Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 October 2013
The continuing and polemical debate over the authenticity of the Peace of Callias has become so complicated that it would be a positive service to scholarship to remove some of the more contentious evidence and reduce the scope of the argument. That is the object of this article. A fragment of Callisthenes has bulked very large in the modern literature. According to the received view the Olynthian historian denied the existence of a formal peace between Athens and the Persian King and alleged that the King observed a de facto limit to his empire, never venturing west of the Chelidonian islands. For sceptics this is grist to the mill. A writer of the mid-fourth century rejected the Athenian patriotic tradition, and it is assumed that he had good reason to do so. On the other hand defenders of the authenticity of the Peace stumble over Callisthenes' apparent denial and are forced to counter-denial or to sophistry. What is common to both camps is a tendency to refer to the evidence of Callisthenes without noting that the original text is lost. The ‘fragment’ (which it is not) is preserved by Plutarch in a sophisticated passage of source criticism and due attention needs to be paid to his mode of citation. Only then can we begin to elicit what Callisthenes may have said and reconstruct the probable context in his historical exposition. As always, we need to approach the unknown through proper study of the known.
1 This is the most conservative interpretation of wthe fragment, as found for instance in Prandi, Luisa, Callistene: uno storico tra Aristotele e i re macedoni (Milan 1985) 53–4.Google Scholar
2 See, in particular, Meister, K., Die Ungeschicht lichkeit des Kalliasfriedens und deren historische Folgen (Palingenesia xviii: Wiesbaden 1982) 12–15, 34, 58–66Google Scholar, with full citation of earlier literature. Cf. Wade-Gery, H. T., Essays in Greek history (Oxford 1958) 204Google Scholar: ‘the unknown arguments which may have moved Kallisthenes remain one of the most potent weapons in the armoury of doubt’.
3 A summary is conveniently provided by Meister (above, n. 2) 14. Usually Callisthenes is assumed to have been in error: see, most recently, the massive article by Badian, Ernst, ‘The Peace of Callias’, JHS cvii (1987) 1–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. 18: ‘knowing little about the political history of Athens, thought that the first reported peace was due to confusion with the later … one’. Otherwise it is assumed that Plutarch misreported Callisthenes (so Meyer, E., Forschungen zur alten Geschichte ii [Halle 1899] 4–5)Google Scholar or that Callisthenes did know of some form of the treaty. Wade-Gery (above, n. 2) 204 suggested that he was influenced by the doubts of Theopompus and preferred to refer to the de facto situation after the Eurymedon, while Walsh, John, ‘The authenticity and the dates of the Peace of Callias and the Congress Decree’, Chiron xi (1981) 31–63, esp. 46–9Google Scholar, argued that Callisthenes rejected specific clauses of the Peace while accepting in general the historicity of the compact.
4 ‘Fragments’ should properly imply verbal quotation. It has recently been suggested that reliquiae is a more appropriate term: Brunt, P. A., ‘On historical fragments and epitomes’, CQ xxx (1980) 477–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar (note his collection, p. 479, of misquotations of Herodotus in Plutarch's De malignitate Herodoti ).
5 Plut. Cim. 12.5–13.3 = Jacoby, FGrH 70 F 192, 124 F 15, 325 F 22.
6 Plut. Cim. 13.4–5 = FGrH 124 F 16, 342 F 13.
7 These authorities cannot be identified, but they were obviously in error. It is clear that the altar to Peace was established in the aftermath of the Common Peace of 375, as was attested by Philochorus (FGrH 328 F151; cf. Isocr. xv 110; Nepos Timoth. 2.2). See the exhaustive commentary by Jacoby, FGrH iiiB (Suppl.)/I(Text), 522–6.
8 Plut. Lyc. I. The discussion in the Life of Cimon is relatively uncomplicated. For a more elaborate example compare the excursus on Alexander and the Amazon Queen (Plut. Alex. 46).
9 This is my own translation, which corresponds to Perrin's in the Loeb edition and which, I think, does justice to the communis opinio. There are occasionally variants, such as in Connor, W. R., Theopompus and fifth century Athens (Washington 1968) 84Google Scholar: ‘Callisthenes says that the barbarian did not make such an agreement …’; but Connor has no hesitation in arguing that Callisthenes ‘attempted to refute a tradition that a formal peace was arranged.’
10 E.g. Plut. Agis 2.5; Lucull. 28.8; Mor. 871C (cf. Hdt. viii. 112). For a slightly more elaborate example see Mor. 435B (with Eur. Cyc. 334). But I can find no clear instance where the formula introduces a variant with the sense ‘this is denied by X’.
11 This was suggested long ago by Eduard Meyer (above, n. 3), and it was seriously considered by Wade-Gery (above, n. 2) 203. But Wade-Gery accepted the traditional location of the discussion in Callisthenes' Hellenica and the traditional theory that the point of departure was the King's Peace (see below, p. 5); in other words, if Callisthenes had known of and believed in the Peace of Callias, he must have mentioned it in the context. As will be seen, the traditional theory is fallacious, and the linguistic parallels, hitherto not adduced, overwhelmingly support the minority view.
12 Aesch. ii 120. Aeschines is referring explicitly to the exposition at Dem. xix 22, where Demosthenes quotes the alleged statements of (unnamed) Euboean delegates, mentioning rumours ὅτι …Φίλιππος δ᾿ ὑμῖν Εὔβοιαν ὡμολόγηκεν παραδώσειν. For the historical background see Cawkwell, G. L. ‘Euboea in the late 340's’, Phoenix xxxii (1978) 48–9.Google Scholar
13 The idiom recurs more explicitly a paragraph earlier, where Aeschines claims that Demosthenes turned his statement that he believed it right that Thebes should be Boeotian into a promise that Philip would actually bring that about: τοὕτο οὐκ ἀπαγγεῖλαι ἀλλ᾿ ὑποσχέσθαι μέ φησιν. (Aesch. ii 119; cf. Dem. xix 20–1).
14 Plut. Mar. 35.4 = Peter HRR i. 199 (F 11). For the literary and historical background see Passerini, A., ‘Gaio Mario come uomo politico’, Athenaeum xii (1934) 363–4Google Scholar; Calabi, I., ‘I commentarii di Siila come fonte storica’, RAL iii. 5 (1950) 280–1.Google Scholar
15 Plut. Sull. 8.7; cf. App. BC i 56.247.
16 App. BC ii 115.481: Val. Max. i 7.2; Suet. Caes. 81.3; Dio xliv 17.1. Nicolaus of Damascus (FGrH 90 F 130 [23.83], simply mentioned a number of dreams experienced by Calpurnia and did not give their content. The variant tradition of the falling gable, which Plutarch specifically attributes to Livy, recurs in Obsequens 67 without reference to any other story.
17 For a similar account of portents compare Plut. Brut. 48.2, where the famous report of the appearance of Caesar's ghost is contrasted with the story of Brutus' contemporary and intimate, P. Volumnius (Peter HRR ii.52 [F 1]), that one of the eagles became infested by bees (τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγει τὸ σημεῖον, μελισσῶν δέ φησι…). Once again Plutarch draws attention not to a denial but to a variant report.
18 Plut. Crass. 31.7. For other reports of Crassus' death see Dio xl 27.2.
19 Plut. Pomp. 34.3: οἱ δ᾿ οὔ φασι τούτῳ συμφέρεσθαι τὸν Ἀράξην ἀλλὰ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸν, ἐλλὺς δὲ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐκβολὴν εἰς ταυτὸ πέλαγος.
20 App. Mithr. 103.480 repeats the first tradition in Plutarch, agreeing on the twelve mouths of the delta and the variant spelling Cyrnus (cf. Dio xxxvi 53.5), and Pliny, , NH vi 26Google Scholar, alleges that it was majority opinion that the Araxes flowed into the Cyrus. On the other hand Strabo repeatedly gives the alternative version that the rivers had separate courses (xi 1.5 [491], 4.2 [501], 14.3–4 [527–8],14.13 [531]: so apparently Mela iii 40–1) and there is no hint of any polemic.
21 See also Plut. Publ. 19.8 ( = Mor. 250 F), The variant tradition here recorded seems that of Dion. Hal. v 34.3, where there is no detail (or record) of any other story. One may add Plut. Caes. 53.5, a unique report for which there is no control source: once again it seems a simple variant, an aberrant account of Caesar's role at Thapsus (cf. Gelzer, M., Caesar [Oxford 1968] 268Google Scholar n. 3).
22 Plut. Nic. 28.5 = Timaeus FGrH 566 F 101.
23 Polyb. xii 4a, 23 (with Walbank's commentary ad loc); FGrH 566 T 1, 11, 16–19, 23, 27.
24 Jacoby, , FGrH iii B(Kommentar) Text, 582–3Google Scholar, argues that Timaeus consciously falsified the record to the greater glory of Hermocrates, filling the rhetorical gap left by Thucydides and Philistus and (implicitly) reacting against the account of Ephorus (cf. Diod. xiii 19 ff.). There was no direct polemic here, but idiosyncratic elaboration.
25 Plut. Alex. 46.2 (πλάσμα φασὶ γεγονέναι τουτο); Sol. 27.1 (ὡς πεπλασμένην). See also Alex. 77.5; Them. 32.4.
26 Dem. xix 273 (so Lycurg. i 73); cf. Meister (above, n. 2) 16–18.
27 Arist. i (Panath.) 274, 209; xxvi (Rom.) 10; cf. Meister (above, n. 2) 18–20.
28 Jacoby, , FGrH iii B (suppl.)/1 (Text), 172–3Google Scholar, argues that Phanodemus began his work sometime between 340 and 335. If Badian's complex argument (above, n. 3, 15–17) is sound, Ephorus also referred to an earlier peace contracted after Eurymedon and could also have inspired Plutarch's excursus.
29 For convenient reviews of Callisthenes' literary output see Prandi (above, n. 1); Pearson, L., The lost histories of Alexander the Great (Philological Monographs 20: New York 1960) 22–49Google Scholar; Pédech, P., Historiens compagnons d'Alexandre (Paris 1984) 15–69.Google Scholar
30 FGrH 124 T 27 (Diod. xiv 117.8; xvi 14.4)
31 Isocr. iv (Pan.) 120; cf. Meister (above, n. 2) 8–11.
32 For fullest expression of the theory see Pédech (above, n. 28) 27–8, 30–1, Prandi (above, n. 1) 53–4.
33 Best stated, with admirable rhetoric, by Jacoby, RE x. 1694: ‘Dieser Friede bedeutet für jeden Griechen, der sich über die engen Grenzen seiner vaterstädtischen Interessen zu erheben vermochte, einen Schandfleck für den griechischen Namen’. It is, I think, more an expression of the Pan-German sentiment of the early twentieth century than a reflection of fourth-century Panhellenic thought.
34 Diod. xv 1.1–5. The subsequent narrative, certainly based on Ephorus, does mention the discredit brought on Sparta by the King's Peace (xv 9.5), but it is very much a secondary theme, overshadowed by Spartan abuses in Greece proper (cf. xv 19.4). See the Budé edition of Diodorus xv by Claude Vial (Paris 1977), xvi–xix.
35 Cf. Jacoby, RE x.1707; Prandi (above, n. 1) 70–3. Note particularly the highly flattering picture of Pelopidas' diplomatic mission to Susa (Plut.Pel. 30), which basically reaffirmed the terms of the King's Peace, with Thebes playing the role of Sparta.
36 FGrH 124 F 12; cf. Burstein, S. M., ‘Alexander, Callisthenes and the sources of the Nile’, GRBS xvii (1976) 135–46Google Scholar; Prandi (above, n. 1) 153–8.
37 FGrH 124 F 9, 11 (the book numbers are selfconsistent and credible).
38 Schwartz, E., ‘Kallisthenes' Hellenika’, Hermes xxxv (1900) 106–30Google Scholar, esp. 109. ‘für eine solche Schilderung ist kein leichterer Anlass denkbar, als Alexanders Marsch durch Pamphylien im Jahr 333’.
39 Cf. Wade-Gery (above, n. 2) 204. In recent years Schreiner, F. C., ‘More anti-Thukydidean studies in the Pentekontaetia’, SO lii (1977) 19–38, esp. 23–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar, has accepted Schwartz's location; but his grounds seem to me wholly subjective, and he argues (quite implausibly) that Callisthenes was the main source for the Life of Cimon. Schreiner cites Lombardo, G., Cimone. Ricostruzione della biografia e discussioni storiografiche (Rome 1934) 83, 133Google Scholar, who apparently endorsed Schwartz's views (non vidi).
40 Meister (above, n. 2) 65, arguing that the Hellenica provided an ideal context for the old rhetorical topos, the comparison of the Peace of Callias and the King's Peace. But, on his view, Callisthenes denied the historicity of the Peace of Callias and there could be no direct comparison. Jacoby (RE X.1696) was more prudent: Callisthenes was sceptical about the Peace and confined himself to stressing the glorious consequences of the victory at the Eurymedon, which could be adversely compared with the King's Peace.
41 Diod. xvi 89.2; cf. Arr. ii 14.4; iii 18.12; Curt, iv i. 10–11. See further Bellen, H., ‘Die Rachegedanke in der griechisch—persischen Auseinandersetzung’, Chiron iv (1974) 43–67.Google Scholar
42 Arr. i 16.7; Plut. Alex. 16.17 Cf. Bosworth, A. B.Historical commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander i (Oxford 1980) 127.Google Scholar
43 Plut. Alex. 34.2–3; cf. Hamilton, J. R., Plutarch:Alexander (Oxford 1969) 91–2.Google Scholar
44 FGrH 124 F 28, 32–3; 53–4; cf. Pédech (above n. 29) 45–9; Prandi (above, n.1) 76–82.
45 Strabo xiv 1.7 (635) = FGrH 124 F 29; cf. Hdt. vi 21.2.
46 Arr.i 19.4–6; Diod. xvii 22.3–5.
47 Strabo xvii 1.43 (814) = FGrH 124 F 14a. On the attribution of the sack to Xerxes see, most recently, Parke, H. W., ‘The massacre of the Branchidae’, JHS cv (1985) 59–68, esp. 64–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
48 There were of course other contexts in which Callisthenes might have expounded the theme of Eurymedon. It is not impossible (as a referee has suggested) that the discussion occurred in an Introduction which delineated the previous history of Greco-Persian conflict. There is, however, no evidence that Callisthenes prefaced his work with a formal introduction (though it is admittedly likely)and no hint of what material might have been chosen for introductory purposes. On the other hand there is ample evidence for antiquarian and historical digressions in the course of the narrative, and I assume that the observations on the Eurymedon and its sequel came at the point when Alexander impinged on the field of the campaign. But, wherever Callisthenes placed his discussion, it remains true that the Peace of Callias was an uncomfortable theme, best buried in tactful silence.
49 For the motif of heroic emulation in Callisthenes see FGrH 124 F 14a, with Pédech (above,n. 29) 49–51.
50 FGrH 124 F 31 (Townley scholion on Iliad xiii 29); cf. Prandi (above, n. I) 81–2, 97–8.
51 Arr. i 26.1–2; for the other sources see Bosworth (above, n. 42) 165–6. Divine intervention is implied (οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ θείου: Arr.; cf. Plut. Alex. 17.6; Jos. AJ ii 348; App. BC. ii 149. 622), but the recognition of sovereignty was an embellishment unique to Callisthenes.
52 Strabo xiii 4.8 (627) = FGrH 124 F 29.
53 Arr. i 17.3—7; cf. Bosworth (above, n. 42) 128–30).
54 The Ionians admittedly did not capture the acropolis of Sardes, which held out during the occupation and conflagration of the lower city (Hdt. v 100); but the same was apparently true of the Cimmerians, who also failed to capture the acropolis (Hdt. i 15). The citadel itself may only have fallen once—to Cyrus.
55 Hdt. v 102.1 (emphasising the casus belli ); vi 101.3 (revenge motive); cf. vii 8β. 1.
56 Arr. ii 14.4; Curt, iv 1.10–11.
57 Anth. Pal. vi 344: τιμωροὺς προγόνων βάρβαρον εἰς Ἀσίην.
58 Most explicit in Lycurg. i 73: καὶ τὸ κεφαλαῖον τῆς νίκης … ὅρους τοῖς βαρβάροις πήξαντες … συνθήκας ἐποιήσαντο κτλ. That was probably the version of Phanodemus also (see above, p. 5).
59 Isocr. vii (Areop. )80 (cf. Meister [above, n. 2] 9–11); Plato Menex. 241e (perhaps referring to a de facto peace: cf. Meister 7–8).
60 Arr. i 26.5. Alexander clearly left a good deal of unfinished business to be cleared up by Nearchus, whom he appointed satrap of Lycia and Pamphylia.
61 Theon, Prog. 2 (Rhetores graeci [ed. L. Spengel] ii. 67.22–9) = FGrH 115 F 153. The standard discussion is that of Connor (above, n. 9) 78–89; see also Meister (above, n. 2) 59–65.
62 Theon's reference is embedded in a list of classic models for rhetorical training. The immediate context is the technical excursus in historical narrative (πραγματικαὶ διηγήσεις). Theopompus is placed alongside Thucydides on the tyrannicides and Herodotus' triple division of the known world (iv 42–5).
63 Harpocr. s.v. Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασιν = FGrH 115 F 154. A further fragment of this discussion is apparently preserved in Photius and the Suda (FGrH 115 F 155); cf. Connor (above, n. 9) 89–94.
64 See the full exposition of this view in Meister (above, n. 2) 60–5).
65 So (e.g.) Stockton, David, ‘The Peace of Callias’, Historia viii (1959) 62Google Scholar: ‘It is hard to believe that it was not this, the big bubble, that Theopompus was out to prick’.
66 For discussion see Connor (above, n. 9) 79–82, enlarging on Wade-Gery (above, n. 2) 206–7. See also Badian (above, n. 3) 28 n. 51.
67 The only other (outside) possibility is a dating to the reign of Xerxes, in the immediate aftermath of Eurymedon (so Badian [above, n. 3] 3–8). In that case the attested embassy of Callias to the court of Artaxerxes (Hdt. vii 151) is interpreted as a reenactment of an earlier treaty (made under the aegis of Cimon and Callias) after the change of reign.
68 This is a theoretical possibility only. To my knowledge it has never been seriously advanced.
69 Hdt. vii 1.1. See the full rhetorical elaboration in Aristid. i (Panath. ) 114–115.
70 On the historical background see, most fully, Lewis, D. M., Sparta and Persia (Leiden 1977) 69–77Google Scholar; and, for a sceptical review of the evidence for a treaty in 424/3, see Meister 79–94. Despite the perversions of fact that surround it, most scholars accept that the reference in Andocides (iii [De pace ] 29) to a perpetual peace negotiated by Epilycus does relate to some actual negotiation transacted around 424. The supposition is greatly strengthened by the recent discovery of a new fragment of the famous honorary decree for Heracleides (Walbank, M. B., ‘Herakleides of Klazomenai: a new join at the Epigraphical Museum’, ZPE li [1983] 183–4Google Scholar; cf. Whitehead, D. M., ZPE lvii [1984] 145–6)Google Scholar, which proves that the recipient was indeed Heracleides of Clazomenae. Heracleides served Athenian interests in negotiating spondai with the Great King and did so before he achieved Athenian citizenship (i.e. during the Peloponnesian War).
71 That is often argued (most recently by Badian [above, n. 3] 27–8) but there is no evidence. It seems unlikely, even if the Peace of Callias is historical, that a subsequent compact would merely have repeated the clauses of the original treaty without modification. The documentary record of the agreements between the Spartans and the Persian court as preserved in Thucydides viii is interesting evidence of the changes which political circumstances might impose within a matter of weeks (cf. Lewis [above, n. 70] 90–107). Wade-Gery (above, n. 2) 210 claimed that a re-enactment of an existing treaty would be a less startling omission in Thucydides than a totally new agreement (for other adherents to this view see Meister [above, n. 2] 50). Possibly so, but it is merely a matter of degree. On any hypothesis of a peace in 424/3 Thucydides (iv 50) recorded the abortive embassy of 425/4 but ignored the successful negotiations with Darius.
72 Plut. Mor. 862D: criticism of unnamed authorities who denigrated Marathon as ‘a brief clash with the barbarians on their landing’. For the attribution to Theopompus see Jacoby, FGrH iiD.380; Connor (above, n. 9) 88; and, on Plutarch's use of Theopompus, particularly in the Life of Cimon, see Connor 112–6.
73 Note Demosthenes' ironical reference to Aeschines having read texts of the decrees of Miltiades and Themistocles (Dem. xix 303) along side the ephebic oath. That would have been not unlike Lycurgus' invocation of the Oath of Plataea (i 80–2), which comes a few sections after the reference to the Peace of Callias (i 73). Had it suited his purposes, Lycurgus might have had the entire treaty read out to the court.
74 So Meiggs, R., The Athenian empire (Oxford, 1972) 79Google Scholar; Badian (above, n. 3) 9 –11.
75 Thucydides i 116.3 records a brief and abortive foray in the direction of Caunus and Caria which Pericles undertook with sixty ships. It is just possible that Callisthenes exaggerated this action into a push against Pamphylia, much as Stesimbrotus (Plut. Per. 26.1 = FGrH 107 F 8) made Cyprus the ultimate objective (Wade-Gery [above, n. 2] 203 n. 3, 221; most recently Prandi [above, n. 1] 54–5); but I see no reason to opt for this alternative.
76 Note for instance Thuc. i 104.2, where it is recorded parenthetically that the Athenians and their allies were involved in Cyprus with a force of 200 ships at the time that they received the appeal from Inaros. We have no idea how they came to be there or how long they had been operating. Pamphylia admittedly is not one of the scenes of operation in the Erechtheid casualty list (Meiggs/Lewis no. 33), which most probably dates to 460; but there is surely scope for a foray in that area during the following years, when the Athenian presence in Egypt was probably much reduced.
77 Badian (above, n. 3) 9–10.