Divergence, rather than convergence, has been the name of the game in worldwide “modern economic growth,” at least up to the 1980s. This empirical observation no longer puzzles economists, as it did thirty years ago. In the last two decades, we have taken a more sophisticated approach to the issue of the long-run relative performance of pioneers and latecomers, of core and periphery, of rich and poor countries. If we are currently able to talk of “conditional convergence,” “convergence clubs,” and the like, this is the result of a tremendous cross-fertilization between the so-called “new growth theory,” the pioneering work of Moses Abramovitz and a few others, and new approaches in global economic history. Amongst the latter, the monumental research program of Jeffrey Williamson stands in a class of its own. Thanks to his intellectual inputs and coordination efforts we have rediscovered the so-called “first globalization” and the backlash against it, and are thus better equipped to understand the causes and effects of the current globalization wave, and thus produce plausible scenarios for its future course.

In this impressive study of American immigration Nancy Foner presents an “interpretive synthesis” that “brings together strands from the mass of literature on past and present immigration” (p. 4). She argues that the historical and contemporary literatures have developed separately and that there is virtue in bringing them together. Here the historical period covers 1880 to 1920, and the contemporary period begins in the mid-1960s. Of necessity, Foner selects a narrow and manageable range of topics to review. Geographically, Foner limits her coverage to New York City, the “quintessential immigrant city.” In terms of immigrant groups, for the earlier period Foner considers only the experiences of Italians and of Russian Jews, who dominated that immigration; for the later period, in which no two national groups are so dominant, she emphasizes the experiences of West Indians, Asian Indians, Chinese, and Korean immigrants. The chapters consider who the immigrants were, where they lived, the work they did (with a separate chapter on immigrant women and their work), the dynamics of race and prejudice, the maintenance of transnational ties, and the role of schooling.

To the vast and burgeoning literature on the rise, fall, and consequences of European empire-building, David Loades, a distinguished historian of Tudor England, adds this brief and stimulating book on the origins and course of the country's overseas expansion in the two centuries after 1490. He is not concerned with models or with the analysis of global balances of power. Taking a more modest perspective, he argues that between 1490 and 1690 England changed from being the decayed remnant of a once-formidable expansionist power on the Continent to a nascent oceanic and imperial state. By the mid-1500s, he claims, the foundations of the country's subsequent maritime and colonial achievements were already in place. He identifies the vital elements as the creation of a standing specialist fighting navy; the development, from the mid-sixteenth century, of an interest in long-distance voyages and trading ventures, sustained under Elizabeth I by an “enterprise partnership” between the queen and some of her subjects; and the emergence, in the years of the Commonwealth and the Cromwellian Republic, of the navy as an instrument of state rather than dynastic ambition. However, as the argument unfolds he admits the importance of other factors, not least the pursuit of profit and the desire of some of England's populace to escape from religious or political regimes they found intolerable.

In the December 1968 issue of this Journal, Professors Officer and Smith question the “classical and generally accepted view of Reciprocity.” A careful reading of earlier writing on this subject casts doubt upon the novelty of their conclusions. D. C. Masters, one of their authorities, was aware of the limited effects of the Treaty. In Reciprocity, 1846-1911, he writes, “To a considerable extent the prosperity of the period, including the increase in American-colonial trade, was the result of factors other than the treaty itself.” My note raises questions about the authors' use of customs union theory (Part I) and their interpretation of the data (Part II).

The central theme of this book is the interplay of women's employment and the macro-economy in postwar Germany and Japan. David Kucera introduces the distinction between two possible types of flexibility in the labor market. The first occurs in the absence of interference with the market mechanism from laws or institutions. This flexibility may reduce unemployment and increase the response time to shocks, at the cost of low wages and insufficient training. In the second type of flexibility, a buffer group provides this flexibility, while core workers are protected from the vagaries of the market and receive training and high wages. Kucera argues that by using women as a buffer group to protect men, Japan is able at a macro-level to reap the benefits of both the “low-road” and “high-road” approaches. Bolstering this argument, and showing that Germany pursues instead the simpler “high-road” strategy, is the most important aim of the book.

The title of this book is an outline of De Landa's agenda. He wants to convey his philosophical approach to history using examples chosen from the last 1,000 years of human history. “Nonlinear” refers to feedbacks and interactions that prevent movement toward a unique equilibrium. The author interprets history through a series of extended metaphors that link biology, geology, and linguistics to human history. The book is divided into sections corresponding to these classifications. The first, “Lavas and Magmas,” makes connections between history and geology; the second, “Flesh and Genes,” connects history and biology; and the third, “Memes and Norms,” connects history with linguistics. Within each section De Landa illustrates his approach with examples from the (approximately) last “thousand years of nonlinear history.”

What was the relationship between institutionalized poverty and protoindustrial activity in Bunzlau County of Bohemia at the end of the 1820s? The agriculturally weaker estates developed protoindustries and were therefore the first to institutionalize the care of the poor. Yet protoindustrial development decreased the vulnerability of those at the low end of the income distribution, although industrial activity attracted immigrants from agricultural estates. The immigrants competed for resources with the economically weak, thereby increasing the need for poor relief. On balance, however, protoindustrial activity ameliorated the lot of the destitute peasantry living in this mountainous region of northern Bohemia.

That the later Roman empire was a period of stagnation, not to say X of decline and total collapse, in the economic as in other spheres has long been recognized. But it has been the contribution of such modern scholars as Frank, Rostovtzeff, and Heichelheim to show that the symptoms and causes of this stagnation are not to be sought solely in the anarchy of the third century A.D. They may be detected earlier, behind the facade of peace and prosperity in the second century, and have roots which reach back into the very beginnings of the Roman domination over the Mediterranean world. In order to avoid too great extension in time, as well as in space, the present discussion will be limited to the symptoms and causes of economic stagnation that may be detected throughout the Mediterranean world during the early Roman empire, the two hundred and fifty odd years that elapsed from the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C., which left Augustus master of the Mediterranean world, to the assassination of Severus Alexander in 235 A.D., which ushered in a half century of anarchy and eventually the totalitarian state of Diocletian and Constantine.