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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2009
One of the most provocative statements in Jewell and Patterson's recent textbook on the American legislative process is that there is an inherent contradiction between political party and committee leadership. They posit: ‘Where committees are strong and independent, party leadership is weak. Where party leadership is strong, the committees are either weak or simply agents of the party leaders.’ As an example, the authors argue that congressional committees in the United States are strong, proud and independent, whereas the leadership of political parties is comparatively weak. This independence is based in part on the fact that chairmen of committees are selected by seniority and traditionally have not been removed by party leaders. Party lines are often crossed in the voting within committee, and chairmen have considerable say over whether a bill will be reported out or not.
1 Jewell, Malcolm E. and Patterson, Samuel C., The Legislative Process in the United States (New York, Random House, 1966), p. 203.Google Scholar
2 Ibid., p. 204.
3 Finer, Herman, Governments of Greater European Powers (New York, 1956), p. 116.Google Scholar
4 Geywitz, Carlos Andrade, Elementos de derecho constitucional chileno (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1963), p. 444.Google Scholar
5 Gil, Federico G., The Political System of Chile (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 111.Google Scholar
6 See, for example, Muñoz, Ingrid Ahumada, Las comisiones parlamentarias en Chile y otros paises (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1967), p. 62.Google Scholar
7 Gilberto, Moreno G., Los comités parlamentarios (Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, S.A., 1964), pp. 70–81.Google Scholar
8 Ibid., pp. 37–51.
9 Gil, , op. cit., p. 265.Google Scholar
10 Sotomayor, J. Rogers, ‘Democracia “representativa” y representación “delegada”’, Política economía cultura (No. 259, Viernes, 15 Diciembre de 1967), pp. 9–10.Google Scholar
11 This approach to the Senate was influenced by a reading of the following article by Leon Lindberg, who in turn derived most of his concepts from David Easton. See Lindberg, Leon, ‘The Role of the European Parliament in An Emerging European Community’, in Frank, Elke (ed.), Lawmakers in a Changing World (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 121–3 especially.Google Scholar
12 It should be noted that this norm is not always observed. Some Committee reports and floor debates turn into highly partisan debates, as was the Constitution, Legislation, Justice and Rules report on Senator Altamirano in 1967. Altamirano had been jailed for personally slandering the President of the Republic and the armed forces. The Committee reported on whether he should lose his right to attend and vote in Senate sessions, and votes followed party lines. Furthermore, partisanship became so strong that the minority issued a separate report from the majority.
13 Based on interview response and cross-check of votes on the floor in Senate debates.
14 Based on Blau's, Peter discussion in Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York; London; Sidney, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 215.Google Scholar
15 The degree to which strict party line voting does exist may be attributed in part to the national electoral law which requires a large number of signatures to run as a non-party candidate, and the need for campaign funds which national parties can provide. The latter factor has special impact for the PDC, PS and PC.
16 Bills are reviewed in two stages in the Senate. The first or general review stage involves a decision of whether or not to legislate on the bill in question. The second or specific stage is an article-by-article review of the bill. For a discussion of the Senate's influence on the law-making process, see the author's ‘The Senate in the Chilean Political System’, in Kornberg, Allan and Musolf, Lloyd D. (eds.), Legislatures in Development Perspective (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1970).Google Scholar
17 A committee secretary is a trained staff member who brings a high level of expertise and specialized skill to a committee's work. For more details, see ‘The Senate …’, op. cit., loc. cit.
18 For a discussion of conflicting role orientations in four American state legislatures, see Wahlke, John C. et al. , The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York and London, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), Chaps. XI–XV inclusive.Google Scholar
19 See Lewis A. Coser's discussion of communal conflict and noncommunal conflict in Coser, Lewis A., The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Free Press, 1956), pp. 81–2.Google Scholar
20 Chilean congressmen are elected on a party list basis for each district. All votes for a party are divided by a quotient formula which determines how many party candidates are elected. Hence, a good vote-getter on the list can pull other senators from the same party in on his coat-tails. See for example, ‘Methods of Electing National Executives and National Legislatures in South America’, Special Memorandum No. 21 (Washington, Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1963), pp. 9–11.Google Scholar
21 Haines, Wilder H., ‘The Congressional Caucus of Today’, American Political Science Review, ix (1915), 696–706.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
22 For a discussion of the ranking of Senate standing committees, see the author's ‘The Chilean Senate: Internal Distribution of Influence’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1969), Chap. III.Google Scholar
23 For a discussion of how personal identification with the system (i.e. giving each participant a stake in ensuring its persistence) provides for reduction in the intensity of partisan considerations and displacement by system attachment and support, see Dahrendorf, Ralf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 216.Google Scholar
24 See Masters' comments in Masters, Nicholas A., ‘Committee Assignments’, in Peabody, Robert L. and Polsby, Nelson W. (eds.), New Perspectives on the House of Representatives (Chicago, Rand McNally and Company, 1963), pp. 53–6.Google Scholar
25 For documentation, see the author's ‘The Senate …’, op. cit., loc. cit.
26 See for example, Jorge, A. Tapia Valdés, La técnica legislativa (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1960), p. 30Google Scholar, and Gil, op. cit.
27 Matthews, Donald R., U. S. Senators and Their World (New York, Vintage Books, 1960), p. 169.Google Scholar
28 Ibid. Also see Fenno, Richard F. Jr., The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress (Boston and Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, 1966), Chap. XI.Google Scholar Fenno's perceptive comments on the overlap of Senate party leaders and their membership on top committees is quite similar to the overlap of Chilean senators on national party policy organs discussed earlier in this article.
29 Fenno, , op. cit., p. 252.Google Scholar
30 The system for distributing committee seats by party or party bloc is discussed in the author's ‘The Chilean Senate …’, op. cit., loc cit., Chap. IV.