Using a sample of over 9,000 buyback announcements from 31 non-U.S. countries, we find support for the results of studies based on U.S. data: On average, share repurchases are associated with significant positive short- and long-term excess returns. However, excess returns depend on the likelihood of undervaluation and the efficiency and liquidity of equity markets. In contrast to findings in U.S. markets, we do not find that these long-term excess returns are simply a compensation for takeover risk or have become less significant in recent years.

An increase in “unusual” news with negative sentiment predicts an increase in stock market volatility. Unusual positive news forecasts lower volatility. Our analysis is based on over 360,000 articles on 50 large financial companies, published during the period of 1996–2014. Unusualness interacted with sentiment forecasts company-specific and aggregate volatility several months ahead. Furthermore, unusual news is reflected more slowly in aggregate volatility than company-specific volatility. News measures from articles explicitly about the “market,” which are more easily accessible to investors, do not forecast volatility. The observed responses of volatility to news may be explained by attention constraints on investors.

We estimate conditional multifactor models over a large cross section of stock returns matching 25 CAPM anomalies. Using conditioning information associated with different instruments improves the performance of the Hou, Xue, and Zhang (HXZ) (2015) and Fama and French (FF) (2015), (2016) models. The largest increase in performance holds for momentum, investment, and intangibles-based anomalies. Yet, there are significant differences in the performance of scaled models: HXZ clearly dominates FF in explaining momentum and profitability anomalies, while the converse holds for value–growth anomalies. Thus, the asset pricing implications of alternative investment and profitability factors (in a conditional setting) differ in a nontrivial way.

We show that chief executive officers (CEOs) exhibit a hometown bias in acquisitions. Firms are over twice as likely to acquire targets located in the states of their CEOs’ childhood homes than similar targets domiciled elsewhere. Small, private home-state deals underperform other small, private deals, and the bias is stronger when acquirer governance is lax, suggesting that CEOs acquire private home-state targets for their own benefits. In contrast, large, public home-state acquisitions are value enhancing. CEOs create value in public home-state acquisitions by avoiding extremely poor deals and through deals with higher synergies. Thus, both agency issues and hometown advantages drive home-state acquisitions.

We propose a consistent and computationally efficient 2-step methodology for the estimation of multidimensional non-Gaussian asset models built using Lévy processes. The proposed framework allows for dependence between assets and different tail behaviors and jump structures for each asset. Our procedure can be applied to portfolios with a large number of assets because it is immune to estimation dimensionality problems. Simulations show good finite sample properties and significant efficiency gains. This method is especially relevant for risk management purposes such as, for example, the computation of portfolio Value at Risk and intra-horizon Value at Risk, as we show in detail in an empirical illustration.

We find that the controlling family holds both the chief executive officer and chair positions in 79% of Norwegian family firms. The family holds more governance positions when it owns large stakes in small, profitable, low-risk firms. This result suggests that the family trades off expected costs and benefits by conditioning participation intensity on observable firm characteristics. We find that the positive effect of performance on participation is twice as strong as the positive effect of participation on performance. The endogeneity of participation, therefore, should be carefully accounted for when analyzing the effect of family governance on the family firm’s behavior.

This article investigates the gap-filling explanation for corporate debt maturity choices in a multi-country setting. We argue that companies adjust their debt maturity in response to shocks in government debt maturity both at home and abroad; the difference between the two effects depends on the markets’ relative size and level of integration. Focusing on the European case and treating the Economic and Monetary Union as a shock in market integration, we find strong empirical support for our predictions. Our results have relevant implications for the opportunity for individual governments to use their debt maturity structure as a policy tool.

This article investigates the impact of political uncertainty on contractual lending terms using a large sample of syndicated loans and a within-firm estimation approach to achieve identification. Firms pay 7 basis points (bps) more on loans originated when their lenders are undergoing an election relative to when their lenders are not undergoing an election. Lenders from less financially developed countries are more likely to pass political uncertainty costs to borrowers. Consistent with electoral uncertainty driving this premium, the most contested elections have the largest impact (17 bps). Overall, political uncertainty leads to a tangible increase in firms’ financing costs.

This study examines the consequences of conflicts between creditors. Using the setting of debt covenant violations, I employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of banks’ interventions on their borrowers’ trade credit. The results show that trade credit experiences a substantial decline when banks intervene in the borrowing firm following covenant violations. The decline is mitigated by the presence of dependent suppliers and exacerbated by banks’ incentives to exercise control rights. Such externalities are reflected in the loan-contract design. Borrowing firms sign less restrictive loan contracts when they rely more on trade credit or trade creditors.

We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment in the spirit of Merton (1971), in which subjects dynamically choose their portfolio allocation between a risk-free and risky asset. Using the optimal allocation of an investor with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility, we fit the experimental choices to characterize the risk profile of our participants. Despite substantial heterogeneity, decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative risk aversion are the predominant types. We also find some evidence of increased risk taking after a gain. Finally, the session level risk attitudes show a different profile than the individual descriptions of risk attitudes.

This study exploits a new long-run data set of daily bid and offered exchange rates in spot and forward markets from 1919 to the present to analyze carry returns in fixed and floating currency regimes. We first find that outsized carry returns occur exclusively in the floating regime, being zero in the fixed regime. Second, we show that fixed-to-floating regime shifts are associated with negative returns to a carry strategy implemented only on floating currencies, robust to the inclusion of volatility risks. These shifts are typically characterized by global flight-to-safety events that represent bad times for carry traders.

We study whether it is better to enforce the zero lower bound (ZLB) in models of U.S. Treasury yields using a shadow rate model or a quadratic term structure model. We show that the models achieve a similar in-sample fit and perform comparably in matching conditional expectations of future yields. However, when the recent ZLB period is included in the sample, the models’ ability to match conditional expectations away from the ZLB deteriorates because the time-series dynamics of the pricing factors change. In addition, neither model provides a reasonable description of conditional volatilities when yields are away from the ZLB.