Silvestri interviews McCloskey about her forthcoming book, ‘Beyond Behaviorism, Positivism, and Neo-Institutionalism in Economics’, critical of recent economics, especially of neo-institutionalism. Neo-institutionalism uses the ugly character ‘Herr Max U’ as its central idea: the elevation of Prudence to the only virtue. Institutions are mainly intermediate, not ultimate, causes in society. Ethics, rhetoric, identity, ideology, and ideas matter. McCloskey's turn to defending liberalism is in the background of her critique of behaviorism, positivism, and neo-institutionalism as anti-liberal, reducing the analysis of people to a model of childish slaves. Liberalism is the theory of non-slave adults. Of the big ideas of the past few centuries, only liberalism treats people with suitable dignity, and permits them to have a go, and make others rich. Neo-institutionalism shares the two sins of modern Samuelsonian economics: a devotion of mere existence proofs; and a deviation to arbitrary tests of statistical ‘significance’. And in its tale of a rise of ‘capitalism’, it shares the errors of amateur economic history. The better word for the modern economic world of the Great Enrichment – fully 3,000% increases in real income per person – is ‘innovism’. Neo-institutionalism, as the method of historical economics, must be replaced by ‘Humanomics’.

This paper explains how informal institutions influence the reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic and the response to formal restrictions. I claim that it is not enough to introduce countermeasures, as individuals must follow them if they are to be effective. The acceptance of such measures is reflected in individuals' degrees of mobility decrease and contact reduction, the aims of governmental restrictions. I identify a group of attitudes connected with individuals' responses that differ across countries. They are associated with social relations and approaches to dealing with problems. The analysis confirms that formal restrictions can be seen as successful only if they are supported by strong informal institutions. In some cases, they even define individuals' reactions more than formal recommendations. The findings are useful not only for explaining the special case of reaction to pandemic restrictions but also for investigating what generally determines individuals' compliance with formal rules.

This paper proposes a new conceptualization of business model (BM) that rigorously exploits the important insights this notion offers and links them to related views developed in economics and business studies. We develop the foundations of a BM concept consistent with the principles of generalized Darwinism (GD) and with contributions already developed within this framework. Thus, we demonstrate the relevance of GD as a unifying framework for developing the evolutionary theory of firm and industry. We suggest analysing BM as a generative replicator hosted by the firm, which structures interactions between the members of this organization and the social entities of its industrial environment. We argue that GD allows us to clarify the nature and boundaries of the BM concept and to specify its relationships to other key evolutionary concepts, such as organizational routines.

We examine the development of de jure property rights to land by assessing how accurately governments recorded borders of property. We use surveys of farm parcels from two historical states, the Republic of the Orange Free State (OFS) and the South African Republic (ZAR), which are in modern-day South Africa, and employ a descriptive analysis to infer how accurately maps represent parcels of property. We argue that differences in state administrative capacity explains differences in map accuracy and therefore the provision of de jure property rights to land. We find that maps of farms in the ZAR, which had lower administrative capacity, tend to be less accurate than maps of farms in the OFS. Comparisons with military maps compiled under a different administration provide evidence that the costs incurred from previous administrations can limit future attempts to accurately record property. The analysis shows how state administrative capacity can facilitate (or hinder) the provision of property rights to land.

This paper investigates the views on competition theory and policy of the American institutional economists during the first half of the 20th century. These perspectives contrasted with those of contemporary neoclassical and later mainstream economic approaches. We identify three distinct dimensions to an institutionalist perspective on competition. First, institutionalist approaches focused on describing industry details, so as to bring theory into closer contact with reality. Second, institutionalists emphasized that while competition was sometimes beneficial, it could also be disruptive. Third, institutionalists had a broad view of the objectives of competition policy that extended beyond effects on consumer welfare. Consequently, institutionalists advocated for a wide range of policies to enhance competition, including industrial self-regulation, broad stakeholder representation within corporations, and direct governmental regulations. Their experimental attitude implied that policy would always be evolving, and antitrust enforcement might be only one stage in the development toward a regime of industrial regulation.

France relies on unionized judges to assess labor cases in court. The economic literature advocates that judges pertaining to the more belligerent unions alter judicial equilibrium, foster lower settlements, avoid trials, and intensify a professional judge's interventions. This paper intends to test whether such speculations are accurate. The empirical evidence provided here suggests that such fears are not grounded. Using a database on French employment courts, between 2012 and 2016, we show that judges from the most adversarial trade unions foster conciliation and reduce the number of dropped legal cases. The lack of statistically significant impact of unions on the judicial institution's dysfunctions is evident: the labor judiciary's alleged polarization does not drive the rate of appeals and the number of professional judges' intervention. Finally, the judicial malfunctions appear to be driven by institutional distortions and local socio-economic conditions.

This paper explores the interaction of informal constraints on human behaviour by examining the evolution of English football jerseys. The jersey provides an excellent setting to demonstrate how informal constraints emerge from formal rules and shape human behaviour. Customs, approved norms and habits are all observed in this setting. The commercialisation of football in recent decades has resulted in these informal constraints, in many cases dating back over a century, co-existing with branding, goodwill and identity effects. Combined, these motivate clubs to maintain the status quo. As a result, club colours have remained remarkably resilient within a frequently changing landscape.

In this study, we examine disparities in financial development at the regional level in India. The major research questions of the study are: how do we measure the level of financial development at the sub-national level? How unequal is financial development across the states? Does it vary by ownership of financial institutions? To explore these research questions, our study develops a composite banking development index at the sub-national level for three different bank groups – public, private and foreign for 25 Indian states covering 1996–2015. Our findings suggest that despite reforms, banking development is significantly higher in the leading high income and more developed regions compared to lagging ones. Furthermore, we find that all bank groups including public banks are concentrated more in the developed regions. Overall, over the years the position of top three and bottom three states in the aggregate banking index have remained unchanged reflecting lop-sidedness of regional development. We also note improvement in the ranking of some north-eastern states during the period 2009–15.

In his recent book on Property, Power and Politics, Jean-Philippe Robé makes a strong case for the need to understand the legal foundations of modern capitalism. He also insists that it is important to distinguish between firms and corporations. We agree. But Robé criticizes our definition of firms in terms of legally recognized capacities on the grounds that it does not take the distinction seriously enough. He argues that firms are not legally recognized as such, as the law only knows corporations. This argument, which is capable of different interpretations, leads to the bizarre result that corporations are not firms. Using etymological and other evidence, we show that firms are treated as legally constituted business entities in both common parlance and legal discourse. The way the law defines firms and corporations, while the product of a discourse which is in many ways distinct from everyday language, has such profound implications for the way firms operate in practice that no institutional theory of the firm worthy of the name can afford to ignore it.