By focusing attention on managers' concept of risk and the methods they use to measure risk, this paper attempts to lessen the disparity between current theory and practice by suggesting a method that will make IRR and NPV more generally applicable. We attempt to do this through a methodology that combines some PERT assumptions with traditionally accepted academic techniques and those used by practicing business managers to provide a probability distribution of the cumulative net present value (CPV). From these data we develop a probability distribution of the discounted payback period.

The facts of increased institutional trading on the nation's securities markets are by now well known. On the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the six major institutional groups—insurance companies, investment companies, noninsured pension funds, nonprofit institutions, common trusts, and mutual savings banks, now own more than one-fourth of the market value of listed shares compared with less than 16 percent at the end of 1956. But, ownership is merely the tip of the perennial iceberg, since institutional trading of stock has become much more significant than institutional ownership. This fact is pointed up in the recent SEC Study of Institutional Investors. It shows that there has been a relatively slow increase in the share of outstanding stock owned by institutions in all markets, but the institutional share of trading has mushroomed.

A recent study by Larner [11] concluded that the managerial revolution analyzed earlier by Berle and Means [4] was close to completion because a large percentage of the nation's 200 largest nonfinancial corporations was controlled by nonowner managers. This finding makes more significant any substantial differences in financial performance that may exist between owner-controlled and manager-controlled firms, and it increases the potential impact of numerous related theories; for example, see Berle [3], Donaldson [5], Gordon [6, 7 ], Mason [14], Monsen and Downs [16], Williamson [21], and others.

The stock market is in the midst of an era of change unparalleled since the Great Depression, long-standing institutions — including the major stock exchanges — are being radically challenged by contemporary developments, and novel approaches to making markets for common stocks are appearing with increasing frequency. In addition, the Martin Report and the recent hearings of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the future structure of the equities market indicate that the regulatory climate surrounding the stock market can be expected to undergo serious change in the near future.

The characteristics of the mean-variance, efficient portfolio frontier have been discussed at length in the literature. However, for more than three assets, the general approach has been to display qualitative results in terms of graphs. In this paper, the efficient portfolio frontiers are derived explicitly, and the characteristics claimed for these frontiers are verified. The most important implication derived from these characteristics, the separation theorem, is stated and proved in the context of a mutual fund theorem. It is shown that under certain conditions, the classic graphical technique for deriving the efficient portfolio frontier is incorrect.

This paper is a selective review of the received theory of financial institutions with some suggestions regarding future research on this topic. The major emphasis is placed on the positive economic theory of these firms. Financial institutions are considered to be firms that supply financial securities and contracts held as assets by other sectors of the economy and that use the proceeds of these sales to finance the purchase of financial securities and contracts which are the liabilities of other economic units. The theory discussed here is stripped of much of the regulatory and legal framework surrounding financial institutions. The primary reason for so limiting the scope of this paper is a conviction that a reasonably complete model of a simple financial institution is a necessary precursor to useful models of the positive economic behavior of financial institutions in any specific legal, regulatory, and operational framework. While recognizing that no tractable model of a financial institution is likely to be so general as to avoid the problem of model specificity, I take the view that many of the questions asked in the literature would be better answered in less specific models, i.e., in models capable of explaining additional important aspects of the behavior of the financial institution in question.

Despite the enormous attention received by the single-period mean-variance model in the literature, its structural relationship to the empirical world is still largely unexplored. The purpose of this note is to show that when certain consistency requirements and equilibrium conditions in the financial markets are taken into account, the collective judgment of the present literature concerning the mean-variance approach is in some respects too lenient and in other respects too harsh. In addition, it will be noted that the mean-variance model can only achieve consistency with the von Neumann-Morgenstern postulates and absolute preference (also known as first-order stochastic dominance) at the price of a severe upper bound on the risk aversion that can be possessed by the decision maker.

By examining the annual data from 1937-1967, we found that odd-lot volume has become loss important in the market in recent years. Although the odd-lot trading volume has increased steadily in the absolute term since the end of World War II, the share of odd-lot trading in relation to total round-lot volume has been declining. By 1967, the percentage of odd-lot volume to round-lot total sales was down to 11.6 percent. The same data also indicate that odd-lot short sales have increased moderately since 1962; however, the volume is quite insignificant. The average of odd-lot short sales to total round-lot short sales for the 31-year period is only 1.9 percent. Odd-lotters were also found to be net purchasers during this period (1937-1967); however, odd-lotters have turned into net sellers in recent years. The total net sales from 1961 to 1967 amounted to 22.2 million shares, which is approximately 25 percent of the total net purchases of the entire period (1937-1967).

I am going to consider three questions. First, what have been the trends in the institutionalization of savings and, as a consequence, in the evolving role of institutions in the equity markets? Second, what have been the effects of these trends on the securities industry, narrowly defined; that is, on the securities broker-dealers. And, third, what have been the effects of these trends on the financial markets and the economy as a whole?

Since World War II, the significance of the municipal bond market has increased dramatically with state and local government debt growing much more rapidly than public and private debt, federal debt, or the gross national product. Between 1960 and 1970, the annual value of new issues of state and local government bonds increased 110 percent, and there is every indication that the total will continue its rapid rise. In 1969 and 1970, the values of state and local government bond new issues were second only to those of the corporate bond market. Despite the size of the state and local bond market, investors and researchers have devoted their attention to the markets for corporate and U.S. government securities; the interest in these markets has tended to overshadow activity in the municipal bond market.

Under certainty the firm's average cost of capital is a directly observable magnitude — the rate of interest. Under uncertainty the firm–s average cost of capital is an ex ante expectational concept which is not directly observable. In a seminal application of their prior theoretical contributions to corporation finance, Miller and Modigliani (M-M) [11] obtained indirect econometric estimates of the cost of capital for electric utility firms. A sample of electric utilities was ideal for an empirical application of the A M-M valuation model which is rooted in the partial equilibrium framework of an equivalent risk class. For other industries where interfirm differences in operating risk are greater, the equivalent risk class assumption would be less appropriate. That is, each firm in a heterogeneous industry may be considered in a unique risk class and the concept of an industry cost of capital would be suspect. Furthermore, the M-M theoretical construct does not provide insights into the relationship among costs of capital of firms in divergent risk classes.

This paper has considered the sequence of optimal credit expansion decisions of a bank operating under the legal structure imposed by the Federal Reserve System. Two alternative structures are considered, one relating to the pre-September 1968 period and the other to the currently enforced one. Using dynamic programming techniques, a closed-form equation for the optimal credit expansion decision has been derived in each case. The optimal level of credit expansion has been shown to be a nonlinear function of the prevailing interest rate, the parameters of the distribution of reserve losses, and several parameters set by Federal Reserve policy. The presence of uncertainty in the model has been shown to have an indefinite effect; however, several policy parameters may be chosen so as either to restrict or to encourage expansion to levels below or above the simple certainty prediction. These results are intuitively in accord with those of general inventory studies.

Many firms are short of capital. Investment opportunities offering positive net present values often exceed the amount of available internal financing. Management may either impose a capital budget constraint equal to the amount of internally generated funds or finance externally. Assuming that management chooses the latter, it must choose debt, preferred stock, common stock, or various forms or combinations of these securities. Controversy has surrounded the relative costs of debt and equity financing, but, recognizing the tax advantage of debt financing, most theorists agree that a firm will have some debt in its capital structure. This paper will not attempt to examine the important question of the optimal debt/equity ratio in the firm's capital structure but will assume that management has decided it is prudent to issue additional long-term debt. We will delineate the more modest question of the optimal size and timing of the long-term debt issues.

Portfolio selection models based on expected value-semivariance (E-S) criteria have been suggested as offering certain advantages over the expected value-variance (E-V) approach. Although variance is more tractable mathematically, it has not always been satisfying to financial theorists ([3, pp. 278–284], [5], [6], [7, pp. 193–194], and [10, pp. 72–73]). In the pioneering work in portfolio analysis, Markowitz [7, p. 194] observed that semivariance concentrates on reducing losses as opposed to variance which considers extreme gains, as well as extreme losses, as undesirable. In the presence of nonsymmetrical probability distributions, this equal weighting of gains and losses may not adequately describe the alternative portfolios available to the decision maker.

Many recent studies of the demand for financial assets have been of an aggregative nature, using time-series data. However, some efforts to disaggregate and rely more heavily on cross-sectional data have yielded substantial improvements in discovering relationships not evident due to aggregation. The purpose of this paper is to continue in this spirit of disaggregation and to estimate the demand for one homogeneous type of financial asset, credit union shares, on a cross-sectional basis.

In this paper a recursive programming model is constructed and optimized so that a mix of bank assets may be selected. The purpose is to link optimization over time with a commercial bank asset management model.

Litzenberger's and Rao'ps (L-R) econometric estimate of the cost of capital is in some ways ingenious as well as interesting. The methodology of the estimating procedure is that of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable (IV) approach which was previously used by Miller and Modigliani in their 1966 study. The product differentiation of the L-R study emanates primarily, though not exclusively, from the fact that the valuation equation is derived from capital market line theory. This feature results in the indirect econometric estimates being “useful” for deriving insights into cost of capital variations cum interfirm differences in operating risk. Ergo, Litzenberger's and Rao's empiricism is in no way dependent upon the homogenous risk class concept of Miller and Modigliani.

Weeden & Co.'s business is that of making markets. We do it in many different types of securities and we take considerable inventory risk in the process. As market makers we learn to be direct in our dealings. “My market is 62 bid; offered at 62½.” “I can offer 5,000 at 62½ net.” The pace and the pressures of the marketplace tend to make us impatient with those who speak in vague terms, who mask their intentions, or who do not know the facts.

For almost a decade, Myron Gordon has argued repeatedly that an enterprise's dividend policy can affect its share price [2, 3, and 4]. The essence of his argument is that risk-averse investors are likely to perceive current dividends as less risky than future ones. Consequently, a corporate decision to reduce current, in favor of increased future, dividends will reduce share prices, even when the funds are invested to yield the firm's cost of capital.

During the past two decades, corporate managements have been increasingly Interested in growth through mergers and acquisitions. This external growth trend has been accompanied by the development of several merger strategies and philosophies. As a result, merger literature is frequently concerned with concepts such as price-earnings ratio strategy [13] and merger synergy. Synergy may be operational (e.g., the development of marketing or production economies) and/or financial in nature. Although financial synergy may produce “real” benefits (e.g., a lower cost of capital or increased cash flows), it is the general custom today to associate financial synergy with temporary [8], pecuniary [10], or instantaneous [9] earnings per share benefits.