High courts such as the US Supreme Court announce legal rules that guide subsequent decisions by lower courts and other actors. Because legal rules are forward-looking in this sense, judges’ expectations about the distribution of future cases are critical. Focusing on this fact, we provide microfoundations for judicial preferences over legal rules by deriving them directly from expectations about the distribution of future cases. Doing so has important consequences: in contrast to standard assumptions in models of judicial decision-making, preferences over legal rules are asymmetric rather than symmetric. We demonstrate that this has significant implications for judicial decision-making on collegial courts. Finally, we show that changes in the case distribution—for example, as a result of technological change—can lead to significant legal change, even in the absence of ideological or doctrinal change on the court.

To what degree is judicial agenda setting top-down or bottom-up? Existing studies lack evidence of the frequency or magnitude of these two processes. We conceptualize the judicial agenda as the legal questions/rules receiving judicial attention, measure it using citations to Supreme Court opinions, and estimate vector autoregression models to identify how each level of court initiates or responds to variation in attention to precedent at other levels of the judiciary. The Supreme Court exerts some top-down control, but agenda setting is more often bottom-up, revealing lower courts are more integral to setting the federal judicial agenda than previously understood.

Supreme Court influence depends greatly on the responses of lower court judges to its precedent. Justices employ numerous strategies to obtain lower court deference to their decisions, including the provocative practice of relying upon foreign law. Referred to as “constitutional cross-fertilization” when used in constitutional interpretation, this practice is labeled by critics as a threat to American democracy. Research suggests that the Court uses such references strategically to prop up controversial and ideologically charged decisions, and that they obtain a benefit in the form of increased citations. These studies do not tell us if the Court gains lower court deference. I contend that, in constitutional cases, lower court judges will not find reliance upon such sources persuasive; rather, they will regard these references with disdain. My findings support my argument. Contrary to the justices’ intentions, reliance upon foreign law in constitutional cases is associated with an increased probability of negative, as opposed to positive, treatment. Justices incur significant costs from participating in the global rights dialogue.

There is convincing evidence that Americans have high, stable levels of knowledge about the Supreme Court. Yet, this conclusion masks variance in political knowledge associated with ethnicity. Using data from surveys of Latinos and non-Latinos fielded before and after the Supreme Court’s rulings in Arizona v. United States and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, we find Latinos know less about the Court than other Americans. However, Latinos’ knowledge of the Court increased significantly between the surveys, while others’ Supreme Court knowledge did not. We discuss the implications of this result for the Supreme Court’s legitimacy and civic education policy.

The State of the Union represents an opportunity for the president to share policy goals with other political actors. Thus, the State of the Union can proxy how much information the Court has about executive preferences when receiving a case. We find that the less time a president devotes to a policy area, the more likely the Court is to issue a request for a brief in a case dealing with that issue area. This finding indicates that the Court is cognizant of presidential signals of policy preferences and actively seeks to supplement its understanding of the executive’s preferences.

Scholars recognize that judicial review depends upon judicial independence: an independent court is more likely to invalidate a statute it opposes than a nonindependent court. But scholars have lost that the previous statement is a conditional relationship, in which judicial independence moderates the relationship between a court’s ideological preferences and its decision to strike statutes. I model this conditional relationship using the US Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions on important federal statutes. The analysis reveals that judicial independence is best modeled as a conditional predictor of judicial review and that modeling judicial independence as an additive predictor risks false negative results.

The struggles Indigenous Peoples face are unique from other minority groups living in the United States because they exist in an odd, semisovereign status. While the US Constitution outlines that First Nations are sovereign entities, current federal law and policies hold that tribes are simultaneously sovereign and not sovereign. Using an original data set consisting of all cases involving Indigenous Peoples before state supreme courts from 1995 to 2010, we find Indigenous Peoples are more likely to receive positive judicial outcomes when the judiciary is elected and the indigenous population of the state is relatively high.

House deliberations over healthcare legislation in 1798 show members of the Fifth US Congress debating the constitutional basis of small government assumptions about states’ rights and federal power, asking why the regime’s principles should not be understood as requiring direct federal intervention in the lives of socially and economically vulnerable groups irrespective of states’ authority. Extending the current scholarly debate over nationalization and state building in early American thought, I suggest that questions alleged by many scholars to have been excluded from political and constitutional debate in the early republic were, in cases like this, robustly contested.

We examine whether the public evaluates Supreme Court nominees on the basis of judicial philosophies when presented with a description of those philosophies. Employing a conjoint experiment, we find that the public will evaluate nominees’ judicial philosophies as well as the nominees’ partisanship, ideology, and qualifications. We also discover significant differences between Republicans and Democrats. These results have important implications for the future of judicial nominations, framing, and public support for the judiciary.

This paper develops and tests a theory that in states with judicial elections, criminal justice outcomes will be more punitive than in states without elections. Leveraging a data set previously unused in the judicial politics literature, I estimate time-series regressions of state sentencing and incarceration rates over a 38-year period while distinguishing between types of judicial elections to establish support for the theory. I find that states where trial judges are reelected are generally more punitive than states without judicial elections, and this punitiveness is in response to the public’s ideological preferences, indicating that elections serve as an important judicial accountability mechanism for citizens.

This issue of the Journal of Law and Courts features articles devoted to measuring the personality traits of US Supreme Court justices. In this brief comment, I attempt to do the following. First, I briefly summarize Hall et al. (2021) and Black et al. (2021). Here I pay special attention to some of the methodological issues that give rise to the disagreement between these authors. Second, I provide some general thoughts on the enterprise of attempting to measure personality traits of US Supreme Court justices. While I am generally skeptical of the utility of such an enterprise, I could be convinced of its value. Accordingly, I attempt to lay out what a skeptic like myself would like to see in order to be convinced of the intellectual value added of work in this area.

European courts have responded to increasing caseloads by providing justices or other actors with a higher degree of discretionary docket control. Does docket type—mandatory or discretionary—shape judicial behavior? Using a most similar systems research design regarding tax decisions in the Norwegian and Danish supreme courts, we show that discretionary dockets are associated with higher dissent and reversal rates than mandatory dockets, that low-status litigants have a lower chance of winning under mandatory dockets, and that docket type conditions the effects of justices’ preferences. Our findings have implications for comparative judicial politics and for institutional design.

Governments reform the process of nominating judges to constitutional courts, seeking to reduce the courts’ involvement in state affairs. Since 2008, reformers have tried to appoint judges who would be more judicially restrained. We examine the rulings of judges on Israel’s Supreme Court in its capacity as Israel’s High Court of Justice on the Israeli executive’s decisions. We show that reformers did achieve their goal of reducing High Court of Justice judges’ decisions supporting petitions against the executive. However, that trend has abated due to existing legal conventions regarding particular policy subsystems.

Models of behavior on the US Supreme Court almost universally assume that justices’ behavior depends, at least in part, on the characteristics of individual justices. However, few prior studies have attempted to assess these characteristics beyond ideological preferences. In contrast, we apply recent advances in machine learning to develop and validate measures of the Big Five personality traits for Supreme Court justices serving during the 1946 through 2015 terms based on the language in their written opinions. We then conduct an empirical application to demonstrate the importance of these Supreme Court Individual Personality Estimates and discuss their proper use.

Researchers often study the impact of legal change by investigating judges’ decisions and ignoring litigants. Many scholars believe the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal increased how specific factual allegations must be to avoid dismissal, but studies generally fail to find an effect. Using text analysis, I find evidence that litigants and their lawyers changed the information they provided after the decisions in certain types of cases. These results call into question prior studies and illustrate the need to consider the behavior of litigants. They also help shed light on issues of access to courts and separation of powers.

Psychological scholarship on personality is uniting with political science to redefine existing theories. This is clearly the case with research on judicial behavior and the US Supreme Court. But if this new approach is to survive and thrive, it must employ measures equal to the task. We show that Supreme Court Individual Personality Estimates, which seek to estimate justices’ personalities by examining their concurring opinions, suffer from a number of important methodological deficits that critically limit their usefulness. We briefly discuss what kinds of improved personality measures scholars should use instead and offer an improved set of estimates for one trait with an application that demonstrates our cautionary tale.

After democratic transitions, many Eastern European countries reformed their political institutions in a piecemeal fashion. Focusing on the Bulgarian Constitutional Court from 1992 to 2012 and the Soviet-style procurator general, we analyze how legal reforms operate in practice in transitional societies. Using original data, we find that judges are influenced by the powerful and unaccountable procurator general. Judges’ decisions to strike down laws also are guided by alignment with their or their appointers’ political preferences and the opinions of interested parties in amicus briefs. The study has implications about interbranch relations and the role of procurator generals in constitutional review.

In another article in this issue, Black et al. discuss their preferred approach to estimating Supreme Court justices’ Big Five personality traits from written text and provide several critiques of the approach of Hall et al. In this rejoinder, we show that Black et al.’s critiques are substantially without merit, their preferred approach suffers from many of the same drawbacks that they project onto our approach, their specific method of implementing their preferred approach runs afoul of many contemporary social scientific norms, our use of concurrences to estimate personality traits is far more justifiable than they suggest (especially in contrast to their use of lower court opinions), and their substantive critiques reflect a potential misunderstanding of the nature of conscientiousness. Nonetheless, we also acknowledge their broader point regarding the state-of-the-art textual analysis methodology vis-à-vis the estimation of personality traits, and we provide some constructive suggestions for the path forward.