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The Politics of Instability in Ecuador: The Overthrow of the President, 19611

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2009

Peter Pyne
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On 7 November 1961, a crucial date in modern Ecuadorian political history, Dr José María Velasco Ibarra, constitutional President of the Republic of Ecuador, was deposed from his high office and sought refuge in the Mexican Embassy. The apparent stability that had characterized the country's political life since 1948 was shattered. The pattern of politics since November 1961 is similar in many respects to that which occurred in the decades between the two World Wars. Coups d'état, dictatorships and military juntas are political phenomena common to both periods. The military intervention which to Velasco's dewnfall in 1961 re-established a convention which had been dormant since 1947.

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Articles
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Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , May 1975 , pp. 109 - 133
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1975

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References

2 Between 1924 and 1948 no President completed his term of office and 22 Presidents, dictators and military juntas succeeded one another. Since 1960 there have been eight regimes in power. Lilo, Linke, Ecuador: Country of Contrasts (3rd ed., London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 29–30;Google ScholarGeorge, I. Blanksten, Ecuador: Constitutions and Caudillos (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1964), p. 32.Google Scholar

3 For a detailed case study of an Ecuadorian coup d'état see Martin, C. Needler, Anatomy of a Coup d'Etat: Ecuador 1963 (Washington D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1964).Google Scholar

4 Edwin, Erickson et al. , Area Handbook for Ecuador (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 73.Google Scholar

5 Charles, R. Gibson, Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Small Nations: The Case of Ecuador (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 172, 177.Google Scholar

6 Erickson, op. cit., p. 342.

7 Gibson, op. cit., p. 92. According to one authority, one-third of the population in 1963 remained outside the monetary economy. Anthony, Bottomley, ‘Imperfect Competition in the Industrialization of Ecuador’, Inter-American Economic Affairs. 19, 1 (1965), 83.Google Scholar

8 See Table 3.

9 Peter, Pyne, ‘Ecuador: Executive-Legislative Relations 1960–1961 and the Overthrow of a President’ (unpublished M.Phil. thesis, Glasgow University, 1972), pp. 9, 10.Google Scholar

10 Coalitions invariably materialize in Ecuadorian politics, reflecting the weakness of individual political parties. Coalitions are created for the purpose of achieving certain political objectives (e.g. opposition to a particular régime or the election of a presidential candidate) and usually disappear when the objectives are either met or defeated. Georg, Maier, The Ecuadorian Presidential Election of June 2, 1968: An Analysis (Washington D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1969), pp. 38–40.Google Scholar

11 His previous attempts to win power had occurred in 1934, 1940, 1944 and 1952. All had been successful except for the 1940 election which Velasco claimed had been fraudulently won by Arroyo del Río.

12 In fact, political parties, strictly defined, hardly existed in Ecuador in 1960. Many ‘parties’ lacked continuity in organization and had a life span dependent upon the political popularity of their current leaders. Nor did they have any permanent organization at local level. Pync, loc. cit., pp. 34–38. Support for the FNV declined from almost 400,000 votes in 1960 to less than 40,000 votcs in 1962, when the party's personalist leader was in exile. Erickson, op. cit., p. 268.

13 In February 1960, the PSE split, one section supporting the FDN, and the other faction, which later became the Partido Socialista Revolucionario Ecuatoriano (PSRE), supporting the UDNA. Hispanic American Report (Institute of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies, Stanford University). XIII (1960), 116, 117.Google Scholar

14 Maier, op. cit., p. 56.

15 Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems (ICOPS), Ecuador: Election Factbook, 2 June, 1968 (Washington D.C.: ICOPS, 1968), p. 33.Google Scholar

16 A book written by Plaza in association with a North American author, Stacy, May, and entitled: The United Fruit Company in Latin America (Washington, 1958) provided the ammunition for some of these attacks.Google Scholar

17 El Universo (Guayaquil), 1.1.1961.

18 El Comercio (Quito), 3.4.1960, 1.5.1960.

19 Ibid., 12.6.1960.

20 Ibid., 11.8.1960, 12.8.1960; La Prensa (Guayaquil), 12.8.1960; El Telágrafo (Guayaquil), 13.8.1960.

21 Hispanic American Report, xiii (1960), 545–546; El Con;ercio, 13.8.1960–30.8.1960.

22 The officers were accused of treason by the Minister of the Interior, Araujo Hidalgo, but the charge was never substantiated. El Comercio, 9.10.1960, 16.10.1960, 23.10.1960; Hispanic American Report, xiii (1960), 718, 719.

23 When Velasco lbarra came to power in 1960, he would have been content to replace only key civil service personnel, leaving the bulk of the bureaucracy unchanged. But pressure from his party lieutenants and from his job-hungry hordes of supporters led to large-scale dismissals. El Comercio, 30.7.1960, 4.9.1960.

24 In 1941, Peru invaded Ecuador and defeated her forces. In response to a plea for wartime hemispheric solidarity, President Arroyo del Río of Ecuador signed the Rio de Janeiro Protocol in 1942, granting vast lands in the Oriente region to Peru. Popular reaction to this led to the President's deposition by a military coup in 1944 and the end of the Liberal Party's political hegemony.

25 El Comercio, 31.7.1960.

26 Hispanic American Report, XII (1960), 813.

27 Dollars could be bought at a dual rate of 15 or 18 sucres to the dollar depending on the purpose for which they were required, i.e. dollars needed for certain essential imports were sold at the cheaper rate.

28 Victor, Alba, Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 270;Google Scholar Erickson, op. cit., pp. 262, 494.

29 By 1962, Ecuador had broken off diplomatic relations with Cuba. Erickson, op. cit., p. 9.

30 Velasco explained ‘Para que no fracase totalmente la economía nacional, se impuso la unificación del tipo de cambio’ El Comercio, 30.7.1961.

31 Peter, Pyne, The Role of Congress in the Ecuadorian Political System and its Contribution to the Overthrow of President Velasco Ibarra in 1961 (Glasgow: Institute of Latin American Studies Occasional Paper No. 7, 1973), pp. 23–24.Google Scholar

32 These paid government supporters are collectively referred to in Ecuador as ‘las barras’ from the word for the railing around the public gallery in the Congressional Palace. The barras were an integral part of Congress in the 1950s and 1960s. El Cornercio, 9.8.1960, 20.8.1960, 21.8.1960.

33 El Universo, 1.1.1962; El Telégrafo, 1.1.1962; El Comercio, 1.1.1962.

34 El Comercio, 18.6.1961–20.6.1961.

35 Ibid., 15.7.1961, 23.7.1961, 25.7.1961, 26.7.1961.

36 Ibid., 30.7.1961, 20.8.1961, 1.10.1961, 8.10.1961, 1.1.1962.

37 These strikes occurred in five provinces, four of them in the Sierra. It is interesting to note in this respect that government investment in the Sierran provinces had dropped from 5% of the total state investment in 1959 to 33% in 1961 while it rose in the Coastal provinces from 35% to 53%. Memoria del Gerente General del Banco Central del Ecuador Correspondiente al Ejercicio del 1962 (Quito, 1963), p. 441.

38 Arosemena's calm behaviour while under fire won him the respect of many legislators who had not previously been prepared to follow him. El Comercio, 18.10.1961, 3.12.1961, 1.1.1962; El Unicierso, 1.1.1962; Lilo, Linke, ‘Ecuador's Politics: President Vclasco's Fourth Exit’, The World Today, 18 (1962), p. 62.Google Scholar

39 Erickson, op. cit., p. 277; Linke, op. cit., p. 58.

40 The President went on the air to tell the nation that ‘Dr Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy, cannot be, is not, and will no longer be, Vice-President of the Republic’. El Telégrafo, 1.1.1962.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Erickson, op. cit., pp. 506–507.

44 El Universo, 1.1.1962.

45 Erickson, op. cit., p. 507.

46 It would also appear from a recent book, which appeared after this article was written, that CIA agents in Ecuador contributed to the erosion of support for Velasco because he refused to break off diplomatic relations with Cuba and take action against local communist and related movements. Philip, Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1975) pp. 103–316 gives a detailed account.Google Scholar

46a Gibson, op. cit., pp. 172, 177.

47 Ibid., p. 190; Erickson, op. cit., pp. 351, 457–458.

48 Gonzalo, Eduardo Abad Ortíz, ‘El Proceso de lucha por el poder en el Ecuador: Una descripción’ (unpublished licenciate dissertation, El Colegio de México, 1970), pp. 39–41.Google Scholar

49 Gibson, op. cit., p. 87.

50 In June 1961, El Comercio reported that half of the banana crop was rotting in plantations or on the quays; that the market for some exports had almost disappeared; and that the fall in the prices of cacao and coffee had been so severe that the reduction in national income was several times greater than the amount received in aid and loans. El Comercio, 20.6.1961.

51 ‘In 1961 the Central Government of Ecuador derived 40·8% of its revenues from import duties and 6·2% from export taxes’. Bottomley, op. cit., p. 90.

52 Gibson, op. cit., p. 156.

53 The Chambers of Industry, Commerce and Agriculture of the Sierra Sent a joint message to the President asking him not to unify the rate of exchange. El Comercio, 4.12.1960.

54 Ibid., 16.7.1961, 23.7.1961.

55 Abad, , thesis, pp. 64, 65;Google ScholarHispanic American Report, XIV (1961), 628, 818.

56 It was reported that in April 1961, Velasco sent a telegram to the Cuban government making known his opposition to ‘every kind of intervention in Cuba’. El Comcrcio, 13.4.1961.

57 ‘By 1961 there was some increasing concern both within and outside Ecuador that communism was growing in the country and that Velasco was doing nothing about it, that he appeared nor to regard it as a threat’. Mary, Martz, ‘Ecuador and the Eleventh Inter-American Conference’, Journal of Inter-American Studies, 10, 2 (1968), 318.Google Scholar

58 Hispanic American Report, XIV (1961), 430, 626; Abad, , thesis, p. 61.Google Scholar

59 El Comercio, 4.3.1961.

60 In his meeting with Stevenson, Velasco agreed in principle to a meeting of hemispheric governments to discuss the Cuban question on condition that the Cuban government be invited to participate in the discussions. Velasco was then reported to have asked the US for $200 million in aid. Hispanic American Report, xiv (1961), 529; El Comercio, 20.6.1961. See also Linke, op. cit., p. 63; Rodrigo, Borja C., ‘Panorama de la Politica Ecuatoriana’, Combate (Costa Rica), 4, 19 (1961), 20.Google Scholar

61 The CTE ‘played a major role both in maintaining Velasco Ibarra in the presidency in 1960 and in overthrowing him the following year’. Erickson, op. cit., p. 262. See also Alba, op. cit., p. 270; Linke, op. cit., p. 63.

62 The four guarantor nations of the Rio Protocol, the United States, Argentina, Brazil and Chile responded by declaring that the Protocol could not be unilaterally declared null and void. El Comercio, 11.12.1960, 18.12.1960.

63 Martz, op. cit., pp. 307–321.

64 Hispanic American Report, xiii (1960), 815.

65 A letter to the editor of El Comercio in Jan. 1960 complained about the legislators' failure to implement pre-election promises: ‘Una vez Ilegados al Recinto de las Leyes, el resultado: Nada o casi nada’. El Comercio, 26.10.1960.

66 In September 1961, Velasco warned Congress: ‘I again state my respect for the honourable National Congress, but I must emphasize that the Constitution of the Republic prohibits Congress from interfering with the legal powers of the President…Congress has not omnipotent power.’ Ibid. 20.9.1961.

67 Robert, A. Packenham, ‘Legislatures and Political Development’ in Allan, Kornberg and Lloyd, D. Musoif, eds., Legislatures in Developmental Perspective (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1970).Google Scholar

68 Harry, Kanror, Patterns of Politics and Political Systems in Latin America (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1969), p. 450.Google Scholar

69 Blanksten, op. cit., p. 100.

70 For a more extended treatment of this topic, see Pyne, , The Role of Congress in the Ecuadorian Political System (Glasgow Occasional Paper).Google Scholar

71 Agor reports that the Chilean Congress adopted a strongly independent stance vis-à-vis the executive partly because it had inherited this tradition from the parliamentary system of government that existed until 1925. Weston H. Agor, ‘The Senate in the Chilean Political System’, in Kornberg and Musolf, op. cit., p. 271.

72 After Velasco had been deposed, Arosemena admitted that as Vice-President he had supported students and workers in their anti-government campaign. El Comercio, 13.11.1961.

73 ‘The provincial landowners form the most reactionary group of all significant political sectors … there is broad sympathy and support for the hacendado viewpoint among those who monopolize most instruments of power’. Erickson, op. cit., p. 263.

74 Pyne, , thesis, p. 73.Google Scholar These figures must be treated with a certain amount of caution because it was not possible to ascertain the educational or occupational background of 28% of the Senators and 36% of the Deputies. However, a survey carried out by Díaz reported that politicians were generally considered as belonging to the upper class. Antonio, Díaz, ‘Notas sobre la clase media del Ecuador’, Política (Caracas), 17 (1961), p. 72.Google Scholar

75 República del Ecuador, Labor del Congreso Nacional 1960, 1961. 2 volumes. (Quito, n.d.). On coming into power, the new Congress had been faced with the daunting backlog of 1,152 Bills which had been initiated by previous legislatures.Google ScholarEl Comercio, 14.8.1960.

76 Abad, , thesis, p. 6;Google ScholarHispanic American Report, xiv (1961), 819; El Comercio, 8.10.1961.

77 ‘There were Ministers who lasted hours, dictators who lasted weeks and Presidents who lasted for days. The result of this process was total political confusion.’ Abad, , thesis, p. 29.Google Scholar

78 República del Ecuador, Diario de Debates del Congreso Pleno, 1960 (Quito), pp. 110–152;Google ScholarEl Comercio, 13.11.1960, 8.9.1961, 24.12.1961.

79 República del Ecuador, Labor dcl Congreso Nacional 1960, 1961.

80 Under the 1946 Constitution, the President had the power to issue emergency decree laws of an economic nature.

81 República del Ecuador, Diario de Debates de la Cámara de Diputados 1961; Diario de Debates de la Cdmara dcl Senado 1961.

82 Velasco stated that Congress had received a delegation from the CTE prior to the general strike of Oct. 1965 and had given it a grant of 50,000 sucres towards its strike fund. El Comcrcio, 22.10.1961.

83 Velasco later claimed that Arosemena had tried to overthrow him in 1953 while the latter was the Minister for Defence. Ibid., 12.11.1961, 23.7.1961.

84 It is worth noting that in the new 1967 Constitution, the Vice-President's former role as President of Congress was abolished in order to avoid the threat to constitutional stability posed by an ambitious congressional leader. Vistazo (Quito and Guayaquil), 05 1968, p. 32.Google Scholar

85 ‘la mejor industria es la política’. El Comercio, 22.8.1962; ‘For those whose ambition makes them want to rise even higher, to the very top, there is again an easy way: through politics and bureaucracy. However, any position thus reached is generally of short duration.’ Linke, Ecuador: Country of Contrasts, p. 80.

86 ‘When incentives for political participants are strong, intense political conflict is probable’. James, L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 294. Several members of Arosemena's presidential Cabinet were Congressmen who had taken a prominent role in the struggle to remove President Velasco Ibarra.Google Scholar

87 El Coenercio, 18.10.1961, 19.10.1961.

88 Ibid., 22.10.1961.

89 Velasco Ibarra has been described as’…an old-time caudillo and demagogue with a Fascist mystique and a messianic complex…’ Fred Rippy, J., ‘Latin America's Postwar Golpes de Estado’, Inter-American Economic Affairs, 19, 3 (1965), 77.Google Scholar

90 El Comercio, 21.2.1960.

91 Velasco himself admitted in 1961 the difficulties involved in implementing radical change: ‘Fácil decirlo, difícil hacerlo. Con nuestros medios económicos, con la preparación de nuestros hombres, no es tan fácil hacer esos cambios radicales.’ El Comercio, 19.8.1961.

92 Velasco referred to Ecuador's political parties as oligarchical heads without bodies, completely divorced from the people, ignorant of popular beliefs and feelings and out of touch with the contemporary situarion. Ibid., 3.2.1961.

93 He was very conscious of the weakness of his position in this respect: ‘…I cannot count on a duly structured political party which would know how to defend me, how to carry out successful propaganda, and how to keep alive that civic emotion in spite of the difficultics which wear away the popularity of any government.’ Quoted in Linke, Ecuador: Country of Contrasts, pp. 48–49.

94 Velasco himself first seized power by using his position as President of Congress to overthrow President Martinez Mera in 1934. Less than a year later he attempted to abolish Congress. During his second administration (1944–1947), he renewed his attack on the legislature, provoking serious clashes between the two branches of government. In 1970, Velasco abolished the legislature and ruled as dictator for almost two years before being overthrown once again.

95 Pyne, , thesis, Table xxii, p. 79.Google Scholar

96 During his trip to Russia and Eastern Europe in the summer of 1961 Arosemena claimed he had been treated like a political undesirable by the Ecuadorian diplomatic service on the orders of the President. El Telégrafo, 1.1.1962.

97 Georg, Maier, ‘The Impact of Velasquismo on the Ecuadorian Political System’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Illinois University, 1965), p. 113.Google Scholar

98 Such roles were also thrust upon him to some extent by the relative weakness of these Structures in the political system. See infra.

99 One of his political opponents described him as ‘Impassioned, impulsive, violent, impatient; incapable of carrying out a programme’. Borja, op. cit., p. 18.

100 It speaks much for the uncertain position of the Ecuadorian chief executive that only three heads of state since 1924 have managed to serve Out a four year term of office. According to former President Gab Plaza (1948–1952), Ecuador's presidents have to dedicate much of their time, energies and talents to preventing themselves from being overthrown. Galo, Plaza, Problems of Democracy in Latin America (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1955), p. 37.Google Scholar

101 It could be argued that even in Ecuador, Velasco's variety of caudillismo had become an anachronism by 1961. The operation of the political system had become too complex to be controlled by one man in such a fashion.

102 Kantor, op. cit., p. 433.

103 A rigidly stratified social system segregated the small upper and middle classes from the largely uneducated and illiterate masses and resulted in political parties and interest groups which were organized by and for a small portion of the population. Díaz, op. cit., pp. 73, 74.

104 Samuel, P. Huntingdon, ‘Political Development and Political Decay’, World Politics, 17 (1964–1965), 386–430.Google Scholar

105 Hispanic American Report, xiv (1961), pp. 238, 340; El Comercio, 9.4.1961, 14.5.1961.

106 The CTE's membership of 85,000 (1960), constituted a mere 2% of the total population. The FEUE had a total membership of 9,000 at this time.

107 Institutional underdevelopment characterized all facets of society in Ecuador. Nett States: ‘Ecuadorian society is far from modern. Its affairs, on the whole, are not carried out in special purpose organizations which select and apply the best means for achieving specific goals.’ Emily, M. Nett, ‘Some Characteristics of the Cultural Elites of Quito’, Contemporary Latin America, vol. iii. A Selection of Papers presented at the Fourth Annual Conference on Latin America, 17–19 04 1961, Philip, B. Taylor Jr, ed. (Houston, Texas: Office of International Affairs, University of Houston, 1970), p. 66.Google Scholar

108 As late as 1965, 15% of the population lived in areas which did not have access to the main road network. Gibson, op. cit., p. 48. Ecuador occupied the following rankings out of the 20 Latin American states in terms of these communications indices: daily newspaper circulation, 12th; newsptint consumption, 13th; radios, 18th; television, 16th; railroads, 14th. Bruce, M. Russetr et al. , World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 108–10, 120–2, 126–7;Google ScholarLatin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles, Statistical Abstract of Latin America 1964 (Los Angeles: University of California, 1965), pp. 48, 92.Google Scholar

109 Díaz, op. cit., pp. 73, 74.

110 In the closing days of the Velasquista administration about 35 people were killed and probably over ioo wounded. Erickson, op. cit., p. 277.

111 The use of violence by organized groups in Ecuador does not necessarily imply general alienation and blind frustration or deliberate efforts to overthrow the administration. As Payne has shown in Peru, demonstrations and the threat of mass violence can be integral parts of the political system and, as such, may be used to exert pressure on the decisionmakers. James, L. Payne, ‘Peru: The Politics of Structured Violence’, Journal of Politics, 27 (1965).Google Scholar For the use of violence as an access channel to rule-making institutions, see also Martin, C. Needler, Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence and Evolutionary Change (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 46–49.Google Scholar

112 The military in Ecuador has long considered itself the ‘protector’ of democratic institutions and of the rights of the people. This assumed role has led to a tradition of frequent intervention in politics. Military coups have brought approximately fifty chief executives to power.