In recent financial literature a large volume of the articles dealt with asset leasing. This author and his colleagues [6] and others [7] developed the conditions under which asset leasing cannot increase the overall firm's value over normal debt leverage. Many others [2, 3, 11] analyzed the “lease-buy” decision using a variety of models and assumptions. None, however, considered the effect of asset leasing on the firm's capitalization rate. While asset leasing per se would not affect the firm's unlevered cost of capital, it should affect its estimation. This paper developed the adjustment factor to obtain the firm's corresponding unlevered cost of capital with leasing leverage. Basically, Modigliani and Miller's methodology [9] was adjusted for the different tax situation with asset leasing. The effective benefit of leasing on the firm's average cost of funds was shown to be not nearly as effective as an equivalent amount of ordinary debt.

In 1952, Harry M. Markowitz [6] described a theory on the selection of assets in forming a portfolio. Assuming asset returns are stochastic, his theory postulated that rational investors should select a portfolio from the set of all portfolios which offered minimum risk (measured by variance) for varying levels of expected return. This set was named the efficient set by Markowitz.

This paper presents a new explanation for the use of debt financing, particularly private debt, in addition to equity without relying on the existence of taxes or bankruptcy costs. The paper assumes that information about returns on investment projects is costly and subject to efficient specialization, so that managers of firms develop inside information not possessed by the market. Suppose the manager of a firm possesses such inside information about a new investment project and his objective is to act in the best interests of existing equity owners. If the information can be disclosed to the market without impairing the value of the project, he will do so. However, much information will be of a strategic nature where the value of the project depends upon confidentiality. Public financing of such projects without disclosing the information will mean that the excess value or surprise monopoly profits in the new project will be split between new and old owners.

In equilibrium, each new capital asset must be priced properly relative to other assets. If an investor can also buy and sell assets in his portfolio costlessly and quickly, then the new asset will be accepted immediately and fully into the market and it will immediately behave as though it were a seasoned or previously available asset. However, it is often argued that recently issued bonds and seasoned or fully distributed bonds behave differently due to the frictions and risks associated with distributing a new security in the market. And it is also argued that recently issued bonds undergo a behavioral transformation as they become seasoned bonds. According to this argument there are significant empirical behavioral differences between recently issued bonds and seasoned bonds [4,5,7,9,13]. These differences disappear as the market gradually absorbs the new bond issue and the bond becomes “seasoned.”

The valuation of the firm in the context of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe [22] and Lintner [18] brings into a new focus the product ion-investment decisions of the firm faced with demand and cost uncertainty. The market value of the firm and the level of systematic risk which arise from its product ion-investment decisions become items of primary importance. Although there are earlier treatments of the real determinants of valuation and risk in a dynamic context (e.g., Thomadakis [24] and Myers and Turnbull [20]), the case of a firm which experiments for the acquisition of information can furnish new insights.

In recent years, there has been considerable interest in the random walk theory of stock price behavior. This theory, as applied to the stock market, implies that past stock-price movements cannot be used to predict future market prices in such a way as to “profit” from the predictions. By not “profiting,” we mean that a trader using the past history of stock prices cannot apply mechanical decision rules that result in a consistently better performance than a simple buy and hold strategy. If stock price movements were to become systematic so that a “profit” were possible, proponents of the random walk theory argue that a sufficient number of market participants would quickly recognize the recurring pattern and exploit it. In exploiting it, they would drive out the opportunity for “profit,” causing the price series to approximate a random walk.

The Sharpe or diagonal portfolio model has been accepted by a large segment of both academic and practical researchers in portfolio theory. The model is tractable, requires a relatively small set of inputs, and is viewed by many to present “reasonable” assumptions regarding the workings of the security market.

This article studies how the rise of financial technology (Fintech) lending affects credit access, interest rates, and social welfare. We consider a lending competition model with two incumbent banks and a Fintech lender, which use different information and technologies to assess borrower creditworthiness. We show that Fintech lending could negatively affect high-quality borrowers’ access to credit when the Fintech lender’s screening accuracy is superior to that of the banks. Furthermore, Fintech lending may worsen the allocative efficiency of credit and reduce social welfare under some conditions. Analytical and numerical results suggest that Fintech lending mostly reduces the expected interest rates.

We examine the costs of trading restrictions by exploiting an SEC rule change eliminating an approximately 80-day restriction period in private placements for small issuers. Using a difference-in-differences specification, we find that the restriction is binding, as dollar volume increases 19 percentage points vis-à-vis proceeds, and costly, as offering discounts fall by 8 percentage points. Discounts fall more for issuers with higher information asymmetry or longer restriction periods. We account for endogenous responses to the rule change. Overall, our findings suggest that trading restrictions are costly and have large effects on firms’ cost of capital.

We relate Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction to asset pricing, thereby offering a novel explanation of size and value premia. We argue that small-value firms must offer higher expected returns to compensate for the risk posed by serendipitous invention activity, whereas large-growth stocks provide protection against creative destruction and receive expected return discounts. A 2-factor model that accounts for creative-destruction risk effectively explains the cross-sectional return variation of size- and book-to-market-sorted portfolios. The estimated risk compensations associated with creative destruction are substantial and statistically significant, indicating their relevance for asset pricing.

Private information imposes a severe trading disadvantage on uninformed traders while at the same time providing firms with valuable signals for investment adjustment. The two forces have opposite impacts on the cost of capital, and the net effect depends on which force dominates. We show that stocks of firms with low flexibility in investment adjustment (“value firms”) command an information premium, whereas stocks of firms with high flexibility in investment adjustment (“growth firms”) deliver an information discount. These results are consistent with the findings that growth firms exhibit stronger investment sensitivity to information in stock prices than value firms.

Despite their claimed advantages, toehold strategies have rarely been adopted in recent corporate takeovers and do not seem to increase acquirer returns. Are toeholds ineffective and becoming obsolete? We show that this is not the case. We find that toeholds are preferred for executing difficult takeovers. After controlling for such endogeneity in toehold-based acquisitions, toeholds do increase returns to acquirers. Moreover, the performance of toehold strategies improves over time due to more selective and more effective acquisition of toeholds. We find that this time trend is in part explained by learning from past toehold acquisitions.

We provide the first examination of hedge fund boards and their directors. The majority of directorships are held by extremely busy independent directors. These directors are sought by funds because they have more reputational capital at stake, making them independent and credible monitors whose presence can certify fund quality to investors. Busy independent directors are more likely to be hired by high-quality funds, and their departure from the board is associated with investor withdrawals. Moreover, funds with busy independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, abuse discretionary liquidity restrictions, or engage in performance-based risk shifting.

The bank financial management process involves assets, liabilities, and factors external to the bank and thus is multivariate. Because variables such as deposits, loans, or interest rates are often related with a time lag to another variable such as investments, the process is also dynamic. Although the research work of Aigner [1], Aigner and Bryan [2], Anderson and Burger [3], Bryan [6], Bryan and Carleton [7], Fraser and Rose [10], Hester and Pierce [13], and Melnik [14] has dealt with the multivariate aspect of the process, the consideration of dynamic properties in empirical work has been limited.

In their recent paper Porter, Wart, and Ferguson (PWF) [6] discuss the factors which they allege to be responsible for “the time-consuming nature of empirical tests of” stochastic dominance (SD) efficiency relative to Markowitz (EV) efficiency. Based upon their analysis, a number of algorithms for improving computational efficiency are offered. The “tricks” upon which applications would be based are of no concern here. Our concern is with the logical inconsistency of any attempt to compare and contrast SD and EV efficiency criteria on empirical grounds.

The mean-variance portfolio model of Markowitz and Tobin has been the most substantive contribution to the theory of individual asset demand under uncertainty, in terms of comparative static results and testable implications. Although subject to a number of criticisms at the axiomatic level, it still stands as the classic portfolio model. The general equilibrium extension of the Tobin-Markowitz model due to Sharpe [14], Lintner [9], and Mossin [11] has led to important propositions about the nature of risk in general equilibrium and its effect on the pricing of assets, and the model has subsequently been subjected to extensive empirical testing. It has been used for a variety of purposes in areas ranging from corporate-finance theory to the debate on the social discount rate.

Consider an economy consisting of individuals and firms with the following characteristics: all individuals are rational in the von Neumann- Morgenstern sense and non-neutral toward risk; the dividend streams of some firms are certain, while the dividend streams of the other firms are uncertain; and the economy is equipped with perfect financial markets. In this economy, as we show in the present paper, the value of each firm with a certain dividend stream depends only on the dividend stream itself and the set of future interest rates—i.e., the market value of such firms is independent of the attitudes toward risk and the level of wealth of any individual. However, the value of each firm with an uncertain dividend is, with one exception, not independent of anything: it depends not only on the firm's own dividend stream, the set of future interest rates, and (all) individuals' risk attitudes, but also on the wealth levels of these individuals and on the dividend streams of all other firms with uncertain dividends even when these streams are stochastically independent. The exception occurs when the individuals have exponential utility functions of money. In this case, the market value of each firm with uncertain dividends is independent of other dividend streams and of individual wealth levels if these variables are statistically independent of the firm's dividends. Exponential utility functions of money, of course, are not considered empirically plausible.

The purpose of this paper is to estimate empirically the effect of the deferred call provisions on corporate bond yields using the conceptual framework of callable and call-free yields developed by Jen and Wert [3]. After reviewing briefly the above-mentioned study in Section I, Section II presents patterns of callable and call-free yields of deferred issues from January 1956 to June 1961 by grades, months of offering, and coupon rates and contrasts them with those of the freely callable issues. Section III further contrasts yields of deferred issues with those of freely-callable ones on a pair comparison basis, while Section IV discusses the implication of the study for both the issuers and the investors.

A market can be imperfectly competitive for a variety of reasons; in the context of an auction or a contract awarding, imperfections may stem from the limited number of bidders involved. Bidders, recognizing that their behavior (or that of others) can affect the market outcome, may adopt strategies that are unlikely to lead to a Pareto efficient allocation. Such inefficiencies can occur in the absence of any collusive behavior on the part of bidders. If barriers to bid entry are removed, and bidders are sufficiently homogeneous, the likelihood increases that bids will reflect full (private) valuations of the auctioned goods. Under these conditions Pareto efficient allocations would be guided by a set of minimum prices: a “sale to the highest bidder” would be transacted at a price approximate to the valuation of the second highest bidder, and contracts would be awarded at the competitive supply price. Even when the number of bidders is restricted, auction procedures can be adopted which will insure efficiency to a degree. This efficiency is achieved by changing the motivations of the available bidders, and by providing incentives for bidders to reveal their full valuations of the objects being auctioned. This paper describes a set of auction procedures which achieve these ends.

The debt overhang problem is shown to arise in the context of an entrepreneurial project that requires a sequence of investments financed by an outside lender. The entrepreneur, not internalizing losses accruing to the lender which financed the initial investments, may inefficiently cancel the project and instead pursue an outside opportunity. It is shown that loan commitments (contracts that allow the entrepreneur to borrow a variable amount at a set interest rate in return for a fixed fee) are the optimal financial contracts in this setting, strictly dominating standard debt. The existence of the fixed fee allows loan commitments to set a relatively low interest rate, improving the entrepreneur's incentives to continue the project. The paper specifies the optimal contract fully, derives robust comparative statics properties (using an extension of Milgrom and Roberts (1994)), and extends the results to more realistic settings (e.g., allowing the market risk-free rate to be stochastic).