This paper examines how the progressive personal tax rate affects the equilibrium asset pricing model. In a continuous-time framework with progressive taxation, it can be shown that the expected excess rate of return on a risky asset is an increasing function of (i) the covariance of asset return with aggregate consumption rate changes, and (ii) the covariance of asset return with the aggregation of individual wealth change, weighted by the investor's tax scheme progressivity index. The capital asset pricing model derived in the absence of tax is shown to understate the expected excess rate of return and to have a misspecification error under the progressive tax scheme. Furthermore, the expected excess rate of return can be decomposed as the consumption risk premium and tax premium. The tax premium depends on the tax structure prevailing in the economy.

This study examines corporate leverage during systemic banking crises in an international setting, including 85 countries from 1987 to 2017. Using the historically determined component of institutions and exogenous variations in institution building, the analyses show that leverage cyclicality varies substantially across institutional settings. Leverage is strongly countercyclical under more binding constraints on the capital supply, suggesting important supply effects of such crises on leverage. Weak institutions are more conducive to crises and uncertainty. Leverage countercyclicality is more pronounced during crises that coincide with higher uncertainty, whereas leverage is procyclical with stronger legal systems and information sharing in capital markets.

We test whether model misspecification or liquidity spirals primarily explain the observed excess dependence in filtered (for economic fundamentals) hedge fund index returns and the links between volatility, liquidity shocks, and hedge fund return clustering. Evidence supports the model misspecification hypothesis: i) hedge fund filtered return clustering is symmetric, ii) filtered Short Bias fund returns exhibit negative dependence with filtered returns for other hedge fund types, iii) negative liquidity shocks are associated with clustering in both tails and market volatility subsumes the role of negative liquidity shocks, and iv) these same patterns appear in size-sorted equity portfolios.

Hand-collecting credit line drawdowns that firms classify as long-term debt, we first document how long-term drawdowns rise with high investment needs or weak external capital market conditions. Nearly all drawdown proceeds finance long-term investment, including M&A activity. Unrated and lower-rated firms rely more on long-term drawdowns than high or very poorly rated firms. We further find that credit lines have tighter covenants than terms loans. Drawdowns are repaid fairly quickly and often refinanced with other long-term debt. Our findings support the monitored liquidity insurance theory of credit lines and highlight that long-term drawdowns act as a valuable bridge financing mechanism.

We construct a new numerical measure of earnings announcement surprises, standardized unexpected earnings call text (SUE.txt), that does not explicitly incorporate the reported earnings value. SUE.txt generates a text-based post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD.txt) larger than the classic PEAD. The magnitude of PEAD.txt is considerable even in recent years when the classic PEAD is close to 0. We explore our text-based empirical model to show that the calls’ news content is about details behind the earnings number and the fundamentals of the firm.

Using three exogenous shocks to ex ante litigation risk, including federal judge ideology and two influential judicial precedents, we find that lower shareholder litigation risk reduces a firm’s propensity to delist from the U.S. stock markets. The effect is at least partially driven by indirect costs of litigation and that being a private firm can significantly reduce the threat of litigation. Overall, the results suggest that mitigating excessive litigation costs for public firms is crucial to ensure the continued vibrancy of the U.S. stock market.

We study the valuation of collateral by comparing spreads on loans by the same bank, to the same borrower, at the same origination date, but backed by different types of collateral. Pledging collateral reduces borrowing costs by 23 BPS on average. The effect varies across different types of collateral, with marketable securities being most valuable, and real estate and accounts receivables and inventory being more valuable than fixed assets and a blanket lien. Further, the rate reduction from pledging collateral is sensitive to the value of the underlying collateral, and collateral tends to be more valuable for smaller and private firms and for loans with longer maturity.

Using real-time data, we show that currency excess return predictability is in part due to mispricing. First, the risk-adjusted profitability of systematic trading strategies decreases after dissemination of the underlying academic research, suggesting that market participants learn about mispricing from publications. Moreover, the decline is greater for strategies with larger in-sample profits and lower arbitrage costs. Second, the effect of comprehensive risk adjustments on trading profits is limited, and signal ranks and alphas decay quickly. The finding that analysts’ forecasts are inconsistent with currency predictors implies that investors’ trading contributes to mispricing and suggests biased expectations as a possible explanation.

It Is commonplace within the confines of finance literature to explain variations in the firm's residual income stream via the dichotomy of business risk and financial risk. On an ex-post basis the business risk of the enterprise is a direct result of the firm's investment decision and is, thereby, embodied in its asset structure. It follows that the company's cost structure, product demand characteristics, intra-industry competitive position, and managerial talent all affect its business risk posture.

Over the years there has been a growing interest in the over-the-counter (OTC) trading of exchange-listed securities (known as the third market). Although the third market has flourished and its advantages have been expounded, it has not been possible to compare accurately the third market with organized exchanges because of an incomplete quotation system. On April 5, 1971, the National Association of Security Dealers Automatic Quotation (NASDAQ) system began including bid-and-ask quotations for 30 stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE); see Table 1.

Professor Basil Kalymon, in his recent article [1], correctly asserts that the appropriate variance for the portfolio selection model, reflecting portfolio risk, should measure the risks created “not only by the inherent fluctuations of returns, but also by the decision-maker's lack of perfect information about the parameters of his model” [1, p. 560]. He identifies a significant failing of portfolio selection models, that “the question of estimating the required parameters in the models has been largely sidestepped … by assuming that the parameter values are known” [1, p. 559]. By showing that error in estimating security returns is an important component of risk in portfolio selection models, Professor Kalymon has taken portfolio theory an important step forward.

Two methods for deriving efficient sets involve either the Markowitz [3] approach, where every security can be viewed as being related to an index unique to itself, or the Sharpe [4] single-index model, where every security is related to the same index. Given the extreme differences between these models, Cohen and Pogue [1] developed two intermediate models. They found that the efficient set derived from the Sharpe single-index model came closer to approximating the Markowitz model's efficient set than their models when empirically tested on a sample of common stocks. Subsequently a similar test was performed by Wallingford [6] which yielded contradictory conclusions.

On February 1, 1971, the National Association of Security Dealers instituted an automatic quoting system for over-the-counter stocks. Heralded as a major advance in the elimination of market imperfections, the National Association of Security Dealers Automatic Quote System (NASDAQ) allowed bidand- ask prices of different firms in this geographically dispersed market to be centralized. Essentially its operation allowed individual “houses” to obtain the various bid-and-ask prices of market makers for a given unlisted security.

The world is still recovering from the shock of radically higher energy prices triggered by the October 1973 war in the Mideast. In the months following the oil embargo and the quadrupled price of petroleum, there seemed to be a very real possibility that the strains imposed on world markets and institutions, and indeed on national economies, would cause a fracture in one or another part of the complex linkages that make up the world economic system.

Using an international sample of IPO firms and two country-level measures of financial literacy, we find strong evidence that financial literacy is negatively associated with IPO underpricing. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of financial literacy in reducing IPO underpricing is more pronounced when the information environment is less transparent. Employing path analysis, we document that information friction, firm transparency, and stock market participation are mechanisms that mediate this relationship. Our study contributes to and extends the literature by providing strong evidence that citizens’ financial literacy has an important and consistent influence on IPO underpricing.

Using a standardized methodology, we empirically evaluate 55 proposed determinants of capital structure in terms of statistical significance, economic significance, and identification. We find that robust and economically important determinants of debt ratios are relatively few in number. Nevertheless, because each determinant relates to one of five market imperfections—taxes, distress costs, information asymmetry, agency costs, or supply frictions—we draw conclusions from the evidence as a whole regarding the explanatory power of different capital structure theories. We find greater support for pecking order theory and supply-related theories, with less support for traditional tradeoff theory and agency theory.

We find that mortgage loans originated after the adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD; a mechanism discouraging loan officers’ labor mobility) have a lower default probability, a higher loan modification rate, and a lower foreclosure rate. These effects are unaccompanied by any reduction in loan supply and contribute to more stable housing prices. Using the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as an alternative identification generates consistent results. Overall, our findings suggest that restricting loan officers’ labor mobility leads to better ex ante screening and ex post monitoring, improving the origination efficiency for U.S. residential mortgage loans.

In this paper, a simple model of individual financial decision making is used (1) to construct the market demand curve for common stock, and (2) to question the appropriateness of market value maximization as the objective of corporate financial management.

Motivated by the effect on valuation of stopped or reduced debt coupon payments from a company in financial distress, we value a level-dependent annuity contract where the annuity rate depends on the value of an underlying asset process. The range of possible values of this asset is divided into a finite number of regions, with constant annuity rates within each region. We present closed-form formulas for the market value of level-dependent annuities contracts when the market value of the underlying asset is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion. Such annuities occur naturally in models of debt with credit risk in financial economics. Our results are applied for valuing both corporate debt with suspended interest payments under the U.S. Chapter 11 provisions and loans with contractual level-dependent interest rates.

We examine the role of peer (e.g., Lipper manager indices) versus pure (e.g., S&P 500) benchmarks in fund manager compensation. We model their impact on manager incentives and then test those predictions using novel data. We find that 71% of managers are compensated based on peer benchmarks. Consistent with the model, peer-benchmarked fund managers exhibit higher effort generating higher gross performance and collect higher fee income. Analyzing advisors’ choice between benchmark types, we show that peer-benchmarking advisors cater to more sophisticated and performance-sensitive investors, and are more likely to sell through direct channels, consistent with investor heterogeneity and market segmentation.