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From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Ramesh Thakur
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Extract

[Peacekeepers] should not… have the obligation, the soldiers, or the equipment to engage violators in hostilities. International peacekeeping forces express and facilitate the erstwhile belligerents' will to live in peace; they cannot supervise peace in conditions of war. Turning them into a fighting force erodes international consensus on their function, encourages withdrawals by contributing contingents, converts them into a factional participant in the internal power struggle, and turns them into targets of attack from rival internal factions.

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Articles
Information
The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 32 , Issue 3 , September 1994 , pp. 387 - 410
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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References

1 Thakur, Ramesh, ‘From Great Power Collective Security to Middle Power Peacekeeping’, in Smith, Hugh (ed.), Australia and Peacekeeping (Canberra, Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1990), p. 20.Google Scholar

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42 Based on confidential discussions with officials who were involved in the decision to set up the UN Operation in Somalia.Google Scholar

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45 Quoted in Thakur, Ramesh, Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland and the International Commission (Edmonton, 1984), p. 200.Google Scholar