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American Journal of Law & Medicine and Harvard Law & Health Care Society
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2021
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- Type
- Recent Developments in Health Law
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2001
References
The court in CVS defined fiduciary duty as instances where “one party reposed confidence in another and reasonably relied on the other's superior expertise or knowledge.” See Anonymous v. CVS Corp., New York Law Journal, March 9, 2001, at 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 5, 2001).Google Scholar
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