Almost everyone involved in the legal profession today is aware of the wide, and perhaps insurmountable, chasm between the scholarly research that takes place in elite law schools and the actual work of practicing lawyers and judges. To a greater extent than other academic professions like medicine and public health, law professors too often have little to say to working lawyers and judges, even those judges on the U.S. Supreme Court. Perhaps this has been the case from the beginning, but the gap appears more dramatic in recent decades, as legal scholarship has departed from traditional doctrinal analysis and moved in more interdisciplinary and abstract theoretical directions.

In his deliciously funny book, Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, Professor David Hyman argues that Medicare corrupts our most base impulses. It urges us, for example, to grab for more than our fair share of benefits while offering providers “the prospect of staggering amounts of money – even as…actuaries were promising Congress that the Medicare program would be easily affordable.” Modeled on C.S. Lewis’ The Screwtape Letters, Professor Hyman's satirical examination of Medicare takes the form of a memo to Satan from an underling demon in the Department of Illness and Satanic Services (DISS), reporting on the success of Satan's diabolical plot to corrupt humanity. Sprinkled with political cartoons, absurd (but true) stories of Medicare's over-the-top fraud enforcement efforts, and a historical account of Medicare's genesis (replete with Congressmen and strippers), Medicare Meets Mephistopheles gives us a well-researched and easy-to-read primer on the biggest pot of gold in medicine.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently upheld United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York Judge's denial of petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that it was not objectively unreasonable for the Appellate Division to conclude, in light of clearly established federal law as expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States, that a New York statute providing for the recommitment of specific defendants who plead not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect (NRRMDD) under a mere “preponderance of the evidence” standard does not violate either due process or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

On August 29, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that an injured ERISA plan beneficiary need not be “made whole” by any injury-related recovery from a third party in order for her ERISA plan to assert subrogation or reimbursement rights if the plan's terms either 1) “unambiguously establish a plan priority” to any funds a beneficiary recovers from a third party, or 2) are reasonably interpreted to establish such a priority by an ERISA plan fiduciary clearly authorized to do so.

In 1991, appellants William and Judith Moore (the Moores) purchased an ERISA health insurance policy (the plan) from Blue Cross Blue Shield of the National Capital Area and its wholly-owned subsidiary CapitalCare (CC/BCBS). On September 10, 1992, the Moores’ daughter Alistaire, a plan beneficiary, was seriously injured in an automobile accident.

In Pabon v. Wright, the Second Circuit held that the Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse medical treatment contained a corollary right to the information necessary to make an informed decision. Plaintiff, William Pabon, was an inmate at Green Haven Correctional Facility in New York (Green Haven). He named two groups of defendants: his doctors and nurses at Green Haven and his doctors at Dutchess Gastroenterologists, P.C. (Dutchess).

In October 1996, a laboratory test indicated that Plaintiff may have contracted Hepatitis C. The Green Haven doctors referred Plaintiff to Dutchess for additional testing, where additional tests confirmed that Plaintiff had Hepatitis C. In July 1997, Plaintiff returned to Dutchess for additional evaluation, and the physicians told him that he must undergo a liver biopsy in order to receive treatment for his condition.