This article examines the visit of Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop to Washington DC in June 1983. Scholars have speculated that the visit was motivated by a desire to normalise Grenada's troubled relations with the United States or, alternatively, that it was a public relations and lobbying exercise. This article concludes that Grenadian government officials variously viewed the visit as a public relations exercise, an opportunity for dialogue and an opportunity to gain economic support. For the United States the prospect of Bishop's visit prompted a reassessment of its Grenada policy and, after Bishop met senior US officials, resulted in a hardening of existing policy.

From the monetary reform of July 1994 until January 1999 Brazil followed the policy of pegging the new currency (the real) to the US dollar. The central rate was initially fixed at 1[ratio ]1 to the US dollar, but no fluctuation band was set and the market rate was allowed to fluctuate substantially. After a sharp appreciation of up to 15 per cent the real remained at a premium to the dollar for two years (until June 1996). In March 1995, following the Mexican crisis, the Banco Central do Brasil adopted a crawling band without preannounced depreciations. This change in policy was meant to increase somewhat the flexibility of the exchange rate regime while still maintaining an anchor for inflationary expectations. The market rate depreciated by 13.9 per cent in the course of 1995 (December 1995 on December 1994), 7.1 per cent in 1996, 7.3 per cent in 1997 and 8.3 per cent in 1998. By December 1998 it had reached 1.2054 to the US dollar, a depreciation of only 20 per cent with respect to the central rate fixed at the end of the hyperinflation but about 40 per cent with respect to the rate prevailing in July 1994.

This article examines the impact of a decade of neoliberal policies on poverty and income distribution in Brazil. It demonstrates that while trade and market reform contributed towards the attainment of price stability and accelerated capital inflows, little was achieved by way of reducing income inequality and poverty. The article concludes by outlining the policy options which might be adopted to tackle this critical problem.

Where is the Cuban economy heading? The economy has been recovering at an average rate of four per cent per year since 1994 (after GDP declined by 35 per cent between 1989 and 1993). Many reforms have been undertaken in the direction of a market economy, but it is far from clear what kind of economy the Cuban ruling party has in mind after recovery. This article discusses the successes and shortcomings of the reform process in Cuba since the downfall of communism in Europe and the Soviet Union. It also addresses the salient issues in what appears to be a new development strategy in Cuba, and what could be said about the reforms and the strategy in the light of the debate on transition ‘ten years after’.

Latin America has been a world pioneer of neoliberal, structural reform of social security pensions (‘privatisation’). This article focuses on the diverse political economy circumstances that enabled such reform, analysing why policy makers have chosen such a costly strategy and how they have managed to implement it. First, in nine countries with diverse regimes (authoritarian and democratic) it examines the internal political process that led to the adoption of reform. There tends to be an inverse relationship between the degree of democratisation and that of privatisation, but the political regime alone cannot fully explain the reform outcomes in all cases. To expand the search for explanatory variables, other key factors that might have influenced the reform design are studied, among them relevant political actors (driving and opposing forces), existing institutional arrangements, legal constraints, internal and external economics and policy legacy.