In a well-crafted recent article in this JOURNAL, Robert Fleck argues that voting on the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the last and among the most contentious pieces of major New Deal legislation, was heavily influenced by regional political differences and by the “southern political system.” This contention is broadly supportive of a view held by several traditional historians, who have argued that political differences between the North and South were a major factor in voting. According to this view, the considerable support for minimum wages among southern workers, African American leaders, and the general public did not translate into congressional votes for the FLSA due to southern political institutions that effectively disfranchised many of the voters who were predisposed to support the FLSA. In a previous article I argued that, although southern representatives were more likely to vote against the FLSA, this was primarily because of economic differences between the two regions, not political factors. I argued that the opposition to the FLSA was spearheaded by low-wage employers, who were disproportionately concentrated in the South. This note examines the reasons for these conflicting results. It is argued that Fleck's approach to prediction, which evaluates the marginal impact of his independent variables individually, but does not jointly consider the variables that defined the southern political system, is misleading, and a more appropriate approach using his own regression results supports my contention that political differences between North and South were inconsequential to the overall roll-call vote on the FLSA. It is shown that, holding economic factors constant, had the South been politically like the North, the estimated roll-call vote on the FLSA would have been very similar to the actual votes in 1937 and 1938.

The influence that short-time economic fluctuations in western Europe presumably had on the development of the Swedish timber trade during the latter half of the nineteenth century must, to an American audience, seem to be a rather specialized subject, and I think a few introductory words giving a background might be useful.

Recent problems in the performance of the American steel industry have prompted a number of calls for an “industrial policy” for this sector. Before any such programs of public intervention can be considered, however, it would behoove public policymakers to examine why the industry fell into its present state of decline. This paper, an abstract of a longer study, analyzes the relations of business and government in American steel from 1945 to 1960, and concludes that public policies had as much to do with subsequent industry decline as did other factors previously delineated by scholars.

I present estimates here of the geographic persistence of estate owners and managers in Barbados during 1673–1723. The estimates are based on evidence generated by the functioning of an economic market; the evidence was produced by tracing the names of purchasers over time through the invoice accounts of slave sales held by the Royal African Company on the island.Estimated rates of out-migration from Barbados were low during the 1670s, comparable in magnitude to those found in colonial New England towns, but the rates rose considerably during the following decades. The initially low rates of out-migration might have been the result of the great profitability of sugar planting in early Barbados, while the subsequent increase might have been due to the development of methods of plantation management that allowed estate owners to earn profits as absentees.

The application of the notion of learning by doing to account for the measured input efficiency growth of an aggregation of production units admittedly creates worrisome ambiguities about exactly what was being “learned,” how, and by whom. (David, p. 562)

The textbook explanation for Britain's high unemployment in the 1920s is that the return to gold at $4.86 left the currency overvalued. Recent estimates suggest that an 11 percent devaluation would have eliminated roughly half the unemployment in 1925. This article questions the validity of that conclusion. It measures the power of exchange rate devaluations to decrease unemployment in the context of sectorally distinct labor markets. The results suggest that though a devaluation would have been helpful, eliminating half of 1925's unemployment would have required one much greater than 11 percent and would have caused significant price pressures.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries British overseas territories under control of the Colonial Office were required to place all business affairs which could not be handled within their own boundaries or those of an adjacent British area in the hands of an office in London known as the Crown Agents for the Colonies.

This paper investigates the evolution of gender equality in Sweden during a phase characterized by industrialization, urbanization, and demographic transition. To this end, we build a database with quantitative indicators to construct a spatial Historical Gender Gap Index. We find that after a period of stagnation, Sweden made significant progress in closing the gender gap from the 1940s onward to reach the high level of gender equality that it is now famous for. The empirical exploration of the relationship between gender equality and economic development reveals that regions displaying higher gender equality performed economically better than less gender-equal regions.

Secure property rights are usually considered to be essential for sustained economic development. In England, it is debated whether property rights have been secure since the medieval period or if they were only established after the Glorious Revolution. In this context, the paper examines the Court of Wards, which from 1540 to 1646 administered the Crown’s right to take custody of children and their lands when these were held by feudal-military tenures. The paper shows that wardship was a common occurrence, its exactions arbitrary but often heavy, and that it reduced the value of lands held by these tenures.

We present a new monthly index of the yields on junk bonds (high risk, high yield bonds) for the period 1910–1955. This index supplements the indexes of government bond yields, and Aaa and Baa corporate bond yields economic historians have relied on previously to describe the long-term risk spectrum. First, we describe our sources and methods. Then we show that our junk bond index contains information that is not in the closest alternative, and suggest some ways that the junk bond index could be used to enrich our understanding of the turbulent middle years of the twentieth century.

This is a colossal volume—it is at once a compendium, a survey, a critical evaluation, and a clear exposition of a burgeoning field. It is a study of macroeconomic policy-making in the presence of heterogeneity across actors. Allan Drazen argues that the sine qua non of politics is the conflict of interests; and the core of political economy is that policies are the outcome of the interaction of competing individuals and groups whose concern is their own welfare and not necessarily that of any other individuals or the society as a whole.