We explore the effects of human capital on workers during the latter nineteenth century by examining the U.S. Navy. Naval officers belonged either to a regular or an engineer corps and had tasks assigned for their specialized training. We compile education and career data for officers from Naval Academy and navy registers for the years 1858 to 1907. Wage premia for “engineer-skilled” officers deteriorated over their careers; more traditionally skilled officers enjoyed higher gains in earnings and more frequent promotions. This compelled those with engineering skills to leave the service early, hindering the navy's capacity to further technologically develop.

Writing in 1845 Friedrich Engels (and with him many other informed contemporaries) had few hesitations in pointing out the driving forces of the epochal transformation he was witnessing:

The history of the proletariat in England begins with the second half of the last century, with the invention of the steam engine and the machinery for working cotton. These inventions gave rise, as is well known to an industrial revolution, a revolution which altered the whole civil society; one, the historical importance of which is only now beginning to be recognized.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century Spanish America had about 400,000 slaves, which made 3 percent of the population. Before this time the importance of slavery had been greater, having received a large stimulus because of the sharp demographic decline of the natives following the Conquest. The arrival of Africans meant that in 1650 the proportion of slaves to total population was from 5 to 10 percent.

Historical GDP estimates for China by Broadberry, Guan, and Li are problematic because of an implausible series for government expenditure. Revised estimates reduce GDP per capita, mainly during the Ming, by up to a third. Two peaks in income now stand out: the Song efflorescence and the years around 1700. If the latter peak is real, comparisons of the Yangzi delta with leading European countries show a Great Crossing in the Middle Ages, a Great Convergence in the seventeenth century, and a Great Divergence in the eighteenth. Otherwise, the Great Divergence may date from the sixteenth century.

As the key conveyance of nineteenth-century American industrialization and early experimentation with tariff policy, the antebellum textile sector has always received extensive attention by economic historians. In the past two decades, we have learned much about industrial financing, investment behavior, productivity growth, the nature of the production function, and the optimality of tariff policy, yet we remain ignorant still on some fundamental issues. One of these involves a better understanding of the equipment replacement decision under conditions of rapid growth, technological improvement, and variable tariff policies. But most importantly, the identification of sources of productivity improvement and their magnitude had remained inadequately understood until very recently with the appearance of Paul David's article in this Journal. David's important contribution applies aggregate production function analysis to textiles in an effort to isolate the determinants of labor productivity growth during the three decades preceding the Civil War. The model is neoclassical with a Cobb-Douglas specification, variable returns to scale, disembodied technical progress and with a learning variable explicitly introduced into the production function. David finds evidence of constant returns to scale, strong learning effects, high rates of disembodied technical progress, and improved labor quality, the latter sufficient to offset the alleged downward pressure on productivity attributable to a long-run decline in input (especially labor) utilization rates.

The Old Poor Law has recently found a forceful defender in Mark Blaug, who in two articles has challenged the critics of England's first public welfare system and displayed the clay feet of that towering structure of words, the evidence for the 1834 Report. This is a notable achievement, but Mr. Blaug's case should not be accepted in toto: indeed, that it has survived so long without criticism is surprising. G. R. Elton felicitously referred to one of his critics as a “self-appointed hound of heaven,” but scholars who propound provocative theses are likely to provoke responses. Mr. Blaug's interpretation of the Old Poor Law is, to at least one “selfappointed hound,” eminently provocative.

This article investigates the impact of “learning-by-producing” on inventive activity. From 1870 to 1910, in both emerging (electrical equipment and supplies) and maturing (shoes and textiles) industries, the geographic association between invention and production was rather weak. Regional shifts in production did not lead to corresponding increases in invention. The location of inventive activity tended to mirror that of individuals with advanced technical skills appropriate to each industry. Consequently, scholars may have overemphasized the importance of learning-by-producing in accounting for geographic differences in inventive activity, and underestimated the significance of technical skills amongst the population.

I can best summarize the content of this paper by exhibiting four quotations:

A trading community like early Victorian England, which can still profitably employ all its capital in its mills and ships, becomes indifferent to the acquisition of territory, and even tends to regard the colonies previously acquired as a useless encumbrance. That was the normal state of mind of our commercial classes during the middle years of last century. They dealt in goods, and in order to sell goods abroad, it was not necessary either to colonise or to conquer. To this phase belongs the typical foreign policy of Liberalism, with its watchwords of peace, non-intervention, and free trade. The third phase, the modern phase, begins when capital has accumulated in large fortunes, when the rate of interest at home begins to fall, and the discovery is made that investments abroad in unsettled countries with populations more easily exploited than our own, offer swifter and bigger returns. It is the epoch of concession hunting, of coolie labour, of chartered companies, of railway construction, of loans to semi-civilised Powers, of the “opening up” of “dying empires.” At this phase the export of capital has become to the ruling class more important and more attractive than the export of goods. The Manchester School disappears, and even the Liberals accept Imperialism. It is, however, no longer the simple and barbaric Imperialism of the agricultural stage. Its prime motive is not to acquire land, though in the end it often lapses into this elementary form of conquest. It aims rather at pegging out spheres of influence and at that sort of stealthy conquest which is called “pacific penetration.” The old Imperialism levied tribute; the new Imperialism lends money at interest.

Andrew J. Seltzer raises an interesting question: How large was the net effect of southern political institutions on congressional support for the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)? Although Seltzer claims to use my econometric results to show that those institutions had little effect, his interpretation of my results depends entirely on two assumptions that I did not make and that he does not justify. The first assumption is that two variables—the Turnout-Manufacturing Correlation and Turnout—somehow “defined the southern political system.” The second is that southern political institutions caused higher values of Turnout-Manufacturing Correlation. Seltzer's assumptions are theoretically baseless and empirically indefensible, and they lead him to the wrong conclusion. I will explain why.

There has been some dispute about the impact of New Deal policies on the business climate. Some historians have argued that the New Deal frightened business, and others that it encouraged business. This paper analyzes the impact of the New Deal on business investment by looking at the response of investment to the outcome of the 1934, 1936, and 1938 elections, as well as the passage of certain New Deal legislation. The data reject the hypothesis that the New Deal frightened off business investment.

Perhaps because the world had never before or since seen such a large proportion of national income devoted to accumulating overseas assets, the processes of British accumulation in the period from 1870 to 1913 have long been given disproportionate attention in the study of modern British economic history. Calculations based on C. H. Feinstein's latest studies of U.K. income, expenditures and product suggest that roughly half of the nation's annual savings took the form of net foreign lending during these years, savings averaging slightly less than ten percent of net national income. Undoubtedly, interest in these matters has been further augmented by the intriguing problem of the United Kingdom's loss of world leadership in both industrial output and per capita income during these same years.

Based on findings in Massachusetts probate records, 1650–1753, this paper argues that the average value of consumer goods among farmers and other rural inhabitants in that colony did not decline over the course of the colonial period but fluctuated around an average value little different from that for an equivalent segment of the population at risk in Maryland at the turn of the eighteenth century. Similar findings by Jackson Turner Main for.colonial Connecticut extend this absence of trend to a wider area of New England and to the years immediately preceding the American Revolution.

The South's failure to industrialize more rapidly in the antebellum period did not lead to its immiserization. The South's terms of trade improved over the antebellum period so that its consumption potential expanded more rapidly than did production. Specialization in cotton production promoted a favorable movement of relative prices facing Southern producers. A customs union analysis shows that the South might have industrialized to a greater extent and might have raised its consumption potential further had it been able to impose an independent tariff on imports from all areas, including the rest of the United States.

The development of rationality in economic life, according to Werner Sombart and Max Weber, is one of the most important aspects of modern economic history. Gradually, religious and ethical considerations lose dieir influence in commercial behavior; finally, in the nineteenth century, economic judgment proceeds on the basis of its own logic. Business is liberated from noneconomic sanctions.

There is widespread agreement among historians of the colonial period, as there was among contemporary observers, that a significant deficit existed in the American colonies' balance of trade with Great Britain. That a large deficit did exist in the late colonial period is shown by estimates of commodity trade given in Table 1 for the period 1768 through 1772 (for which period statistics of all legal overseas trade exist in the “American Inspector-General's Ledgers”). It is clear from Table 1 that the overall deficit in the commodity trade with the British Isles was due mainly to the deficits incurred by New England and the middle colonies. Similarly, it appears that on the average for this five-year period, the southern colonies, as well, incurred a deficit—although a small one—in their commodity trade with Great Britain.

Comparing investment in transportation companies in Albemarle county, Virginia, and Cumberland county, Pennsylvania, I analyze why nineteenth-century internal improvements revolutionized the northern economy, but only seemed to increase the South's dependence upon plantation agriculture. In both counties local investors and financed early improvements.

Local governments played a notable and somewhat neglected part in the American movement for internal improvements. Their activities in aid of canals and railroads varied greatly in scale and method and in the scope of planning involved. They ran the gamut from the far-flung projects of great commercial cities striving for the dominance of the trade of vast areas to the donations of obscure rural townships trying only to make sure that the promised railroad should pass through their village rather than the adjacent crossroads. Among the greater cities, none played a more notable role than Baltimore in the promotion of internal improvements. Its total of railroad subscriptions, loans, and bond endorsements was about twenty million dollars—a figure of municipal contribution only exceeded by Cincinnati's investment in a city-owned railroad. Baltimore was in the field of internal improvements well before Cincinnati and remained in it long after such early rivals as Philadelphia had withdrawn. Baltimore's first investment in the Baltimore and Ohio was audaorized in 1827, and its last loan to the Western Maryland was made in 1886. It continued to vote stock and to appoint public directors to the board of railroad corporations until it sold its interest in the Baltimore and Ohio in 1890 and in the Western Maryland in 1902.

This article explores the determinants of wealth for seventeenth-century Englishmen living in three very different environments—Worcestershire, East London, and Tidewater, Virginia. Wealth differences among these regions can be described in terms of the particular mix of occupational status groups, age groups, and literates each possessed. When all of these variables are accounted for, region becomes an insignificant determinant of wealth. Occupational status, predictably, had the primary influence on wealth, but the system, through provisions for age and education, also made definite allowances for the ability to use and consume resources efficiently.

An analysis of over 10,000 loans made by a major credit source in Keene, New Hampshire, from 1832 to 1897 is presented. The data sources are unique and include information on property ownership and wealth, occupation, involvement in businesses, age, and connections with the credit source. As time passed more funds were lent to borrowers out of the city and county, lending was used to support many new industrial and other enterprises, as well as for infrastructural and social capital investments. Many loans were made to individuals and businesses with close ties to the source of credit.