We examine shareholder litigation and the price and nonprice terms of bank loan contracts. After filing a lawsuit, defendant firms pay higher loan spreads and up-front charges, experience more financial covenants, and are more likely to have a collateral requirement. These findings are consistent with reputational losses associated with shareholder litigation. The magnitude of a firm’s lost market value when the lawsuit is filed is positively related to the increase in the firm’s future borrowing costs. We investigate whether the lawsuit allegations and its merit affect future bank loan terms. Our results do not appear to be affected by self-selection.

This paper illustrates regression and Kalman filtering methods for estimating the time-varying term structure of volatility expectations revealed by options prices. Short- and long-term expectations are estimated for four currencies using daily PHLX options prices from 1985 to 1989. Throughout this period, there were important differences between shortand long-term expectations. The slope of the term structure changed frequently and there were significant variations in long-term volatility expectations. The expectation estimates can be used to value OTC options, to improve hedging strategies, and to test the hypothesis that the options market overreacts.

Existing empirical studies of the put-call parity condition report frequent, substantial violations. An important problem in interpreting these results is that these studies all investigate American options. While some of these studies attempt to reduce the effects of possible early exercise on their tests, they cannot fully account for the effect of early exercise. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude from these studies whether, or to what extent, observed put-call parity violations are due to market inefficiency or due to the value of early exercise. We avoid the early exercise problem by testing put-call parity using European options. We find violations that are much less frequent and smaller than the studies using American options. Moreover, these violations reflect premia for liquidity (immediacy) risk.

Recent empirical studies of mutual fund competition examine the relation between a fund’s performance, the fund manager’s compensation, and the fund manager’s choice of portfolio risk. This paper models a manager’s portfolio choice for compensation rules that can be either a concave, linear, or convex function of the fund’s performance relative to that of a benchmark. For particular compensation structures, a manager increases the fund’s “tracking error” volatility as its relative performance declines. However, declining performance does not necessarily lead the manager to raise the volatility of the fund’s return. The paper presents nonparametric and parametric tests of the relation between mutual fund performance and risk taking for more than 6,000 equity mutual funds over the 1962 to 2006 period. There is a tendency for mutual funds to increase the standard deviation of tracking errors, but not the standard deviation of returns, as their performance declines. This risk-shifting behavior appears more common for funds whose managers have longer tenures.

We distinguish between horizontal and vertical joint ventures, and find correspondingly different valuation effects. Horizontal joint ventures create synergistic gains that are shared by the partners. In contrast, vertical joint ventures generate gains only for suppliers. This is similar to the patter we find for simple contracts, which suggests economic similiarities between vertical joint ventures and contracts. Analysing firms' choices between these contracting options, we find that firms choose vertical joint ventures over simple contracts when potential hold-up problems are severe and when suppliers face finance constraints. The results d not support a risk-sharing motive for joint ventures.

We analyze the determinants of replacement investment decisions in a contingent claims model with maintenance and operation cost uncertainty. We find that the optimal time between replacements is increasing in the volatility of cost, the purchase price of a new asset, and the corporate tax rate; and is decreasing in the systematic risk of cost, the salvage value of the asset, and the investment tax credit. The optimal time between replacements can either increase or decrease with an increase in the depreciation rate. Extensions of the model to examine the effects of technological and tax policy uncertainty on replacement investment decisions give intuitive, but striking results. Uncertainty about the arrival of a technological innovation that would decrease maintenance and operation cost results in a significant decrease in replacement investment. Uncertainty in a tax law change that would encourage investment decreases current investment; and uncertainty in a tax law change that would discourage investment increases current investment.

This paper develops a formal model of the effect of time-varying asymmetric information on the timing and pricing of equity issues when managers are better informed than outside investors. We assume that as time passes, the adverse selection problem becomes more severe as more managers receive a private signal. Under this assumption, the model predicts temporal variation in the quantity of issues, with a bunching of issues after information releases. It also predicts that the price drop at issue announcement increases with the time since the last information release. These predictions are consistent with several recent empirical studies relating equity issues to earnings and dividend announcements.

Using disaggregated panel data, we examine how firms change trade credit in response to a monetary tightening. We find that both accounts payable and accounts receivable increase with tighter monetary policy, implying that trade credit helps firms absorb the effect of a credit contraction. Further, both S&P 500 firms and a comparison group of smaller firms increase net trade credit (accounts receivable minus payable), making up for the reduced liquidity associated with tighter policy. However, we find no evidence that large firms play this role more actively than smaller firms.

We investigate whether intertemporal variation in stock and bond risk premia can be explained by time-varying covariances with priced risk factors. We estimate and test a conditional two-factor variant of Merton's ICAPM in which excess returns on an equity index and a long-term government bond portfolio proxy for risk factors. Conditional second moments follow the asymmetric dynamic covariance (ADC) model of Kroner and Ng (1998). We find that conditional bond variance responds symmetrically to bond return shocks but is virtually unaffected by stock return shocks, while conditional stock variance responds asymmetrically to both stock and bond return shocks. Models that impose a constant correlation restriction on the covariance matrix between stock and bond returns are strongly rejected. We conclude that the conditional two-factor model fails to adequately explain intertemporal variation in stock and bond risk premia.

Present models for selecting portfolios according to the mean-variance criteria do not account for the simultaneous effect of error in estimating means, variances, and covariances of security returns. This paper describes an experiment in which the impact of estimation error is so strong that the usefulness of present mean-variance approaches to portfolio selection is brought into question.

I test whether social influence affects individual investors’ trading and stock returns. In each of the 20 most active stocks in Finland over 9 years, the number of owners in a municipality multiplied by the number of investors who do not own a stock, a measure of the rate of transmission of diseases and rumors through social contact, predicts individual investor trading. I control for known determinants of trade, including daily news, and show that competing explanations for the relation are unlikely. Socially motivated trades predict stock returns, and the effects are not reversed, suggesting that individuals share useful information. Individuals’ susceptibility to social influence has declined during the period, but the opportunities for social influence have increased.

Empirical investigations into the codetermination of security prices and economic events are called event studies. There are several ways of estimating the codetermination of interest. Since Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll [8], it has been general practice to first translate variables into rates of return, then net out general market movements, and, finally, examine the relationship between residual returns and events. The methodology in all of its variants falls under the rubric of “residual analysis.”

I empirically investigate the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings and mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and find evidence consistent with the agency theory’s prediction of a negative relation between CEO inside debt holdings and corporate risk taking. Further analysis shows that CEO inside debt holdings are positively correlated with M&A announcement abnormal bond returns and long-term operating performance, but negatively correlated with M&A announcement abnormal stock returns. Finally, I find evidence that acquirers restructure the postmerger composition of CEO compensation that mirrors their capital structure in order to alleviate incentives for wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders or vice versa.

We examine whether a firm’s debt maturity structure affects its credit quality. Consistent with theory, we find that firms with greater exposure to rollover risk (measured by the amount of long-term debt payable within a year relative to assets) have lower credit quality; long-term bonds issued by those firms trade at higher yield spreads, indicating that bond market investors are cognizant of rollover risk arising from a firm’s debt maturity structure. These effects are stronger among firms with a speculative-grade rating and declining profitability, and during recessions.

We examine the link between bank competition and financial stability using the recent financial crisis as the setting. We utilize variation in banking competition at the state level and find that banks facing less competition are more likely to engage in risky activities, more likely to face regulatory intervention, and more likely to fail. Focusing on the real estate market, we find that states with less competition had higher rates of mortgage approval, experienced greater inflation in housing prices before the crisis, and experienced a steeper decline in housing prices during the crisis. Overall, our study is consistent with greater competition increasing financial stability.

In this paper, we demonstrate that the conflicting results found in the literature of tests of the unbiased forward rate hypothesis (UFRH) depend upon the econometric specification used as well as differences in the time period of estimation. It is established that the time series properties of spot and forward exchange rate data rule out certain econometric specifications used to test the UFRH. Specifically, we find that both spot and forward exchange rates for the U.K., Germany, Japan, and Canada have unit roots and are cointegrated. We also find that the co-integrating parameter in the regression of realized spot on forward rates for each currency is approximately one, implying that researchers who use this specification to test the UFRH may falsely accept the hypothesis simply because of the specification used in the test. Using an alternative error correction specification, we find that the UFRH is resoundingly rejected for all currencies and that the coefficients in this specification exhibit temporal instability. More importantly, we find that the evolution of the estimated parameters is becoming increasingly inconsistent with the UFRH with the passage of time. We conclude the paper with an investigation into potential causes for the gross violation of the UFRH.

We study how investor sentiment affects stock prices around the world. Relying on households’ Google search behavior, we construct a weekly measure of sentiment for 38 countries during 2004–2014. We validate the sentiment index in tests using sports outcomes and show that the sentiment measure is a contrarian predictor of country-level market returns. Furthermore, we document an important role of global sentiment in stock markets.

This study examines board monitoring when a credible chief executive officer (CEO) replacement is on the board. Inside directors whose talents are in greater demand externally, as reflected by their holding outside directorships, are more likely to become CEOs, and their presence is associated with greater forced CEO turnover sensitivity to accounting performance and CEO compensation sensitivity to stock performance. These results reveal that certain insiders strengthen board monitoring by serving as a readily available CEO replacement and contradict the presumption that all insiders are under CEO control. Furthermore, the results persist when accounting for the endogenous firm selection of talented inside directors.

Using a unique database of aggregate daily flows to equity mutual funds in Israel, we find strong support for the “temporary price pressure hypothesis” regarding mutual fund flows: Mutual fund flows create temporary price pressure that is subsequently corrected. We find that flows are positively autocorrelated, and are correlated with market returns (R2 of 20%). Our main finding is that approximately one-half of the price change is reversed within 10 trading days. This support for the “temporary price pressure hypothesis” complements microstructure research concerning price impact and price noise in stocks by indicating price noise at the aggregate market level.

We compare two mechanisms for selling IPOs, the fixed price method and American book-building, when investors have correlated information and can observe each other's subscription decisions. In this environment, the fixed price method is a strategy that can create cascading demand. Alternatively, an underwriter building a book aggregates investor information into the offer price. We find that bookbuilding generates higher expected proceeds but exposes the issuer to greater uncertainty, and that it provides the option to sell additional shares that are not underpriced on the margin.