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Military-Inspired Anti-Bureaucratic Corruption Campaigns: an Appraisal of Niger's Experience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Kunle Amuwo
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Extract

The French colony of Niger gained republican status on 18 December 1958 and political independence on 3 August 1960. This vast country, twice the size of its ex-metropole, and which figures amongst the 25 least-developed countries in the world, was under the political direction of the Parti progressiste nigérien for over 15 years. The P.P.N. had come to power in September 1958, after capturing 78 per cent of the votes cast in favour of continued membership of the now defunct French Community, and was headed by Hamani Diori, the leader of the local section of the Rassemblement démocratique africain, the more or less common platform for French-speaking West African politicians after World War II. However, President Diori formed his first cabinet only after the independence constitution had been promulgated on 8 November 1960.

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Articles
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The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , June 1986 , pp. 285 - 301
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1986

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References

Page 285 note 1 For some interesting and detailed accounts of this coup d'état and its ‘whys’, see Higgott, Richard and Fuglestad, Finn, ‘The 1974 Coup d'État in Niger: towards an explanation’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 13, 3, 09 1975, pp. 383–98;Google ScholarComte, Gérard, ‘Les pâques nigériennes’, in Le Monde (Paris), 26 04 1974, pp. 17ff;Google Scholar and Jouve, Edmond, ‘Du Niger de Hamani Diori au gouvernement des militaires’, in Le Mois en Afrique (Dakar), 149, 05 1978, pp. 38–9.Google Scholar

Page 286 note 1 See ‘Coup d'eacute;tat au Niger’, in Afrique contemporaine (Paris), 05–06 1974, pp. 14–15.Google Scholar

Page 286 note 2 Revolutionary theoreticians like Frantz Fanon have also tended to formulate similar criticisms against civil bureaucrats. See, for instance, Sow, Fatou, Les Fonctionnaires de l'adminstration central sénégalaise (Dakar, I.F.A.N., 1972), pp. 14 ff.Google Scholar

Page 287 note 1 See Sarassoro, Hyacinthe, La Corruption des fonctionnaires en Afrique: étude du droit pénal comparé (Paris, 1980), pp. 1–2.Google Scholar

Page 287 note 2 Lofchie, Michael F., ‘Representative Government, Bureaucracy, and Political Development: the African case’, in African Administrative Studies (Tangiers), 16, 1976, pp. 129–38.Google Scholar

Page 288 note 1 Sarassoro, op. cit. Cf.Bretton, Henry L., Power and Politics in Africa (London, 1973), pp. 128 ff.Google Scholar

Page 288 note 2 See Nye, J. S., ‘Corruption and Political Development: a cost-benefit analysis’, in The American Political Science Review (Washington, D.C.), LXI, 2, 06 1967,Google Scholar quoted in Médard, J. F., L'État sous-développé en Afrique noire: clientèlisme politique on néo-patrimonialisme? (Bordeaux, 1982), p. 21.Google Scholar

Page 288 note 3 Lofchie, loc. cit.

Page 288 note 4 Sarassoro, op. cit. passim.

Page 288 note 5 For more insights, see Andreski, Stanislav, ‘Kleptocracy as a System of Government in Africa’, in Monday, U. Ekpo (ed), Bureaucratic Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: toward a search for causes and consequences (Washington, D.C., 1979), pp. 275–90.Google Scholar

Page 288 note 6 Médard, op. cit. p. 2. Cf.Myrdal, Gunnar, ‘L'État “mou’ dans les pays sous-déveboppés’, in Revue du tiers-monde (Paris), x, 01–03 1969, pp. 5–24.Google Scholar

Page 289 note 1 Scott, James C., ‘The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Countries’, in Ekpo, (ed.), op. cit. pp. 22–62.Google Scholar

Page 289 note 2 Cited in N'Diaye, L., ‘Les Discours de Monsieur Traoré’, Rapport de séminaire, C.E.A.N., Bordeaux I, 1978–1978.Google Scholar

Page 289 note 3 Cf.Weiss, Danielle, ‘Niger’, in Europe outre-mer (Paris), 554, 06 1976, pp. 14–15.Google Scholar

Page 290 note 1 The first major military-inspired campaign in Mali against embezzlement and other corrupt practices was launched on so January 1972. The second was more indirect, via the enactment of an Ordinance in February 1974 which stipulated prison sentences for corruption amongst senior civil servants. The third followed the arrest on 28 February 1978 of three important and powerful members of the military junta– Lieutenant-Colonels Dembele, Doukara, and Bagayako – who were accused of ‘corrupt enrichment’, and the régime hoped the campaign would help flush out their accomplices in the public service. These anti-corruption drives particularly affected various financial establishments and services in Bamako, the Malian capital.

Page 289 note 2 Cf. ‘Une Administration petandiére, absentéiste et préoccupeé d'affairisme comme celle que les FAN out herité’, in Le Sahel (Niamey), 4 08 1976, p. 1.Google Scholar See also, ‘Bureaucratic: les raisons d'une lourdeur’, in Sahel hebdo (Niamey), 277, 20 07 1981, pp. 18–19.Google Scholar

Page 291 note 1 See the editorial in Le Sahel, 6 February 1975, and the commentary on ‘Jeter du lest’, 29 April 1975.

Page 291 note 2 However, it is hard to talk of a military monopoly in this direction because senior public servants continue to be part and parcel of the commanding heights of the bureaucratic control system. For more details, see Amuwo, Kunle, ‘Les Rapport des régimes militaires et des l'administration publique en Afrique francophone de l'ouest: Mali, Niger, Haute-Volta (Bourkina Fasso). Une Étude comparative du pouvoir militaire en Afrique’, Ph.D. dissertation, I.E.P., Bordeaux 1, 10 1984, pp. 159 ff.Google Scholar

Page 291 note 3 This was the situation when this writer undertook field research work in Niamey in June–July 1983.

Page 292 note 1 See Rapport de la zone franc (Paris, 1982), pp. 218–19.Google Scholar

Page 292 note 2 See Andriamirado, Sennen, ‘Niger: Kountché serre la vis’, in Jeune Afrique (Paris), 1165, 4 05 1983, pp. 32–3.Google Scholar

Page 293 note 1 African Research Bulletin (Exeter), 1–31 August 1984, pp. 7336–7.

Page 293 note 2 Cf. ‘Niger: economic recovery plan’, in West Africa (London), 22 07 1985, p. 1515.Google ScholarPubMed

Page 293 note 3 See Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens (Paris), 3 04, 1984, p. 970.Google Scholar

Page 293 note 4 After the 12th Cabinet reshuffle of 14 November 1983, effected in the wake of the botched coup d'état of 6 October 1983, Kountché left himself as the only member of the armed forces in the Cabinet. At the same time, however, top military officers continued to exercise responsibilities in the territorial and regional administration.

Page 293 note 5 See ‘Technical Reshuffle’, in African Research Bulletin, 1–31 August 1984, pp. 7336–7.

Page 294 note 1 See Le Sahel, 5 January 1984, p. 3.

Page 294 note 2 L'Année politique africaine, (Paris, 1975), p. 83.Google Scholar

Page 295 note 1 For an elaboration of these concepts, see Le Vine, Victor T., Political Corruption: the Ghana case (Stanford, 1975), particularly ch. 1, ‘Political Corruption:an outline of a model’, pp. 1–11.Google Scholar

Page 296 note 1 Field research notes, Niamey, June–July 1983. See Maiga, Mohamed, ‘Niger: pourquoi le putsch…?’, in Afrique-Asie (Paris),24 10 1983, pp. 28–29,Google Scholar and Andriamirado, Sennen, ‘Niger:révélations sur le putsch manqué’, in Jeune Afrique, 1192, 9 11 1983, pp. 28–30.Google Scholar

Page 297 note 1 See ‘Kountché Worried over Rise in Fraud Cases in Niger’, in The Guardian (Lagos), 6 06 1985, p. 3,Google ScholarPubMed and ‘Niger to Set Up a Special Court on Fraud’, in ibid. 11 June 1985, p. 3.

Page 297 note 2 Cf. ‘Fight against Corruption’, in West Africa, 24 June 1985, p. 1298.

Page 298 note 1 The Niger–Nigerian border was, however, opened for a very brief spell during the Muslim festivals in 1984, as a result of a high-powered delegation with a special message from General Kountché to General Buhari, pleading for presidential ‘grace’. Muslim festivals are generally regarded as one of the peak periods for the sale of cattle, and the Niger régime argued that it could not afford to lose critical foreign-exchange earnings from this source of wealth.

Page 298 note 2 See West Africa, 11 February 1985, p. 287.

Page 298 note 3 Cf. interview with Ide Oumarou, in ibid. 1 July 1985, pp. 1309–11. Niger's ex-Foreign Minister and current Secretary-General of the O.A.U. tended to give the impression, perhaps inadvertently, that if the two related aforementioned factors were absent, there would have been no need to fight public-sector corruption.

Page 299 note 1 For some insight into this phenomenon, see Sahel hebdo, 314, 3 May 1982, pp. 11–12.

Page 299 note 2 It might be maintained that this policy was simply a carry-over from the ancient order. And this, in spite of the claim by Diori, Hamani that his economic-policy package was neither ‘liberal’ nor ‘collectivist’. See Diori's address to the Chamber of Commerce, Niamey, 18 May 1961, in République du Niger, École nationale d'administration, ‘L'Adaptation des institutions politiques aux nécessités de la société africaine’, Niamey, 1968, pp. 11ff.Google Scholar

Page 301 note 1 See Decree No. 74–50/PCMS in Journal Officiel de la République du Niger (Niamey), 1 05 1974,Google Scholar and Le Temps du Niger (Niamey), 27 04 1974, p. 1.Google Scholar