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Institutional Reform and Violence Reduction in Pernambuco, Brazil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2017

KRISTIAN HOELSCHER
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Abstract

If institutions are important for regulating violence, can institutional reforms make societies less violent? This article examines the north-east Brazilian state of Pernambuco primarily between 2007 and 2013, proposing that patterns of declining lethal violence can be explained by changes in both the accountability and effectiveness of formal state institutions and informal social norms. Drawing on two months of qualitative fieldwork, findings suggest that social and political mobilisation enabled a political coalition to initiate substantial changes under the Pacto pela Vida (Pact for Life) public-security programme, which improved the legitimacy and operational effectiveness of the criminal justice system, and coincided with a marked reduction in homicide rates. While showing that these reforms were central in reducing lethal violence in Pernambuco between 2007 and 2013, the article concludes by discussing the challenges of policy continuity in light of increasing rates of lethal violence since 2014.

Spanish abstract

Si las instituciones son importantes para regular la violencia, ¿pueden las reformas institucionales lograr que las sociedades sean menos violentas? Este artículo examina el caso del estado nordestino brasileño de Pernambuco entre 2007 y 2013, proponiendo que los patrones del declive de la violencia letal se pueden explicar por cambios tanto en la rendición de cuentas y efectividad de las instituciones formales estatales como por las normas sociales informales. Basados en dos meses de trabajo de campo cualitativo, los hallazgos sugieren que la movilización social y política allí posibilitó a una coalición política iniciar cambios sustanciales bajo el programa de seguridad pública Pacto pela Vida (Pacto por la Vida), el cual mejoró la legitimidad y efectividad operacional del sistema de justicia penal, y coincidió con una marcada reducción en las tasas de homicidio. Al mostrar que estas reformas fueron centrales en la reducción de la violencia letal en Pernambuco entre 2007 y 2013, el artículo concluye discutiendo los desafíos alrededor de la continuidad de dichas políticas a la luz de aumentos en las tasas de violencia letal desde 2014.

Portuguese abstract

Se instituições são importantes para controlar a violência, podem as reformas institucionais fazerem com que sociedades se tornem menos violentas? Este artigo examina o estado de Pernambuco, no nordeste brasileiro, entre os anos de 2007 e 2013, propondo que os padrões de declínio da violência letal podem ser explicados por mudanças tanto na responsabilização, quanto na efetividade das instituições formais do estado e nas normas sociais informais. Baseando-se em dois meses de trabalho de campo qualitativo, os dados levantados sugerem que a mobilização política e social permitiu a uma coalizão política iniciar mudanças significativas trazidas pelo programa de segurança pública Pacto pela Vida, que melhorou a legitimidade e efetividade operacional do sistema de justiça criminal, e coincidiu com uma marcante redução da taxa de homicídios. Ainda que mostre que essas reformas foram fundamentais para a redução da violência letal no Pernambuco entre 2007 e 2013, o artigo conclui discutindo os desafios para a continuidade de políticas contra a violência em um cenário de aumentos nas taxas de violência letal desde 2014.

Keywords

social violenceviolence reductioninstitutional reformpublic-security policyPernambucoBrazilviolencia socialreducción de la violenciareforma institucionalpolítica de seguridad públicaPernambucoBrasilviolência socialredução da violênciareforma institucionalpolítica de segurança públicaPernambucoBrasil
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 49 , Issue 4 , November 2017 , pp. 855 - 884
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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23 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for emphasising this point.

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62 This is important as state governors in Brazil are responsible for public security, and are therefore influential in shaping policy.

63 I thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.

64 Interviews, senior members of the municipal secretariat for urban security, March 2013; interviews, local NGO, March 2013. On the repressive tactics of Vasconcelos see also Alexandre de Freitas, ‘Fundamentos para uma sociologia crítica da formação humana: um estudo sobre as redes associacionistas da sociedade civil’, PhD Dissertation (UFPE, 2005).

65 Interviews, senior member of the municipal secretariat for urban security, March 2013.

66 Interview, former senior member of the Courts of Justice, Pernambuco, Feb. 2013.

67 ‘There was no monitoring, no goals, no structures in place to protect crime scenes’: Interview, PC delegado (police investigator), Feb. 2013.

68 Interviews, senior member of the PC, Feb. and March 2013. Such practices reinforced the political appointment of allies and the usurpation of the state apparatus for personal ends. See also Montero, Alfred and Samuels, David (eds.), Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

69 This occurred both out of frustration that known criminals were evading punishment, and for officers’ own personal financial gain. Interviews, member and senior member of the PM, March 2013.

70 Separate interviews, senior members of the PC and PM, March 2013.

71 Noto, Ana, Galduróz, José, Nappo, Solange and Carlini, E., Levantamento nacional sobre o uso de drogas entre crianças e adolescentes em situação de rua nas 27 capitais brasileiras – 2003 (São Paulo: Centro Brasileiro de Informações sobre Drogas Psicotrópicas, 2004)Google Scholar.

72 Interviews, senior member of the PM, March 2013; interviews, community leaders, Feb. and March 2013. A community leader noted: ‘If you compare here and a little [version of] Rio [de Janeiro], there crime is organised. Here it is just disorganised.’

73 Author's translation from Júnior, José Maria Nóbrega, ‘Homicídios em Pernambuco: dinâmica e relações de causalidade’, Coleção Segurança com Cidadania, 1: 3 (2009), pp. 237–60, here p. 248Google Scholar.

74 For further elaboration see Andréia Macêdo, ‘“Polícia, quando quer, faz!”: análise da estrutura de governança do “Pacto pela Vida” de Pernambuco’, Dissertation (Universidade de Brasília, 2012); and Ratton, José Luiz, Galvão, Clarissa and Fernandez, Michelle, ‘Pact for Life and the Reduction of Homicides in the State of Pernambuco’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 3: 1 (2014), pp. 1–15 Google Scholar.

75 CVLIs are PPV's main measure for evaluating impact in reducing lethal violence. CVLI data includes intentional homicides and deaths following assault, robbery or similar altercations (corresponding to first- and second-degree murder).

76 Interview, former coordinator of NGO, March 2013.

77 Interview, senior member of the Courts of Justice, March 2013; interview, senior colonel in PM, March 2013.

78 While not mentioned in interviews, participatory budgeting processes in Recife during the 2000s may have increased citizens’ awareness of their rights and ability to challenge the status quo. I thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this. Also see Nuijten, Monique, Koster, Martijn and de Vries, Pieter, ‘Regimes of Spatial Ordering in Brazil: Neoliberalism, Leftist Populism and Modernist Aesthetics in Slum Upgrading in Recife’, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 33: 2 (2012), pp. 157–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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80 Interview, NGO, March, 2013; interview, UFPE professor, Feb. 2013.

81 Interview, secretariat for urban violence, Feb. 2013; interview, journalist, March 2013; interview, NGO, March 2013. Particularly influential was the death of Dr Antônio Carlos Escobar, killed in one of the wealthiest parts of Recife in Dec. 2005 while intervening in an assault.

82 Many Latin American societies have responded to violence by supporting mano dura-style responses to violence, including other federal states in Brazil, particularly in the north-east.

83 Interview, senior member of municipal secretariat for urban violence, March 2013; interview, journalist, March 2013.

84 Ibid.

85 Bogotá’s experience showed the importance of reforms that increased ‘public support for, and participation in, the reform process over time’: see Moncada, ‘Toward Democratic Policing’, p. 431.

86 Hoelscher and Nussio, ‘Understanding Unlikely Successes’.

87 Interviews, NGOs, March 2013. See Rique, Célia, Aguiar, Elaine, Lins, José and Barros, Leonardo, A criminalidade no Recife: um problema de amplitude nacional (Recife: Gabinete de Assessoria Jurídica às Organizações Populares, 2005)Google Scholar.

88 See Assies, Willem, To Get Out of the Mud: Neighborhood Associativism in Recife 1964–1988 (Amsterdam: Centro de Estudios y Documentación Latinoamericanos, 1992)Google Scholar; on Pernambuco's historical civic activism, see: Mosher, Jeffrey, Political Struggle, Ideology, and State Building: Pernambuco and the Construction of Brazil, 1817–1850 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008)Google Scholar; and De Carvalho, Marcus, Liberdade: rotinas e rupturas do escravismo no Recife, 1822–1850 (Recife: UFPE, 1998)Google Scholar.

89 http://cremepe.org.br/2006/02/20/carreata-protesta-contra-violencia/.

90 www.cartamaior.com.br/?/Editoria/Direitos-Humanos/37-mulheres-sao-assassinadas-em-31-dias-em-Pernambuco/5/ 9172.

91 www.alepe.pe.gov.br/2006/04/20/violencia-pernambuco-debate-seguranca-publica.

92 Interview, NGO leader, March 2013.

93 Interview, secretariat for urban violence, Feb. 2013; interview, journalist, March 2013.

94 Interview, NGO leader, March 2013.

95 Campos came under considerable pressure to follow through on these campaign promises. See Michael Jerome Wolff, ‘Policing and the Logics of Violence: A Comparative Analysis of Public Security Reform in Brazil’, Policing and Society (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2015.1093478.

96 For example, in the north-eastern state of Alagoas, political will or capacity to respond to recent civil-society mobilisation in the face of violence was largely absent. See https://globalvoices.org/2012/06/01/brazil-alagoas-peace-most-violent-state/.

97 It was arguably this dynamic that was present in some cases in the mid-2000s in Bahia, which now sees the highest homicide rates in the north-east: Paim, Jairnilson, Costa, Heloniza and Vilasbôas, Ana, ‘Política pública e controle da violência: um estudo de caso na cidade de Salvador, Bahia, Brasil’, Cadernos de Saude Publica, 25: 3 (2009), pp. 485–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

98 Ratton, Galvão and Fernandez, ‘Pact for Life’.

99 Interview, senior member of the SDS, Feb. 2013. ‘Spoilers’ were those who would lose out – materially or otherwise – through the introduction of new forms of accountability, including ‘old guard’ actors reliant on networks of patronage with legal and illegal actors and change-resistant bureaucrats opposed to a meritocratic bureaucracy.

100 Interview, former journalist, Feb. 2013; interviews with senior academic, Feb. and March 2013. See also Wolff, ‘Policing and the Logics of Violence’.

101 See Ratton, Galvão and Fernandez, ‘Pact for Life’.

102 Macêdo, ‘Polícia, quando quer, faz!’

103 Interview, senior member of the Courts of Justice, Pernambuco, March 2013.

104 Interview, senior member of the SDS, Feb. 2013.

105 Police were more closely vetted regarding involvement in illegal activity, for example, and promotions became meritocratic. Initial ‘resisters’, particularly within the police, either fell into line and acted in accordance with the new accountability ideals set out in PPV, or were demoted, ousted, or arrested. Interview, senior member of the SDS, Feb. 2013.

106 Interview, senior member of the SDS, Feb. 2013. The author also attended several weekly meetings during fieldwork.

107 This approach derived from hot-spot policing, a preventative methodology whereby extra resources and personnel are devoted to areas with higher crime: Braga, Anthony, Papachristos, Andrew and Hureau, David, ‘The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis’, Justice Quarterly, 31: 4 (2014), pp. 633–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

108 Important in this process was Campos’ leadership, who chaired PPV meetings once a month from inception until 2014.

109 Interview, senior member of the SDS, Feb. 2013.

110 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston: Addendum: Mission to Brazil’ (4–14 Nov. 2007), 14 May 2008, available at: www.refworld.org/docid/484d20cd2.html.

111 A senior member of the PC remarked: ‘Police [were] also part of this context [of being investigated], and by doing this you show them that they are also vulnerable, that they can be arrested too. And we stick to it … The fact that [a police officer] can be arrested and made an example of, you show the others that going that way is not a good thing to do.’ Interview, March 2013.

112 Statements that grupos had almost been eliminated came not only from high-ranking officers, but also from street-level police, academics and journalists, and many favela residents. Multiple interviews, Feb. and March 2013.

113 Interview, senior member of the SDS, Feb. 2013.

114 According to a senior judicial figure, March 2013: ‘Today the promotion of officers is made on merit … This meritocracy implemented by the state Government in the promotion of military and civilian police is a fundamental difference in Pernambuco.’

115 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur’.

116 Targets and associated bonuses were tied to formal operational goals that focused on respect and protection of life and differed markedly from informal or extrajudicial ‘targets’ of killing criminosos that had been used in the past or elsewhere in Brazil.

117 During fieldwork several lower-ranking officers cited these bonuses as important in these regards.

118 Interview, senior member of the Courts of Justice, Pernambuco, March 2013.

119 Interview, senior delegado in the homicide investigation unit (Departamento de Homicídios e de Proteção à Pessoa – Homicide and Personal Protection Department, DHPP), March 2013.

120 Ibid.

121 On the changes in police conduct, a community organiser remarked: ‘[Before] when the police cars came in, it was for sure there was going to be a shootout. They were not respectful. Today they come in on foot, walk straight in here … it has improved a lot.’ Interview, March 2013.

122 Interviews, community leaders in two favelas, Recife, March 2013.

123 Interview, community leader, Recife, March 2013.

124 Interviews, senior delegado in the DHPP and senior member of the PC, March 2013.

125 Ibid.

126 Since 2007 there has been a clear increase in identification and apprehension of suspects, cases brought to trial, and convictions. Prior to PPV only 3 per cent of homicides in Pernambuco were brought to formal trial. See UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur’. However, the penal system saw very little reform under PPV, and prison overcrowding is commonplace, despite improved case processing.

127 Supporting the idea of strengthened deterrence effects, the Malhas da Lei (Mesh of the Law) initiative instigated by the Pernambuco SDS in 2010 focused on arresting ‘serious criminals’ or perpetrators of multiple homicides.

128 Interview, senior member of the SDS, Feb. 2013.

129 In numerous interviews in favelas across Recife, the general consensus was that communities were far safer places in the years following PPV, despite non-lethal criminality still being often problematic. As an example, Santo Amaro, considered to be the city's most dangerous favela, was transformed under PPV, with the government's official AIS-level statistics showing CVLIs declining from 178 per 100,000 in April 2007 to 44 per 100,000 in August 2013 – a trend supported by reporting in the local media. See, for instance, http://ww4.ufrpe.br/ruralnamidia_ver.php?idConteudo=6013 and http://jconline.ne10.uol.com.br/canal/cidades/noticia/2013/09/03/sds-registra-menor-indice-de-homicidios-nos-ultimos-dez-anos-96022.php.

130 Interview, community leader in central Recife favela, March 2013. There is, however, still considerable distrust towards the police and the state among many residents, despite significant improvements. Interviews, community leaders and residents in several Recife favelas, March 2013. See also Wolff, ‘Policing and the Logics of Violence’.

131 Interview, community leader in central Recife favela, March 2013.

132 PPV was widely considered successful by both the state and citizens. During fieldwork, delegations from Uruguay, Paraíba and Bahia attended PPV meetings. Other states also implemented programmes modelled on PPV, notably PPV Bahia in 2012. This was less successful, however, probably due to resistance to reform and oversight amongst police, bureaucratic indifference, and lack of gubernatorial oversight. See www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/what-makes-salvador-brazil-most-violent-city; and Paim et al., ‘Política pública e controle da violência’.

133 The government of Pernambuco was recognised for ‘Improving the Delivery of Public Services’. See http://workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/Documents/Fact%20Sheet%202013%20UNPSA%20Programme%20Handbook%20_1_.pdf.

134 Multiple interviewees within the police and government, for example, suggested that the expectations PPV had formed and the reductions in lethal violence it had fostered would make it near-impossible for future governors to drastically weaken the PPV model itself – regardless of future trends in lethal violence. A senior representative of the judiciary explained, with a flourish: ‘There are policies of government and there are policies of the state. Campos thinks holistically, plurally. He does not think to solve specific situations; he instead has a vision for a great future.’ Interview, March 2013.

135 Elected in October 2012, Recife's mayor, Geraldo Júlio, also came from the PSB and was a key proponent in designing and implementing PPV. Potential benefits of vertical policy coordination are discussed in Hoelscher, ‘Politics and Social Violence’.

136 This speaks to the importance of supporting violence reduction using both the formal aspects of the criminal justice system and other activities that positively impact on social, political and economic conditions. These can include activities related to urban planning and design, economic opportunity creation, youth-focused social programming, effective local governance, and creating social capital. Without this type of multi-sectoral approach, reforms may prove ineffective over the long term. See Hugo Acero Velásquez, ‘Os governos locais e a segurança cidadã’, UNDP consultation paper (2006), available at http://www.comunidadesegura.org.br/files/gestion_local.pdf; Kahn, Túlio and Zanetic, André, ‘O papel dos municípios na segurança pública’, Estudos Criminológicos, 4: 1 (2005), pp. 1–68 Google Scholar.

137 Interviews, senior member of SDS, Feb. 2013; senior member of PC, March 2013. Reflecting early successes, CVLIs declined 4–5 per cent annually between 2007 and 2009 – prior to additional investment in policing and judicial capacity.

138 Sentiments about popular mobilisation supporting political mobilisation were mentioned in several interviews.

139 The north-east region has the greatest number of crack users in Brazil. See FIOCRUZ, ‘Estimativa do número de usuários de crack e/ou similares nas capitais do país’ (Rio de Janeiro, 2013), available at http://infograficos.estadao.com.br/especiais/crack/perfilusuarios.pdf.

140 www.disquedenunciape.com.br/.

141 Confirmed also in interviews with members of the Departamento de Repressão ao Narcotráfico (Drugs Repression Department, DENARC), March 2013.

142 ‘Catching Up in a Hurry’, The Economist, 19 May 2011: www.economist.com/node/18712379.

143 Waiselfisz, Mapa da violência 2012.

144 This was mentioned in several interviews. See also Koster, Martijn, ‘Fear and Intimacy: Citizenship in a Recife Slum, Brazil’, Ethnos, 79: 2 (2014), pp. 215–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Conversely, the urban poor often have a more pragmatic view in dealing with insecurity. See Koster, ‘In Fear of Abandonment: Slum Life, Community Leaders and Politics in Recife, Brazil’, PhD Thesis, Wageningen University (2009).

145 Ratton, Galvão and Fernandez, ‘Pact for Life’; and Ratton, José Luiz, ‘Apresentação seminário políticas locais de prevenção da violência’, in Ratton, José Luiz, Costa, Gino, Romero, Carlos and Soares, Luiz Eduardo (eds.), A segurança cidadã em debate (Recife: Provisual, 2012), pp. 10–23 Google Scholar (available at https:// www.academia.edu/4842389/Jos%C3%A9_A_Seguran%C3%A7a_Cidad%C3%A3_em_debate?auto=download).

146 Implemented in 2003, Minas Gerais’ Fica Vivo (Stay Alive) programme was similar to PPV in combining progressive policing with social programming, yet with shallower reforms. See Alves, Maria and Arias, Enrique Desmond, ‘Understanding the Fica Vivo Programme: Two-tiered Community Policing in Belo Horizonte, Brazil’, Policing and Society, 22: 1 (2012), pp. 101–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Despite initial success, homicides and violent crime increased from 2010, highlighting challenges to long-term consolidation (http://www.seds.mg.gov.br/).

147 See http://blogs.diariodepernambuco.com.br/segurancapublica/?p=9381; and http://jc.ne10.uol.com.br/blogs/rondajc/2016/01/15/pernambuco-tem-inicio-de-ano-mais-violento-da-historia-do-pacto-pela-vida/.

148 http://jconline.ne10.uol.com.br/canal/politica/pernambuco/noticia/2016/09/24/pacto-pela-vida-morreu-diz-mentor-do-programa-254101.php (accessed 3 May 2017).

149 Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti, ‘“Over, Under and Through Walls”: The Dynamics of Public Security, Police–Community Relations and the Limits of Managerialism in Crime Control in Recife, Brazil’, PhD Thesis, King's College London (2017).

150 See http://jconline.ne10.uol.com.br/canal/cidades/geral/noticia/2015/09/16/sensacao-de-inseguranca-ganha-as-ruas-199201.php.

151 Leeds, ‘Serving States and Serving Citizens’.

152 A concern for PPV is that if insecurity remains high, police tactics may become more hard-line, undermining institutional reforms and the emerging trust between police and communities.