In 1970 Leslie Bethell argued that the Brazilian slave trade was ended by British pressure. Since then others have pointed to slaveholders’ fears of insurrection and of yellow fever. This article addresses the issue by reviewing Brazilian slavery, the African trade and yellow fever. Its analysis of sources and context leads it to question revisionist arguments. Moreover, while it supports Bethell on the centrality of British pressure, it goes beyond his appreciation of internal Brazilian political affairs. It provides greater specificity, clarifying the key importance of political history, the structure of state-society relations and the significance of the Brazilian leadership of the time.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States and Chile competed for dominance in the Pacific, and their maritime rivalry reemerged in the race to Antarctica during the 1940s. The US Navy was able to circumnavigate the white continent, for the first time ever, while Chile's once great navy no longer posed a threat even to its neighbours. The Chilean government expressed concern about the scope of US exploration since the Antarctic always had been an essential component of its maritime policy with national security ramifications. President Gabriel González Videla seized upon Washington's unsuccessful attempts to determine the legal fate of the Antarctic to gain acceptance for a Chilean proposal that avoided the need to renounce sovereignty claims. In doing so, he secured essentially maritime objectives by diplomatic means. This success was more profound than widely appreciated since it came at a time when US intervention in Chile's domestic affairs had reached an unprecedented level.

The most widely-accepted views of the origins of the South Atlantic War contend that it arose either out of the Argentine junta's need to divert attention away from a worsening economy or from misperceptions in both London and Buenos Aires. This article argues that the ‘demobilisation’ of Argentine civil society removed the need for a diversionary war; and that the lengthy crisis bargaining that followed in the wake of the ‘grab’ of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands substantially mitigated the impact of any misperceptions. This article advances an alternative to existing theories that explains the outbreak of this war by reference to both structural and organisational factors. A fast decreasing gap in relative power between Argentina and Britain may have encouraged the junta more seriously to consider the possibility of initiating a war between the two. Thereafter, however, the organisational pathologies of the Argentine military led to a suboptimally timed preemptive invasion, intransigent diplomacy and a ‘hedged’ approach to deployments that severely undermined Argentina's military effectiveness, allowing Britain to undertake reconquest of the islands with a very reasonable chance of success.

This article is concerned with the implementation of the Anglo-Argentine 14th July 1999 Joint Statement relating to the Falklands/Malvinas and the South West Atlantic. Initial consideration is given to the recent historical and political context of the Falklands/Malvinas dispute. The arrest of General Pinochet in London is shown to have been a significant factor in Anglo-Argentine relations during the period of 1998–1999. Thereafter, the background relating to the 14th July 1999 Joint Statement is considered in some detail as it relates to fishing, travel, place names, land mines and an Argentine war memorial on the Falkland Islands. Each element of the Joint Statement is shown to be problematic, and the article concludes with the belief that the provisions of the Joint Statement will continue to strengthen the rapprochement between Britain and Argentina without making any substantial progress towards the eventual solution of the dispute over the Falklands/Malvinas.

The 1989–1990 Colombian student movement played a key role in bringing about a constituent assembly to draft a new national constitution. This article utilises contemporary social movement theory, secondary sources and interviews with student activists to examine the trajectory of this movement. Key explanatory variables of social movement theory – political opportunity structure, organisational form, the framing process and the repertoire of collective action – provide useful insights into the origins, impact and ultimate demise of the Colombian student movement. Judicious use of such variables could benefit research on other social movements in Latin America.

This essay addresses the changing trajectory of grassroots political activity in Latin America, with special reference to Chile and Brazil, and assesses its impact on the policy and practices of social development. It traces this trajectory through the transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule, and focuses on the responses of grassroots organisations to democratic governance and the rise of neo-liberalism. In particular, it shows that social movements have declined or been transformed (or both), while non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have multiplied and become more visible. It appears that where grassroots organisations interact with the state they may be subordinated to state policy, and where they fail to interact they may be ineffective. Their influence on social development mainly occurs piecemeal through social service delivery, not through the shaping of social policy itself.