High courts are widely believed to influence the criminal justice system, yet judicial impact varies widely across political and institutional contexts. Here, we seek to identify the factors that constrain judicial influence on state incarceration rates. We find that the preferences of justices on state courts of last resort and the US Supreme Court influence incarceration; however, high-court impact is conditional on two factors. Judicial influence is stronger in states with divided partisan governments and occurs more quickly in states that lack intermediate appellate courts. Our findings suggest that legislative gridlock and institutional thickness significantly constrain judicial impact.

The Supreme Court sometimes chooses to use its limited time to revisit earlier decisions. In doing so, the justices signal the importance of reasserting, correcting, or reconsidering their arguments. We find that the likelihood of the Supreme Court revisiting a case in a given year increases significantly as the number of circuit courts critical of that opinion increases. These results suggest that an acknowledgment of the important role of the circuit courts influences the decision to revisit cases. Even if the Court merely clarifies or reinforces earlier opinions, criticism in the circuits prompts the Court to take some action. Though the Supreme Court’s word is final, barring a constitutional amendment or legislative override in nonconstitutional cases, the mechanism of criticism in the circuits allows reconsideration of many issues already decided by the Court and sheds light on the importance of institutional structures to the maintenance of the rule of law.

Scholars recognize that judicial review depends upon judicial independence: an independent court is more likely to invalidate a statute it opposes than a nonindependent court. But scholars have lost that the previous statement is a conditional relationship, in which judicial independence moderates the relationship between a court’s ideological preferences and its decision to strike statutes. I model this conditional relationship using the US Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions on important federal statutes. The analysis reveals that judicial independence is best modeled as a conditional predictor of judicial review and that modeling judicial independence as an additive predictor risks false negative results.

We investigate the impact of the consolidation of local agencies publicly providing services, focusing on the prosecution of crime. In many states in the United States, prosecution is a county office with a head prosecutor directing decisions. Other states merge counties into prosecutorial districts. We show that, along with the cost savings that arises, the evidence suggests that prosecutorial services benefit from increasing returns to scale. The efficiency of prosecutorial output is higher in consolidated districts. Further, we show that it is not owing to differing outcomes of the criminal justice system but to fewer inputs used.

This article presents an empirical study of statutory interpretation. Respondents were asked to read statutes and answer questions about how they should be applied to simple cases. The results suggest, first, that it is difficult to separate judgments about the linguistic meaning of a statute from policy preferences about it. Different ways of framing the interpretive question have consequences, however; asking how an ordinary reader would interpret a text helps produce answers that are distinct from a respondent’s own preferences about it. The article considers why this might be so and discusses implications for the interpretation of statutes by courts.

While many scholars have focused on the relationship shared between the Supreme Court and lower courts, fewer have studied how those outside the judicial branch implement court policy. This study examines how police implemented a major shift in vehicle search law after the Supreme Court placed limits on search incident to arrest. Comprehensive traffic-stop data from two states are relied upon for time series intervention analyses to test the decision’s impact. Evidence of the Court’s influence is found in seriously limiting searches incident to arrest and expanding the use of alternative searches as a means to circumvent the ruling.

Interest groups often post about their judicial advocacy on social media. We argue that they do so for two main reasons. First, providing information about the courts on social media builds the group’s credibility as a source of information with policymakers, media and the public. Second, social media provides a way to claim credit for litigation activity and outcomes, which can increase membership and aid in fundraising. Using original datasets of millions of tweets and Facebook posts by interest groups, we provide evidence that interest groups use social media for public education and to credit claim for their litigation activity.

I examine the relationship between judicial federalism and state-level representation. I develop a framework in which federal courts establish a federal “floor” in a policy area, thus creating an asymmetry—states with lower levels of policy must shift policy to the floor, whereas states with higher levels of policy above the floor are unaffected. I use the framework to recast the “countermajoritarian difficulty” as an issue of federalism. To illustrate the framework, I present a quantitative analysis of the legalization of same-sex marriage in all 50 states, using data on public opinion, federal and state judicial decisions, and state-level policy.

This study investigates how citizens assess the credibility of constitutional experts on matters of government authority. Analyses of data from two similarly designed experiments, conducted with national samples, reveal that partisanship, race, and level of education are significant predictors of survey respondents’ willingness to extend credibility to constitutional experts. The compatibility of the views expressed by experts with respondents’ own policy views on issues that are the subject of proposed government action is also important. Evidence shows that this consistency is more important in the decision that experts are credible than in decisions that they are not credible, suggesting that esteem motives are relevant in the decision to credit experts who express views congenial to our own that are distinct from social-identity motives scholars have theorized to be important in partisan resistance to expertise. The implications of findings for holding government officials accountable to constitutional limits on government authority are considered.

How do political actors use rhetoric after an initial policy battle? We explore factors that lead Supreme Court justices to integrate disagreeable rhetoric into opinions. Although disagreeable language has negative consequences, we posit that justices pay this cost for issues with high personal significance. At the same time, we argue that integrating disagreeable rhetoric has a deleterious effect on the institution by reducing majority coalition size. Examining opinions from 1946 to 2011 using text-based measures of disagreeable rhetoric, we model the language of opinion writing as well as explore the consequences for coalition size. Our findings suggest serious implications for democratic institutions and political rhetoric.

Psychological scholarship on personality is uniting with political science to redefine existing theories. This is clearly the case with research on judicial behavior and the US Supreme Court. But if this new approach is to survive and thrive, it must employ measures equal to the task. We show that Supreme Court Individual Personality Estimates, which seek to estimate justices’ personalities by examining their concurring opinions, suffer from a number of important methodological deficits that critically limit their usefulness. We briefly discuss what kinds of improved personality measures scholars should use instead and offer an improved set of estimates for one trait with an application that demonstrates our cautionary tale.

What strategies do judges employ when they anticipate review? Constrained judges behave strategically by using particular instruments—like language complexity—when authoring opinions. Prior studies suggest that judges use complexity in anticipation of legislative hostility. Similarly, the threat of review and reversal may spur opinion complexity. This study examines variations in circuit court opinions resulting from precedent treatment and Supreme Court preferences. When a circuit negatively treats a Supreme Court precedent that the justices prefer or a circuit positively treats a precedent that the justices dislike, opinion complexity should increase. These hypotheses find support, suggesting that circuits strategically insulate using opinion complexity.

Institutional designers of judiciaries often want to provide the appearance of impartiality. As a result, many collegial courts issue per curiam rulings in which judges’ votes are not public. An extensive scholarship, however, provides evidence that ideology and mechanisms of retention affect judicial decision-making. Do per curiam rulings actively mitigate or provide cover for ideological and career-oriented judicial decision-making? I argue that – when serving as the rapporteur (opinion-writer) – a judge on a civil law per curiam court can steer their panel towards the outcome their appointer prefers. When their appointing government turns over, nonetheless, a judge is not compelled to change their decision-making to be in line with their new government, as per curiam rulings protect them from retaliation. An analysis of decisions at the Court of Justice of the European Union provides evidence for this account.

Building on the empirical portrait of federal judicial selection processes and outcomes in the 113th Congress published in part 1, we now turn to in-depth analyses, drawing on extensive interview data, of the confirmation battle over confirmations to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, filibuster reform (the nuclear option) and its consequences, the role of the blue slip system in contemporary judicial selection, case studies of selection successes and failures, and the historic impact of the Obama appointments record on patterns of diversity and partisanship on the federal bench.

The first, hidden stage of the Supreme Court’s agenda-setting process is the formation of the “discuss list,” the small set of cases actually considered in conference. Yet few have systematically considered the operation of and the influences on this critical initial phase of decision making. No systematic, empirical work makes comparisons over time of how features of cases shape the makeup of the chief justice’s discuss list. Here, we examine the composition of the discuss list through a multivariate analysis of all paid petitions for certiorari filed in October Term 1939, 1968, and 1982. We are thereby able to compare the tendencies and efficacy of three long-serving chief justices—Hughes, Warren, and Burger—in making up the discuss list. And, methodologically, we present an alternative to the “observed-value” and the “representative-case” methods of calculating effect sizes for second differences, with software to implement our proposal.

Scholars studying judicial behavior have identified a host of factors theoretically and empirically connected to judicial decision making. One recent theory identifies economic conditions—which have implications for the decisions of voters and politicians—as influencing the voting behavior of US Supreme Court justices. Yet the US Supreme Court is a unique judicial institution addressing limited—though indisputably important—economic cases every year. State courts, on the other hand, address a multitude of issues every year with economic ramifications. Building on the rich body of literature examining state courts of last resort, I analyze whether judges, across a variety of methods for judicial selection and retention, respond to temporary changes in the state of the economy. Results indicate that the responses of state supreme court judges to changes in the state of the economy are conditional on the electoral vulnerability of the justice. This research thus offers considerable insight into judicial behavior under different selection mechanisms and the conditional influence of the state of the economy.

What explains expansions to the federal judiciary? Whereas existing research focuses on unified government as an explanation, we argue ideological proximity between institutions involved in the expansion process more accurately predicts judicial expansions. We examine whether Congress chose to add seats to each federal district or circuit court annually from 1937 to 2012 and find expansions are more likely when (1) the ideological distance between chambers of Congress is smaller and (2) the ideological distance between Congress and individual district or circuit courts is greater. These findings suggest the administration of federal courts is influenced by the political concerns in another branch of government, raising important questions about judicial independence.

Black legal theorists often believe White Americans see Black judges as incapable of deciding racial issues fairly. Using a survey experiment, we examine this by studying perceptions of Black and White judges’ fairness through racial threat and group consciousness. Results show race consistently influences Black Americans’ evaluations of judges, with Black respondents viewing Black judges as fairer on racial issues. For White respondents, race only affects their views of judges in the context of racial resentment, otherwise playing no significant role. These results highlight the complex interplay of race in judicial evaluations.

This paper draws on new data regarding judicial decisions involving religious and anti-religious expression to map the political beneficiaries of judicial empowerment. In particular, the paper assesses the extent to which free-expression decisions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court and European Court of Human Rights have favored claimants who are religious majorities, religious minorities, or secular elites. We find the U.S. doctrine relatively more libertarian and the European Court of Human Rights doctrine relatively more secularist, but both bodies of case law extend regular and substantial rights protection to religious minorities.

As the chief litigator for the US government, the solicitor general plays a crucial role in the Supreme Court decision-making process. The justices and solicitor general share a mutually beneficial relationship that is reinforced by the solicitor general’s willingness to provide legal advice when asked. In this article, we examine whether and how this relationship changes when the solicitor general files a formal “confession of error.” Using data on confessions filed between the 1979 and 2014 terms, we find the justices are significantly less likely to support the solicitor general’s position at multiple stages of the Court’s decision-making process if the solicitor general confesses error in light of a policy change. This punishment is harshest when the solicitor general provides advice as an amicus curiae participant, but it is only temporary. These results provide new insight into the scope and limitations of benefits allotted to the Court’s “tenth justice.”