It has often been claimed that money was to be found in much of the African continent before the impact of the European world and the extension of trade made coinage general. When we examine these claims, however, they tend to evaporate or to emerge as tricks of definition. It is an astounding fact that economists have, for decades, been assigning three or four qualities to money when they discuss it with reference to our own society or to those of the medieval and modern world, yet the moment they have gone to ancient history or to the societies and economies studied by anthropologists they have sought the “real” nature of money by allowing only one of these defining characteristics to dominate their definitions.

With the growing emphasis on structural change and Schumpeterian innovation in economic development, the paradoxical concept “creative destruction” has come into wide use among economists and economic historians. It is an appealing concept because it recalls the death and birth cycles of nature and various tribal myths of gods shuttling between ferocity and compassion. But the concept has been applied to economic situations rather casually. This paper suggests that “creative destruction” is not an apt description of the way dominant production methods succeeded one another in the United States from 1850 to 1914, even though the term is applled to this era more than to any other. Data are presented to show that apparently obsolete methods survived and grew in the face of novel competition. An explanation of the staying power of partially outdated production methods is attempted.

A side from some overworked generalizations regarding poor soil, shortage of capital, lack of arable land, population density and such, there are no studies in English that deal with the general economic history of Greece or with specific problems in her economic development since the establishment of the modern Greek state in the third decade of the last century. An analysis of the influence of the legal system on this development, therefore, may throw light on Greek economic history in general and open a useful discussion. It may also add something to our knowledge of the larger problem of the relation of socialcultural institutions and economic activity.

In preparing a review article of writings on colonial economic history since 1945, one would have little to say if he had to confine himself to studies mentioning economic history in their titles. Textbooks, whether old stand-bys recently revised1 or newly written, devote comparatively few of their pages to the period before 1790, and the colonial volume in the Rinehart Economic History series has not yet appeared.

It is nearly a quarter century since H. L. Beales produced his notable article on “The Great Depression.” Since then a great deal of work has been done on that period, especially by economists and statisticians, so that it is now possible to make a fuller assessment of the changes in Britain's economic position during those years. Most of this work has been in the form of specialized articles and books covering longer periods, on such subjects as national income, investment, or terms of trade, and there appears to be a need for some attempt at synthesis, especially as the various interpretations put forward are not always in agreement and are sometimes contradictory. It would be impossible, of course, in a mere article, to settle all the theoretical problems suggested by the facts or to resolve all the divergencies of opinion, but it is worth while to draw the evidence and opinions together in an effort to get a general picture.

Assessing the role of government in economic development in situations where public and private sectors coexist is extremely difficult. The nature of modern government is so complex and its activities are so broad, that a clear statement of “influence” or “impact” on a national economy becomes almost impossible. Interpretations of Japanese economic history illustrate these problems vividly. Few scholars have dealt with the issue explicitly, and those that have seem unable to reach clear conclusions.

The district of Malabar on the Southwest coast of India has been a major exporter of a wide variety of agricultural products to Europe for more than two thousand years. Despite the two millenia of sustained contact between agricultural producers and merchants, however, social relationships in land are, even today, of a predominantly feudal character; cultivation techniques are generally primitive, and the rural portion of the district, notwithstanding the great commercial importance of its produce, appears to be surprisingly impoverished. How could the social and economic organization of a people so long exposed to the influence of world market activity remain so little affected by the currents of economic change and development in the outside world? The purpose of this article is to explore, by the study of this extreme example, the reasons for the apparent failure of a pattern of sustained economic growth to become established in a rural area exposed to continuing commercial influences.

For the period between the adoption of the Constitution and the outbreak of the Civil War recent contributions have been considerable in amount and particularly notable for a high degree of concentration on the relationship between government and the economy. In 1945 a reader of the literature in the field would have found little to warn him against the assumption that the statesmen and legislators of the ante-bellum republic were faithful adherents, particularly in the economic field, of the Jeffersonian doctrine that that government is best which governs the least. Current scholarship, however, has forced a revision of this traditional view; and it is now clear that American governments intervened actively on a wide range of economic questions and in varied and complex interrelations with the activities of individuals and corporations. This significant correction has resulted in large part from two related shifts in the direction of research that have given increased attention to the economic role of state, and even local, authorities as contrasted with that of the national government, and to the promotive as contrasted with the regulatory functions of government.

When one reviews the literature that has appeared since 1945 relating to American economic history in the period from 1861 to 1900, the trends of scholarly interest and investigation are not entirely clear. The volume of output appears to have diminished and the incidence of interest to have shifted. Postwar publication seems more notable for the appearance, in diverse fields, of some distinguished monographs than for more general studies of the economy or its major components. It may be that the interest of scholars has shifted from this to other chronological periods, but it seems reasonably clear that research in the history of agriculture, public policies, financial institutions, and the relative status of major income groups has declined. There is evident, on the other hand, increased interest in the history of business enterprise, and this concern has been reflected in the appearance of numerous studies of entrepreneurship as well as of histories of individual corporations. It is perhaps significant that in this series of review articles the one exception to the chronological division of United States history is the article devoted to business history. This segregation operates to relieve me of the duty of reviewing the new literature in a field that was obviously of great significance in the last four decades of the nineteenth century. I should say, however, that it has seemed necessary to cite or discuss some few works of particular significance for my analysis.

The discussion of the social character of the English revolution is carried on at present largely in terms of the well-known controversy over the gentry. The debate which has been conducted has undoubtedly been welcomed by all historians as a valuable stimulus to think afresh and more deeply about the seventeenth century. But the preoccupation with the gentry, instructive as it has been, has also had its disadvantages, for it has served, I think, to obscure how much a general judgment on the social origin and development of the revolution depends on a knowledge of many other topics besides those to which R. H. Tawney, Lawrence Stone, and H. R. Trevor-Roper have drawn to our attention.

Perhaps the most important methodological problem in the writing of history is to discover why different historians, on the basis of the same or similar evidence, often have markedly different interpretations of a particular historical event. Why, for example, in a world in which there is almost unquestioned belief, even by Marxist historians, that industrialization is the grand remedy for the economic and social ills of poor and underdeveloped countries, do some historians, and especially the Marxists, still argue about the goods or ills bestowed on the worker by the first great experiment in industrialization, the industrial revolution in England? The expected economic dividend of modern industrialization is undoubtedly a higher standard of living, and the occasional opponents of such development base their opposition not on this indisputable material advance but on the “moral risk” involved in the transformation of life by industrialization.1The historians, however, while concerned also with this possible moral risk, are not all certain that the industrial revolution in England before 1850 did cause the average standard of living of the worker to rise. This uncertainty might be resolved by finding out what actually happened, but in the meantime interpretations differ, and have differed, on the basis of some evidence, of much confusion, and of differing value judgments. It is the specific aim of this article to give a history of the interpretations of the industrial revolution, and to explain them.

The economic differences between the Europeans on the eve of industrialization and the currently less developed peoples has assumed a certain degree of importance in the recent literature. It has been argued that West Europeans had significantly higher per capita incomes than do most of the peoples of the world today and that the levels of living of many people fell off during the process of early industrialization. Obviously, the argument is important in that the levels of living found in most of today's less developed peoples could not decline significantly widiout the risk of disaster.

“Let those who will consult the spirit rappers to bring forth its ghost.”

Such was Professor Shannon's firm caveat as he laid Frederick Jackson Turner's safety-valve doctrine to rest after a post mortem performed with some gusto. The warning seems to have had the effect intended. Although Turner's frontier concept continues to influence the work of American historians and not a few economists the labor-safety-valve doctrine seems generally to have been accepted as dead and buried. We have little taste for ghosts or spirit rapping, but we would like to argue that die safety-valve doctrine, even if suffering from neglect, retains more than a spark of vitality.

The author of the earliest general treatise on economics, writing in the middle of the eighteenth century, regarded the entrepreneur as a key factor in production. Later economists have in general had the same feeling, though they have not defined the word entrepreneur in precisely the same manner. By some the entrepreneur has been considered to be primarily a risk or uncertainty bearer, by others an innovator, by still others a superintendent or manager. The list could easily be expanded. The tendency for economists to emphasize now one and now another aspect of entrepreneurship derives, I believe, from several factors: the variations in the volume and nature of economic opportunities, the increasing size of the business unit, and the changes in the legal forms of business organization.

Once upon his discussiona time, oraroundso it seems, outstandingthe historiographerworks by leading could professors. Perhaps in some fields of scholarship the time still lingers, but not in recent American economic history. A quick glance at studies applying to the twentieth century that have appeared since World War II shows a large array of books that vary in merit but include few outstanding works. Furthermore, the majority of both the more or less important books have been written by people who, to the best of my knowledge, would not call themselves economic historians.

The gradual yet cumulative advance of West European capitalism was in large part epitomized by the developments of its textile trades. They were the first to carry the seeds of economic change into the stagnant preserves of guild conservatism, and subsequently they again proved to be the pioneers of the new factory system. In Germany the sequence of economic change was not quite as uniform. Each German textile district emerged as a specific case of economic growth with contours of industrial evolution that manifested unique deviations from the broad pattern of development. The heterogeneity of the German lands, particularly marked before the advent of the railways, was both cause and effect of this diversity.

Chester G. Starr's recent article in the Journal (March 1958), “An Overdose of Slavery,” does a fine job of showing that people other than slaves worked in antiquity, but it leaves hanging the crucial question regarding the place of slavery in the economy of the ancient world. Moreover, Starr enters a strong plea against comparing ancient and modern slavery. These two aspects of his paper I think merit some further comment.

The present state of economic history in Canada contrastswith that of a quarter century ago. It could be written sharplyin the 1930's that the most distinctive work in Canadian economics was being done by economic historians concerned with the study of transportation and tariffs, trade associations and agricultural organizations, money and banking. There was at the same time a close approach to a generally accepted framework of analysis and interpretation and more than a suggestion of synthesis in Canadian historical writings. This pre-eminence of economic history and this unity of theme are now things of the past. As to the first, the rate of progress in economic analysis and statistics, in sociology and political theory, has brought with it both a change in status and the prospect of extensive revisions, factual and interpretative, of our views of the past. Similarly, a former unity of approach resting on the economics of staple production has lost ground before the complexities of modern industrial change. For the economic historian these changes promise much for present and future research even if, at the moment, they bring small comfort.