Local administrations play a key role in delivering adaptation to climate change. To do so, they need to address collective action. Based on transaction costs economics, this paper explores the role of so-called integrative and segregative institutions in the way local administrations adapt – whether their different functional branches respond to climate change collectively rather than independently. Through a comparative analysis of 19 climate-sensitive local administrations in Germany, the paper shows that variation in the way local administrations structure their internal coordination determines the way they approach climate adaptation. Under integrative institutions, local administrations adjust prior coordination structures to accommodate adaptation. Under segregative institutions, administrations move towards integrative institutions in order to adapt, provided they already ‘feel’ climate change.

Scholars across the social sciences have debated whether resource dependence curses or blesses national development prospects, with a growing consensus on mixed outcomes and the centrality of institutions. Mainstream literature, however, falls short in depicting what the resource curse entails: the claim that “institutions matter” usually has a narrow meaning that largely overlooks the significance of place. A review of the paved road in research reveals a need to critically integrate approaches to studying the curse, as well as more insightful research on which institutions matter, how, and where. Expounding six governance challenges and thirteen development traps, I set out a simple yet crucial lesson: resource-based development presents both blessings and curses for any given resource-rich country in any given time period, and institutions are likely to be part of the explanation. I sketch how a “context matters” framework could guide future research, with illustrations from the Latin American experience.

In this paper, we revisit the relationship between economic freedom and growth across 407 German districts (Kreise). We build six indicators of economic freedom and cluster them into categories reflecting tax rates and size of the government and public sector. Exploiting the variation in the constructed indices of economic freedom, the evidence suggests less indebted districts with a lower share of taxes and a relatively smaller public sector achieve consistently higher growth rates and income levels. The beneficial effect of economic freedom on growth is robust to the variety of specification checks and does not appear to be driven by sample selection. The evidence does not indicate a lower level of economic freedom in former East German districts or greater economic freedom in West German districts but unveils a persistent north–south divide in the post-unification period. In the counterfactual scenario, a transition to the 90th percentile of economic freedom is associated with large income and growth gains. Such a transition would yield higher income levels and growth rates with a notable decrease in regional economic inequality within Germany.

Different personal attributes have been considered to account for judicial policy preferences around the world: ideology, age, gender, race, religion, language and professional background. The appointment of foreign judges is a particularly rare characteristic since most countries do not entertain such a possibility. We use the specific case of the Constitutional Court of Andorra to test the extent to which foreign-appointed judges make a difference, and particularly whether they are more or less inclined to favour local petitioners. An empirical analysis of the entire population of abstract review cases in the period 1993–2016 does not indicate a strong statistical effect.

This article contributes to an institutional economics analysis of the public economy by answering the following question: what is the role of intergovernmental grants in laboratory federalism? In line with factual evidence, the fiscal federalism literature on policy experimentation hints that grants can be employed to stimulate policy innovation through trial and error learning. Yet it lacks a theory of policy experimentation through grants, meaning that, in effect, we lack a fiscal theory of laboratory federalism. In the proposed approach, an intergovernmental grant is likened to a fiscal institution for political compromise between levels of government that frames policy experimentation options and constraints. At the same time, since policy solutions are not always easy to find or to implement, policy experimentation requires some degree of flexibility. Thus, the article shows that the extent of experimentation induced by a grant is influenced (or, more fashionably, nudged) by the conditionality attached to the grant. It argues, moreover, that if a grantor would like to induce more (less) experimentation, then, all other things equal, a grant with fewer (more) conditions attached should fare better than a grant with more (fewer) conditions attached.

The use of information technology in healthcare has accelerated progress toward the long-term goal of a learning healthcare system, in which data from prior clinical experience provides an ever-expanding resource to guide continuous improvements in health care. Although still in its early stages, the use of data from clinical experience to supplement data from premarket testing is changing the roles of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and public and private health insurers in healthcare innovation and technology assessment. It could change who decides what research questions to pursue, whose evidentiary standards decide what counts as actionable knowledge, and who pays the costs of research. The shape and direction of resulting changes will depend on which actors and institutions decide to step forward and claim a larger role in healthcare innovation in response to technological and regulatory change.

This paper will propose a comparative analysis of the conceptualization of colonisation that could shed light on the contemporary economic analysis of the colonial legacy in Africa. More specifically, this article will propose a return to old debates on colonisation, with a special focus on French 19th century political economy. Three main institutionalist lessons can be drawn from a careful analysis of French colonial economics of the 19th century. First, by institutions, the authors referred not only to the modes of colonisation – liberalism or collectivism? – but also to the actors: What should be the respective role of states and of private actors (entrepreneurs, banks, settlers) in the colonisation of Africa? Second, the colonial debates involved a discussion of property, whether in the sense of land ownership (individual vs. collective) or under the prism of property rights. Third, the analysis of the colonisation of Africa by French economists reveals an understanding of institutions as cultural values, norms or even racial attributes.

Robert Neild (born 1924) has made a major contribution to economics and to peace studies. This paper provides a brief sketch of Neild's life and work. While noting his research in economic policy and peace studies, this essay devotes more attention to his largely unnoticed contributions to institutional and evolutionary economics since 1984. These are important in their own right, but they are especially notable because Cambridge heterodox economists have been devoted mainly to other approaches, including Marxism and post-Keynesianism. Neild's distinctive contribution is partly explained by his closeness to both Nicholas Kaldor and Gunnar Myrdal. Myrdal made explicit his adherence to the original American institutionalism: Neild extended that link to Cambridge.

The objective of this paper is to recall the forgotten opposition of Clément Juglar to the colonization of Algeria, the originality of this position, and his contributions to the genesis of analysing colonial institutions. Juglar was not a theoretician of colonialism, but a liberal economist who rejected the process of colonization on economic grounds. This paper provides evidence that conventional wisdom on French colonialism is indebted to his work. The issues of capital returns in the colonies, French colonialism as mercantilism and protectionism, and the role of colonial institutions in economic development were all addressed by Juglar. He identified property rights and colonial institutions as central issues in his explanation of the predictable failure of colonialism, and in doing so he can be regarded as a forerunner of neo-institutionalist analysis of colonialism.