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Altruism and Self Interest in Medical Decision Making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Paul H. Rubin
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Extract

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.

Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations

As the quote above indicates, economists generally are more comfortable with self interest as a motivating force for social benefit than with altruism. This is because in most instances in a market economy, self interest will lead agents to provide benefits for others. Ultimately this is because the butcher or baker will not get paid unless he does something that others are willing to pay for. This is the source of the famous “invisible hand,” also discussed by Adam Smith.

This might sound trivial, except that in discussing aspects of medicine we seem to lose sight of this mechanism and rely on other tools to provide benefits. These tools do not work as well as naked self interest would. Some might say that medicine and medical progress is too important to depend on the market.

Type
Symposium
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 37 , Issue 3 , Fall 2009 , pp. 401 - 409
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2009

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References

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