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Adapting as usual: integrative and segregative institutions shaping adaptation to climate change in local public administrations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2017

MATTEO ROGGERO  and
ANDREAS THIEL
MATTEO ROGGERO*
Affiliation:
Resource Economics Group, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany
ANDREAS THIEL*
Affiliation:
International Agricultural Policy and Environmental Governance, University of Kassel, Kassel, Germany
*
*Email: [email protected]
**Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Local administrations play a key role in delivering adaptation to climate change. To do so, they need to address collective action. Based on transaction costs economics, this paper explores the role of so-called integrative and segregative institutions in the way local administrations adapt – whether their different functional branches respond to climate change collectively rather than independently. Through a comparative analysis of 19 climate-sensitive local administrations in Germany, the paper shows that variation in the way local administrations structure their internal coordination determines the way they approach climate adaptation. Under integrative institutions, local administrations adjust prior coordination structures to accommodate adaptation. Under segregative institutions, administrations move towards integrative institutions in order to adapt, provided they already ‘feel’ climate change.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 14 , Special Issue 3: Special Issue on Adapting Institutions to Climate Change , June 2018 , pp. 557 - 578
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2017 

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