Military Intervention in the New States of Tropical Africa: elements of comparative analysis’, in Bienen, Henry (ed.), The Military Intervenes (New York, 1968),Google Scholar and in Welch, Claude E., ‘Soldier and State in Africa’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), v, 3, 11 1967, pp. 305–22.Google Scholar

Page 108 note 3 Cf. Nelkin, Dorothy, ‘The Economic and Social Setting of Military Takeovers in Africa’, in Journal of Asian and African Studies (Leiden), II, 1968, p. 231Google Scholar: ‘in every country, the issues which best account for the case of military access to power, relate to economic circumstances and their social consequences’.

Page 108 note 4 Huntington, Samuel P., ‘Political Development and Political Decay’, in World Politics (Princeton), 04 1965, p. 417.Google Scholar See also O'Connell, James, ‘The Inevitability of Instability’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, v, 2, 09 1967, pp. 181–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Feldman, A. S., ‘Violence and Volatility: the likelihood of revolution’, in Eckstein, H. (ed.), Internal War (New York, 1964).Google Scholar

Page 108 note 5 Cf. First, Ruth, Power in Africa (New York, 1970), p. ixGoogle Scholar: ‘The army coup d'etat is plainly a short-circuit of power conflicts in a situation where arms do the deciding.’

Page 109 note 1 See Riggs, Fred, ‘Bureaucrats and Political Development: a paradoxical view’, in LaPalombara, J. (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, 1963).Google Scholar

Page 109 note 2 Huntington, loc. cit. p. 403.

Page 109 note 3 Finer, op.cit. pp. 23–60.

Page 109 note 4 Cf. Gurr, Ted, ‘Psychological Factors in Civil Violence’, in World Politics, 01 1968Google Scholar; Davies, James, ‘Towards a Theory of Revolution’, in The American Sociological Review (Washington), 02 1962Google Scholar; Nesvold, Betty, ‘Scalogram Analysis of Political Violence’, in Comparative Political Studies (Beverly Hills), 07 1969Google Scholar; and also Ivo, and Feieraband, R., ‘Aggressive Behavior within Polities’, in The Journal of Conflict Resolution (Ann Arbor), 07 1966.Google Scholar

Page 109 note 5 Zolberg, Aristide, ‘The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa’, in The American Political Science Review, 03 1968, p. 75.Google Scholar The theme of a ‘corporate interests’ threat is familiar to observers of the Latin American scene, and is not strictly new in African studies except in terms of the recent frequency and emphasis with which it is raised. See, for example, Welch, Claude E., ‘The Roots and Implications of Military Intervention’, in his Soldier and State in Africa (Evanston, 1970), pp. 34–5Google Scholar; and Bienen, Henry, ‘The Background to Contemporary Studies of Militaries and Modernization’, in his The Military and Modernization (Chicago, 1971), p. 4.Google Scholar

Page 109 note 6 A somewhat different typobogy has been developed by Luckham, A. R., ‘A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations’, in Government and Opposition (London), Winter 1971 pp. 5–35.Google Scholar The rubric criteria are the strength or weakness of (i) civilian institutions, and (ii) military structures, and also (iii) the nature of the boundaries of the civil and military systems. As Luckham himself points out, typologies are not the best way to derive empirically testable hypotheses; the problem with his classification is that most African states would fall into one of two groups. without adequate separation between very different examples of civil–military relations. The dimensions of the constructs would also be much more difficult to quantify than Luckham tends to believe. The typology is, nevertheless, of great utility in understanding the variety of relationships possible.

Page 110 note 1 Austin, Dennis, ‘The Underlying Problem of the Army coup d'état in Africa’, in Optima (New York), 04 1969, pp. 65 and 67.Google Scholar

Page 110 note 2 Fisher, Humphrey J., ‘Elections and Coups in Sierra Leone, 1967’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, VII, 4, 12 1969, p. 635.Google Scholar

Page 110 note 3 Decalo, Samuel, ‘The Politics of Instability in Dahomey’, in Genève-Afrique (Geneva), VII, 2, 1968, p. 27.Google Scholar

Page 111 note 1 See Glele, Maurice, Naissance d'un état noire (Paris, 1969), p. 290Google Scholar; W. A. E. Skurnik, ‘The Military and Politics: Dahomey and Upper Volta’, in Welch, op.cit. pp. 78–9; and Decalo, Samuel, ‘Regionalism, Politics, and the Military in Dahomey’, in Journal of Developing Areas (Macomb, Ill.), 04 1973.Google Scholar

Page 111 note 2 Kalck, Pierre, Central African Republic: a failure in de-colonization (New York, 1971), p. 152.Google Scholar

Page 111 note 3 This somewhat different interpretation of events leading up to the coup in Bangui does not discount the various other factors involved, including the corporate threat to the army contained in the slashed 1966 budget (Kaick, op. cit. p. 152), or army grumbles against the free-spending politicians who appeared to have corralled all the ‘best women’ in Bangui (Lee, op. cit. p. 100).

Page 111 note 4 Uganda, , Birth of the Second Republic (Entebbe, 1971).Google Scholar

Page 112 note 1 A Chief of Staff of the Air Force and a Chief of Staff of the Army were created. Brigadier Suleiman Hussein, who was elevated to the latter post in October 1970, was murdered shortly after Amin took over.

Page 112 note 2 The growth rate has been 48 per cent per year (from 1,000 to 7,000 men); see Lee, op. cit. p. 105.

Page 112 note 3 Lofchie, Michael F., ‘The Uganda Coup – class action by the military’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, x, 2, 05 1972, pp. 19–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Page 113 note 1 Miners, op. cit. pp. 173 and 179.

Page 113 note 2 See Rapoport, David C., ‘A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types’, in Huntington, Samuel P. (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York, 1962)Google Scholar; Huntington, Samuel P., ‘Praetorianism and Political Decay’, in his Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968)Google Scholar; and Perlmutter, Amos, ‘The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army’, in Comparative Politics (Chicago), 04 1969.Google Scholar

Page 113 note 3 For an excellent critique of the use of the terms ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ in the context of African politics, see Wallerstein, Immanuel, ‘Left and Right in Africa’, in The Journal of Modem African Studies, IX, 1, 05 1971.Google Scholar For some recent developments in Congo-Brazzaville, see House, Arthur H., ‘Brazzaville: revolution or rhetoric?’, in Africa Report (Washington), 04 1971Google Scholar; and the issues of Afrique nouvelle (Dakar) for 11 1971–01 1972.Google Scholar

Page 114 note 1 Zolberg, Aristide, Creating Political Order: the party-states of West Africa (Chicago, 1966).Google Scholar

Page 114 note 2 Zolberg, in Bienen, , The Military Intervenes, p. 71.Google Scholar

Page 114 note 3 See, for example, Roberta Koplin Mapp, ‘Domestic Correlates of Military Intervention in African Politics’, Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, 1970. For other relevant studies, see Donald G. Morrison and H. M. Stevenson, ‘Political Instability in Independent Black Africa: more dimensions of conflict behavior within nations’, and Terrell, Louis, ‘Societal Stress, Political Instability and Levels of Military Effort’, both in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 09 1971.Google Scholar

Page 114 note 4 E.g. Bienen, loc. cit. p. 4.

Page 114 note 5 Philippe Schmitter, ‘Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness, and Public Policy in Latin America, 1950–1967’, Harvard University, 1970, cited in Nordlinger, Eric, ‘Soldier in Mufti’, in The American Political Science Review, LXIV, 4, 12 1970, p. 1133.Google Scholar

Page 114 note 6 Cf. Dennis Austin's similar conclusion about the Ghanaian army, ‘the last of the élites’, which is ‘no less eager to pursue its advantage and protect its interests than other pressure groups within the local universe of Ghanaian politics’; ‘Army and Politics in Ghana’, in West Africa (London), 24 03 1972.Google Scholar See also A. A. Mazrui and D. Rothchild, ‘The Soldier and State in East Africa: some theoretical conclusions on the army mutinies of 1964’, in Mazrui, A. A., Violence and Thought (London, 1969).Google Scholar For a definition of African élites, see the ‘Introduction’ in Lloyd, P. C., The New Elites of Tropical Africa (Harmondsworth, 1966).Google Scholar

Page 115 note 1 Dowse would reject such a stress on personal ambitions, because in his view there are alternate ladders to social power for upward-moving élites; loc. cit. p. 226. This may be true of Ghana, Nigeria, and several other states, but it is not valid for the majority in Africa. Moreover, such an objection does not cope with the problem of élites already in the army who might develop such political ambitions.

Page 115 note 2 Grundy, Kenneth W., Conflicting Images of the Military in Africa (Nairobi, 1968).Google Scholar

Page 115 note 3 The most detailed espousal of this viewpoint is contained in Finer, op. cit., and Janowitz, op. cit. See also Pye, Lucian, ‘Armies in the Process of Political Modernization’, in Johnson, J. J. (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, 1962), pp. 69–90.Google Scholar

Page 116 note 1 Levy, Marion J., Modernization and the Structure of Societies (Princeton, 1966), vol. 2, p. 603.Google Scholar See also Pye, Lucian, Aspects of Political Development (Boston, 1966)Google Scholar; and Bell, M. J. V., ‘The Military in the New States of Africa’, in Van Doom, Jacques (ed.), Armed Forces and Society (The Hague, 1968).Google Scholar

Page 116 note 2 For several examples of this, see Decalo, Journal of Developing Areas, 1973; and E. Philip Morgan, ‘Military Intervention in Politics: the case of Uganda’, African Studies Association, Denver, 1971.

Page 116 note 3 Lee, op. cit. p. 113.

Page 116 note 4 Claude E. Welch has recently analysed the coups in Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone in terms of the emergence of an anglophone praetorian syndrome; see his ‘Praetorianism in Commonwealth West Africa’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies x, 2, 07 1972.Google Scholar

Page 117 note 1 Feit, Edward, ‘The Rule of the Iron Surgeons: military government in Spain and Ghana’, in Comparative Politics, 07 1969, pp. 485–97,Google Scholar and ‘Military Coups and Political Development’, in World Polities, 01 1969, pp. 179–93.Google Scholar

Page 117 note 2 Kiba, Simon, ‘La Vole de la “Nouvelle Marche” au Togo avec le RPT’, in Afrique nouvelle, 31 03 1972.Google ScholarMesan is still largely a paper structure, and the Congolese P.C.T., captured by militant elements, has not evoked much mass participation.

Page 117 note 3 Austin, Optima, p. 66. Meaningful systematic change has only occurred in Rwanda, Zanzibar, and possibly Congo-Brazzaville, consequent to their ‘revolutions’.

Page 117 note 4 First, op. cit. p. 22.

Page 119 note 1 See the statistics in Banque centrale des états de l'Afrique de l'ouest: indicateurs économiques (Paris), 192, 02 1972, p. 3.Google Scholar An evaluation of the Eyadema régime is contained in the author's forthcoming ‘The Army and Politics in Togo’.

Page 119 note 2 See Price, Robert M., ‘Military Officers and Political Leadership: the Ghanaian case’, in Comparative Politics, 04 1971, pp. 361–79.Google Scholar

Page 119 note 3 Kalck, op. cit. pp. 141–8 and 159–83.

Page 119 note 4 West Africa, 7 04 1972.Google Scholar Significantly, Colonel Acheampong recently ordered the reorganisation of this force, and summary sentences for those discovered co-operating with smugglers from across the border.

Page 120 note 1 Price, Robert M., ‘A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: referencegroup theory and the Ghanaian case’, in World Politics, XXIII, 3, 03 1971, p. 425.Google Scholar

Page 120 note 2 Africa Research Bulletin. Economic, Financial, and Technical Series (Exeter), 03 1972, p. 2299.Google Scholar

Page 120 note 3 Afrique nouvelle, 7 10 1971.Google Scholar

Page 120 note 4 This has caused discontent among officers not involved in the anti-Government operation who see themselves passed over, and in the junior ranks. Operation Guitar Boy, the attempted counter-coup in Ghana, was an example of this kind of unrest.

Page 120 note 5 Nordlinger, loc. cit. pp. 1131–48.

Page 121 note 1 Ibid. pp. 1134 and 1144. Nordlinger also adds: ‘In oligarchical societies the soldier is a radical, in societies dominated by the middle class the officers act as arbitrators among middle class groups; and when mass political participation is in sight, the soldier protects the existing order.’ This conclusion is similar to Huntington's in his Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 221–2.

Page 121 note 2 It could also be noted that Mapp's previously cited factor analysis, restricted to African data, did not come up with any statistically meaningful correlations between some of the variables used by Nordlinger.

Page 121 note 3 Price, , World Politics, pp. 403–4Google Scholar: ‘An individual's reference groups are those social groups to which he psychologically relates himself, with which he identifies. To become a member of a group in the psychological sense implies the internalization of its central norms and values – for to be a member implies certain modes of thought and behavior.’

Page 121 note 4 Ocran, K. A., A Myth is Broken (London, 1968),Google Scholar and Afrifa, A. A., The Ghana Coup London, 1967).Google Scholar

Page 122 note 1 Price, , World Politics, p. 407.Google Scholar Interestingly, Nkrumah did refer to the coup leaders as possessing ‘Sandhurst mentality… tend[ing] to frown on everything in our Ghanaian way of life which did not conform with English customs and traditions.’ Enahoro, Peter, ‘Military Rule in Africa’, in Africa (London), 4, 1971, p. 20.Google Scholar

Page 122 note 2 Price, , Comparative Politics, pp. 364–7Google Scholar, and World Politics, pp. 411–13. Indeed, according to Ocran, op. cit. p. 43: ‘When the British were here, our interests were better protected.’

Page 123 note 1 One Commentator points out that even prior to the devaluation, a typical major's pay had declined from N 215 to N 125 under the onslaught of Busia's July 1971 budget; Bennett, Valerie P., ‘The Military under the Busia Government’, in West Africa, 25 02 1972.Google Scholar The army's Corporate grumbles were so strongly phrased that practically the entire press accepted this as the basic reason for the coup; see, for example, The New York Times, 17 and 22 01 1972.Google Scholar Busia, in London, called it an ‘officers’ amenities coup’, and Bennett noted in another article, ‘The “Nonpoliticians” Take Over’, in Africa Report, 04 1972, p. 20,Google Scholar that all the other complaints voiced by Acheampong ‘would probably not have been enough to bring down Busia if his government had not attempted to apply austerity measures to the military’. For one justification of the coup, see General Ocran's letter in West Africa, 11 February 1972.

Page 123 note 2 West Africa, 10 March 1972.

Page 124 note 1 Price recognises – World Politics, p. 429 – some of these limitations when he states in his conclusion: ‘To the degree that the socialization of officers in new states differs, or to the degree that it changes over time within the same State, differences can be expected in the nature of military rule.’ However, the socialisation of officers will differ, even given the same stimulus and similar individuals, due to variations of personality. Each officer will accept or reject particular influences or actions not in conformity with his own self-image or scale of values, producing different composites of attitudinal and behavioural characteristics which Cannot easily be predicted.

Page 124 note 2 Unconventional definitions and nomenclature also abound. Political development, for example, is defined as ‘any change in the structure of government or the process of gaining and exercising political authority that enhances the government's capacity to provide security for its people and to enforce the law throughout its territory’. Lefever, op. cit. p. 174.

Page 125 note 1 Quotations from Lefever, op. cit. pp. 1–2, 10, 19–20, 67, 72, and 186.

Page 125 note 2 Welch, op. cit. pp. 17 and 34–5.

Page 126 note 1 See Willame's, Jean-Claude full-scale study, Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo (Stanford, 1972),Google Scholar especially ch. 4, ‘Private Armies’.

Page 127 note 1 Quotations from First, op. cit. pp. 5, 12, 20–21, 61, and 430.