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The Non-Interventionary Norm Prevails: an Analysis of the Western Sahara

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Karin Von Hippel
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Extract

Fears that the supposedly sacred norm of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states has eroded in the last few years are not entirely groundless. Excuses to intervene, that now receive sanction by the Security Council of the United Nations, include humanitarian concerns, as in Somalia and Rwanda, international peace and security, as in Kuwait and Bosnia, and the denial of democracy, as in Haiti, all of which differ from the interventions of the cold war years. As Thomas Buergenthal has pointed out, ‘Once the rule of law, human rights and democratic pluralism are made the subject of international commitments, there is little left in terms of governmental institutions that is domestic.’

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , March 1995 , pp. 67 - 81
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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References

1 The recent Russian interventions in Chechenya, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan were undertaken without international consultation or approval.

2 Thomas Buergenthal, cited by Franck, Thomas, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, in The American Journal of International Law (Washington, DC), 86, 46, 1992, p. 68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank use the first two methods to force less developed countries to implement economic reforms, often in attempts to reduce price controls or lower inflation. Recently, multilateral organisations like the UN, and governments, like those of the United States and France, have tried to link aid to democratic reforms, notably the holding of multi-party elections.

4 ‘Irredentism’ refers to an historical claim made by one sovereign state to land and/or people outside its internationally recognised boundaries, justified on the grounds that the earlier separation was illegal or forced.

5 The population was approximately 75,000 according to the 1974 Spanish census, and 163,868 according to the Moroccan census taken in September 1982, of whom 96,784 were stated to reside in the capital, El-Ayoun.

6 See Pazzanita, Anthony G., ‘Morocco versus Polisario: a political interpretation’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 32, 2, 06 1994, p. 271, for a map of ‘Western Sahara and Neighbouring Countries’.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Estimates of Morocco's annual expenditure on this costly guerrilla war have been in the $1,000 million range, but the berms at least permitted the resumption of phosphate production which had been hampered by repeated Polisario attacks.

8 At times, Soviet arms also came via Czechoslovakia and Cuba, but these slowed down significantly after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

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12 Zoubir, Yahia, ‘Soviet Policy toward the Western Sahara Conflict’, in Africa Today (Denver), 34, 3, 987, p. 24Google Scholar. Imports of Moroccan phosphates increased again when the United States cut off its supply to the Soviets after the invasion of Afghanistan. Throughout this period, Morocco obtained approximately 60 per cent of its oil needs from the U.S.S.R.

13 Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco, ‘Morocco News Summary’, Washington, DC, 09 and 10 1985, p. 25.Google Scholar

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15 Moscow broadcast in Arabic, 29 October 1979, cited by Zoubir, loc. cit. p. 27.

16 The former Soviet Union provided $2,700 million of arms to Algeria between 1986 and 1993, far outpacing other suppliers. Grimmett, Richard, ‘Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1986–1993’, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 29 07 1994.Google Scholar

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28 The World Economic Factbook, 1994–5 (London, 1994), p. 53. Although the US was only purchasing 15.1 per cent of Algeria's exports in 1992 (as against 60.2 per cent in 1979), this amounted to the third largest share.Google Scholar

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36 Balta, loc. cit. pp. 245–6.

37 In 1991, France supplied Morocco with $312.7 million of development assistance (followed by the US at $74 million), partly as a reward for supporting the West in the Gulf war, and was also Algeria's number one supplier of development assistance that same year, at 45 per cent of the total. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, Morocco, 1993–94, p. 41, and Country Profile, Algeria, 1993–94, p. 42.Google Scholar

38 Interview, 7 June 1991.

39 In fact, the Polisario has tried since its inception to force Spain to renounce the Madrid agreements by sporadically attacking Spanish fishing boats off the Sahara coast. Algeria added additional pressure in the late 1970s by supporting the Movimiento para la Autodeterminación y Independencia del Archipielago Canario.Google Scholar

40 The Spanish consume more fish per head than their European partners, and the coastlines of the Western Sahara and Morocco have rich supplies.

41 Tiempo (Madrid), 29 10 1984,Google Scholar claimed that Spain sold Morocco weapons worth 35,000 million pesetas through Saudi Arabia. See also Reyes, Luis, ‘Relaciones con Marruecos’, in Anuario Sobre Armentismo en España (Madrid, 1986), p. 197.Google Scholar

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44 Africa Confidential (London), 28, 8, 15 04 1987, p. 5.Google Scholar

45 The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Profile, Morocco, 1993–94, pp. 25 and 42.Google Scholar

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47 Hassan's difficulties in obtaining third-world support were partially based on his involvement in the Cabinda crisis in Zaïre, which alienated radical régimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania, which viewed Morocco's actions as interference in the domestic affairs of an African state. The King was also condemned by some Arab leaders for conducting a war against his Arab ‘brothers’ (Polisario members and Algerians). Further, Morocco's assistance with the Camp David accords and its general conciliatory policy towards Israel, along with its purchase of South African weapons during the apartheid era, angered most Arab and many African states.Google Scholar

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49 Hodges, op. cit. p. 348.

50 Interview, 7 June 1991.

51 See, for example, Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Richard, The Western Saharans: background to conflict (London, 1980), p. 302.Google Scholar